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Why some countries are richer than others and why income in some countries
grows more rapidly than in others are questions that have long been at the very center
of the economics and political science disciplines. Indeed, few questions receive the
attention as those related to economic prosperity as Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas’
often-quoted passage reflects:
Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead
the Indian economy to growth like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what,
exactly? If not, what is it about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so?
The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are
simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to
think about anything else (1988, p.5 emphasis original).
We have yet to uncover all the variables that affect economic performance of
course, but some factors are becomingly clear. In particular, we have learned that
gaining purchase on the development question requires a more thorough understand-
ing of the productivity of inputs in the production process. Many would agree
with Paul Krugman’s observation that “Productivity isn’t everything [for economic
growth], but in the long run it is almost everything” (1992, p.9). On this point, Hall
and Jones (1999) cite some revealing statistics:
In 1988, output per worker in the United States was more than 35 times
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higher than output per worker in Niger. In just over ten days, the average
worker in the United States produced as much as an average worker in
Niger produced in an entire year. . . Different capital intensities in the
two countries contributed a factor of 1.5 to the income differences, while
different levels of educational attainment contributed a factor of 3.1. The
remaining difference—a factor of 7.7—remains as the productivity residual
(p.83, emphasis added).
These statistics indicate that most of the differences in per worker output lies in a
“productivity residual” as opposed to the stocks of capital and labor. And, as other
scholars have argued and shown empirically, technological capacity comprises a large
share of the productivity residual (Easterly and Levine 2001; Mokyr 1990; Grossman
and Helpman 1997; Prescott 1988). Thus, technological progress is vitally important
for economic development.
But what underpins the observable variations in technological capacity and the
pace of technological progress? What explains variations in the pace of which eco-
nomic actors in different national economies innovate or adopt new productivity-
increasing technologies and processes? Growth economists have answered these ques-
tions with a focus on how various aspects of the economic environment, particularly
the level of competition, affect incentives for firms to engage in innovation and adopt
existing technologies (Aghion and Howitt 1993; Aghion 2004; Grossman and Helpman
1997 Knot and Posen 2003). A second literature studies the content and comprehen-
siveness of countries’ “national technology systems”, the set of existing public policies
(e.g., government R&D funding schemes, public education spending) and institutions
(e.g, the efficiency of physical and intellectual property rights and linkages between
the state and industry) that affect the likelihood that economic actors will engage in
innovation and technology adoption (Lall and Pietrobelli 2002).
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While economists have developed many important and useful insights, the political
underpinnings of technological progress are not particularly well-understood. Even
as the evidence becomes increasingly clear that technological progress is the “lever
of riches” (Mokyr 1990) and we gain insight into the kinds of public policies that
fuel economic innovation and imitation, we know little about the conditions in which
incumbent politicians, who after all have the means, motive, and opportunity to
manipulate the economy, will deploy these policies. Therefore, while understanding
how policies can catalyze technological progress by, say, reducing the costs and risks
of private research activities and minimizing the salience of market failures is a useful
addition to our knowledge, we need to push further if we are to understand if some
government will actually deploy the kinds of policies in question. Political scientists
have not paid much attention to the topic of technological progress however and as
a result, we know little about its political determinants. This dissertation seeks to
provide a clearer understanding of the issue by investigating the conditions in which
politicians are likely to make a concerted effort to promote technological progress.
1.0.1 A role for politics?
How might politics matter? Many will argue that the best thing a government can
do to promote technological development is to stay out of the economy altogether
and allow markets to operate freely. A common argument is that “state failure” is
the largest hindrance to technological development and economic growth generally
speaking. Many political economists have taken this argument to heart and in their
studies of technological development they study constraints on government predation
and institutions that produce credible (read: stable) economic environments. The
crux of credibility models is that states are notoriously predatory and they seek rents
whenever possible. Thus, if such actions are utility-increasing, agents of the state
will have no qualms about capturing profits produced by investments in technological
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development or reneging on policy promises. However, an institutional environment
that constrains the government’s “grabbing hand” and provides incentives for leaders
to keep their policy commitments will increase the returns to economic investments,
including those into innovation and technology adoption.
Rivera-Batiz (2002) is a good example of the credible constraints argument. He
models an economy in which profits from new technologies are subject to a tax,
collected by state bureaucrats, who also have an opportunity to demand bribes on
top of the official license.The value in creating new technologies or adopting existing
ones decreases with the size of the bribe such that in the extreme case where offi-
cials capture all the profits from a successful innovation or adoption, the expected
value of research is zero and technological development stalls. The author contends
however, that bureaucrats’ have some known probability of being punished for their
rent-seeking behavior that is a function of existing rules and institutions.1 In en-
vironments with institutions that constrain profit-capturing behavior, bureaucrats’
incentives to seek bribes diminish. Hence, countries with institutions and rules that
provide strong restraints on the state’s predatory instincts—that is, states with “good
governance”, to use the author’s somewhat problematic terminology—will also have
firms that can expect to reap the financial rewards of technological development.2
McMillian and Masters (2003) develop another credibility model of technological
progress. In their model, technological development requires that economic actors
allocate funds to innovation or technology adoption over a series of years; one-off
public investments and policy commitments will not produce the gains in productiv-
ity for which they are intended. Accordingly, a serious hindrance to technological
development is a time inconsistency problem in which politicians find it difficult to
1The size of the bribe itself is also important in this regard.
2For similar arguments see (Hall and Jones 1999 and Olson, Sarna, and Swamy 2000).
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credibly commit to maintaining economic conditions that rewards economic actors’
investments in technology development for a sufficiently long period of time. Where
incumbents are not credible, say because of political instability or a lack of incentives
to commit to advertised policy promises and platforms, firms have few incentives to
invest in technological development projects. McMillan and Masters conclude that
the inability to commit to policies over a number of years is one reason why many
African countries, which often have unstable and weakly-institutionalized political
regimes, have too little technological development. Leaders in African countries can-
not credibly commit to the continued deployment of policies that catalyze technolog-
ical progress and the national economy reflects this commitment problem.
Both Rivera-Batiz and MacMillan and Masters construct models in which the key
political dimension is the degree of government credibility. The roots of models like
these lie in neoclassical economics where it is assumed that economic behavior of all
sorts, including investments in technological development, respond frictionlessly to
relative prices. If only politicians can credibly commit to refrain from predation and
commit to sustaining technology-oriented policies over time, technological progress
will surely follow. Even as there is much support for arguments like those discussed
above, I take a different approach, one that gives more attention to the likelihood that
political leaders will deploy certain policies thought to catalyze technological progress
such as education spending and subsidies and tax credits for firm level research and
design spending. I depart from the credibility model, even as it has much support,
because limiting the role of politics to credibility has the important weakness of
underestimating the seriousness of several market failures that requires public policy
to resolve. Lall and Pietrobelli, for example, write:
It cannot be assumed that over time enterprises will move automatically
and efficiently into more difficult technologies (or taking on more complex
tasks) in response to changing prices and factor endowments. Techno-
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logical upgrading and deepening requires enterprises invest in more ad-
vanced—and so costly uncertain and prolonged—learning processes. In
the presence of externalities and deficient factor markets, such investment
will be deficient in free markets. Policy interventions are then needed
to overcome market failures—to tackle learning costs, promote externali-
ties and linkages, coordinate factor market improvements with needs, and
develop institutions. In the final analysis, therefore, national technology
systems depend on the effectiveness of industrial policy (2002, p. 10; em-
phasis added).
To see their point, consider one especially important market failure: the supply of
human capital. Undoubtedly, technological development progress requires a critical
mass of labor with sufficiently high human capital, which increases the success rate
of research and imitative endeavors (Mani 2002; Papageorgiou 2002; 2003; Mayer
2001; Arrow 1962; Lucas 1993). That said, strong theoretical arguments exist that
indicate that the supply of human capital will be far below that which is optimal
absent productive public policy. Crucially, political credibility alone will not alter
this conclusion.
Consider a polity with one industry and two competing firms and where educating
the work force is left entirely to the firms. In this economy, inevitably some portion of
the education a worker receives is general knowledge that is applicable in either firm.
In this environment, an appropriability problem produces a systematic undersupply
of education investments. The problem is that firms cannot ensure that they will
recoup the returns to their education investment. Competing firms have an incentive
to wait until the other firm educates its workers and then “poach” those workers,
thereby gaining all the economic benefits of human capital without having to invest
the financial resources associated with supplying education. Absent some factor that
would prohibit workers from moving to another firm, neither has a strong incentive
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to invest in education; free-riding is the dominant strategy.
Note that political credibility does not resolve this dilemma. Adhering to the rule
of law, reigning in predation, and committing to sustain a given policy over time
may make research spending more profitable, but these acts do not ensure that firms
will recoup their education investments should they make them. Credibility cannot
remedy the fact that poaching is the dominant strategy. What would increase the
supply of human capital in this environment is the presence of some third party that
supplies education, thereby reducing the firm-level costs of education. To understand
the supply of education spending, we need a clearer understanding of the role of the
state beyond credible constraints and commitments.
Nor is a focus on political credibility sufficient to help us understand how firms
cope with the considerable economic costs and risks associated with innovation and
technology adoption. As Metcalf (1978) writes, inherent to the processes of techno-
logical development is the nontrivial probability that “the unexpected might occur,
relative prices might change, technical barriers may prove greater than anticipated
and competitors may leapfrog a firm’s line of development with a superior technology”
(56). In fact, Metcalf’s study reveals that 60% of all R&D projects fail in the sense
that they do not produce a viable (i.e., productivity-increasing) technology. Rostow
(1975) concurs writing, “[A]n act of innovation by an entrepreneur, public or private,
involves risk. He must decide to invest his own or borrowed capital in a new form
of production or service. He may or may not receive the higher profit for which he
hopes” (134).3
3Game theoretic and simulation-based approaches to the process of technological development
explicitly incorporate such uncertainty into their models. Aghion and Howitt (1993), for example,
model the arrival of new ideas as an exogenously specified Poisson process in an attempt to capture
the stochastic nature of idea creation. Several scholars have also conceptualized innovation as a
process akin to biological evolution and, again, at the center of the process is uncertainty as it is
never clear which “adaptations” will succeed and which will fail (Mokyr 1990; Nelson and Winter
1982).
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That “[t]here is nothing preordained about innovation. . . there are 100 ways that
this process could go wrong” (Mokyr, quoted in Mandel 2004 p.96), means that
economic actors that consider investing in technological development take on consid-
erable risks. Absent some sort of risk-sharing agreement with owners of capital, firms
will invest in levels that are below optimal. While it need not be the case that firms
turn to the state for capital—firms can, of course, turn to financial markets—there
are sound reasons to believe that the state can be an important source of risk shar-
ing. In many less developed and transitioning countries for example, domestic capital
markets are not suitably developed to finance efforts at technological development
and so the state may well be the best source for risk sharing (Gerschenkron 1967).
Even when financial markets are developed however, public policies that offset these
costs and risks are still important tools for technological development. Economists
have shown that government-issued R&D tax credits, and subsidy schemes, act as
complements to private R&D spending (Hall and van Reenen 2000). In a sample of
17 OECD countries for example, Guellec and von Pottelsberghe (2003) for example,
find that “among the major instruments of government policy, both fiscal incentives
and direct funding stimulate business-funded R&D” (237).
In summary, a role for politics exists beyond the degree of political credibility;
public policy also matters. As the mantra of William Easterly’s book, The Elusive
Quest for Growth goes, “people respond to incentives” (2001). This is undoubtedly
true and for the economic actors on whom technological progress relies, some of the
most important incentives stem from the policies deployed by governments.
Accordingly, I investigate the conditions in which politicians are likely to promote
technological progress as a source of economic growth. An important point to rec-
ognize, however, is that a policy portfolio designed to stimulate innovation and tech-
nology adoption is only one way an incumbent can stimulate growth. Governments
can instead, or in some combination, use policies that encourage the accumulation of
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capital and labor to generate growth (Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti 2004; Pinto
and Timmons 2005; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). To see the
distinction, recall the Cobb-Douglas production function
Y = A(KαL(1−α)), (1.1)
where Y represents output for country i at time t (subscripts removed), K represents
the stock of capital, L, the stock of labor, 0 < a < 1, and A represents the level
of technological knowledge. Now, arranging Equation 1.1 in terms of growth rates













There is reason to believe that the accumulation mechanisms (increasing K and/or
L) and the technology mechanism (increasing A) are manipulable by distinct govern-
ment policy portfolios. Examples of policies associated with increasing A might be
government fiscal incentives that encourage firm-level R&D spending to innovate and
imitate frontier technologies and post-primary education spending to develop a cohort
of engineers, scientists and business managers that are vital for the success of such re-
search programs. Included in the accumulation strategy (increasing K and/or L) are
policy options such as compulsory savings programs and low tax regimes to mobilize
savings and wage repression as well as primary education spending.4 The presence of
distinct mechanisms means that an incumbent facing an obligation to pursue growth
can fulfill that obligation by initiating policies that encourage the accumulation cap-
ital and labor, that promote technological progress, or some combination of these




Inasmuch as politicians can manipulate these distinct growth mechanisms through
the policies they initiate, the pursuit of growth via technological progress is best con-
ceptualized as an explicitly political choice incumbents make in their effort to retain
power. Accordingly, my dissertation studies what choices incumbents make regarding
how to encourage growth. What is the mix of accumulation and technology policies
that leaders deploy? What is the premium that government place on technological
progress? These are the central questions of the dissertation. In focusing on these
questions, I take an important departure from the existing literature on the politics
of growth, much of which asks whether incumbents will pursue growth. This is cer-
tainly an important issue, but nested within it is another question: what strategies
of pursuing growth are the most politically profitable? Models investigating whether
incumbents will pursue growth leave open this important dimension and, as I discuss
later in this chapter, such an omission is quite important for our understanding of
development.
This introductory chapter charts the course for the rest of this dissertation. It be-
gins with a discussion of the importance of technological progress for economic devel-
opment, drawing from Schumpeter and Robert Solow and other growth economists,
Subsequently, I discuss the puzzle observation that motivates the research. From
there, I briefly outline the theoretical framework. I conclude with an outline of the
dissertation’s chapters.
1.1 Technological Progress and Economic Development
The question that begs asking is what precisely is the significance of understanding
the mechanisms that drive a national economy’s growth experience? If indeed both
accumulation and technological progress can generate increases in income as Equa-
tions 1.1 and 1.2 show, what is the value-added of distinguishing between them? A
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useful place to start a response to this question is with the growth experience of a
handful of East Asian economies.
As has been recounted numerous times, the latter half of the twentieth century
witnessed the extraordinarily rapid development of several East Asian countries. The
development experience there inspired scholars to investigate what fueled such rapid
improvements in economic conditions. Paul Krugman (1994) set in motion an im-
portant debate, arguing that the development path of those countries was not nearly
as “miraculous” as others had deemed it, but rather was due to a process of Soviet-
style investment in physical capital and efforts to mobilize the labor force (1994).
As in the Soviet-Union, massive state-led investment and “forced savings” programs
spurred accumulation in physical capital, while those same governments went to great
lengths to mobilize labor through a variety of different policy instruments, including
wage suppression and primary education spending. It is not surprising then, that
rapid economic growth followed.
Krugman’s analysis continues, however, with the dispiriting proposition that be-
cause those countries failed to experience substantial gains in factor productivity as a
function of technological development, their growth trajectory is neither miraculous
nor sustainable. Accumulation-driven growth, he argues, suffers from diminishing
returns such that the marginal effect of accumulation ultimately falls to zero and
increases in income stop. Krugman’s conclusions regarding the sources of East Asian
growth are disputable (Chen 1997), but his logic regarding the general implications an
absence of productivity growth has for the prospects of sustained economic growth
receives strong support. Krugman reaches his grim conclusions with a reliance on
Solow’s papers of the mid 1950’s (1956; 1957), which have since become the corner-
stone of present understanding of the growth process. One takeaway conclusion from
these papers is that absent technological progress, countries simply cannot sustain
per capita income growth indefinitely. The inherent drawback of accumulation-driven
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growth is that diminishing returns ensures that growth is destined to stall and the
economy tends toward a “steady state.” Aghion (2004) summarizes the conclusion
well and is worth quoting at length here. He writes:
In the absence of. . . technical progress. . . an economy cannot
grow faster at a positive rate. Indeed, because of diminishing returns to
capital, [national income] does not grow as fast as the capital stock, which
in turn means that savings cannot grow as fast as [the rate of capital’s]
depreciation. Eventually, depreciation catches up with savings and at that
point the capital stock stops rising and the economy stops growing (2-3).
Stiroh (2002) states the implications of this line of thought as follows. “The striking
implication of the neoclassical model is that, in the long run, per capita output and
productivity growth are driven entirely by growth in exogenous technical progress
and they are independent of other structural parameters like the savings rate” (39).
As Romer (1992) shows, this dilemma is not resolved even after modeling the role
of human capital. He writes, “But to explain productivity growth through these
increases in human and physical capital begs the question of where the increased
value of the capital originates. The increased value is in new ideas” (71, emphasis
added). In short, the implication of “Solow’s Surprise” as Easterly (2001) calls this
line of argument, is that long-term, continuous per capita income growth cannot arise
from mobilizing the inputs to production. Rather, something else is needednamely
technological progress, Romer’s “new ideas”, which can increase the productivity of
these inputs and as far as we can tell, does not experience diminishing returns.
These arguments are reminiscent of Schumpeter’s seminal works on economic de-
velopment (1934). For Schumpeter, the significance of technological progress is hard
to understate; its importance lies in its ability to break the “circular flow” of economic
activity, a theoretical equilibrium during which economic development is wholly ab-
sent and national economies have little opportunity to move beyond the status quo
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level of economic prosperity. Indeed, for Schumpeter, the concept of economic devel-
opment itself is linked inseparably to the process of innovation. In his formulation,
achieving development requires the efforts of profit-seeking entrepreneurs who have
conceived new products, processes and business models, all of which can increase
the productivity of factor inputs. These innovations, which are likely to occur as a
function of the “creative destruction” dynamic, spur forward economic development.
Absent these innovative and imitating entrepreneurs, technological progress stalls and
so too does economic development.
Mokyr (1990) expands on the importance of technological progress, so-called the
“lever of riches” because it provides a ‘free lunch’, “an increase in output that is
not commensurate with the increase in effort and cost necessary to bring it about”
(3). A basic, albeit incomplete definition of economic development is the process of
expanding the production capacity of an economy. Development is the process by
which an economy is able to produce (1) an increasing amount of products by, say,
increasing the productivity of capital and labor, (2) an increasing array of available
products, such as moving from an agricultural economy to an industrial one, and
then broadening the scope of the industrial sector and, (3) an increase in the quality
of existing products (Grossman and Helpman 1997). Mokyr details, technological
progress is an essential part of all these processes. It is exactly that process in
which actors create altogether new products, new production techniques, and improve
product quality. By contrast, mobilizing physical capital and labor can move an
economy nearer the existing technological frontier, but it cannot extend the frontier
itself, which means that whatever development does occur ultimately must end.
In summary, studying economic development requires that we take serious the role
of time. As Robert Bates writes, “Development . . . highlights the temporal, rather
than the spatial, element of human societies. The study of development must therefore
take into account the passage of time” (quoted in Nooruddin 2003 p.15). Significantly,
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it is precisely the temporal dimension that gives salience to the distinction between
accumulation- and technology-driven growth. How a country experiences growth has
implications for sustained improvements in welfare. Technological progress provides
an escape from diminishing returns and therefore allows the possibility of sustained
increases in per capita income over time. As North puts it, “the stock of knowledge
and the stock of technology set upper bounds to human well being” ( 1981, p.17).
None of this is to say that accumulation is unimportant. On the contrary, accumulat-
ing capital is a critical aspect of the process, as scholars have shown (Gerschenkron
1967; Mankiw et. al., 1992; DeLong and Summers 1991, Krugman 1994; Collins and
Bosworth 1996; Bosworth and Collins 2003). The central conclusion however, is that
growth only through accumulation is destined to stall and that long term growth re-
quires the productivity growth that emerges from technological progress. According
to Romer:
[I]deas are extremely important economic goods, far more important than
the objects emphasized in most economic models. In a world with phys-
ical limits, it is discoveries of big ideas (for example, how to make high-
temperature superconductors), together with the discovery of millions of
little ideas (better ways to sew a shirt), that make persistent economic
growth possible (1992; 64).
1.1.1 Technological development in developing countries
Given this focus on sustaining growth over time, one might reach the conclusion
that technological progress is a concern only for those countries that have already
achieved high levels of wealth. After all, wealthy countries are capital abundant
and have high levels of investment as a percent of their GDP and so increasing the
productivity of investment is of the highest priority. The inverse of this statement
is that low-income countries have little need for technological progress and so the
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issues in question in this dissertation are moot for these countries. While it may
be the case that countries at earliest stages of development can gain much from
resource accumulation and mobilization, Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilbotti (2004) show
that as they reach middling levels of wealth, continued growth and gains in economic
competitiveness demand improvements in technologies that increase the productivity
of capital and labor and also broaden the array of goods produced in the economy
and their quality. Countries unable to make such a transition fall into development
traps in which they fail to sustain growth and the development progress stagnates at
some middling level of prosperity. Technological progress enables sustained growth,
however.
Governments in less developed countries understand these points. Consider the
following passage from the Kenyan government regarding its plan to achieve substan-
tial development by the year 2020, thereby entering the group of newly-industrialized
countries (NICs).
The vision to transform Kenya into a NIC by the year 2020 . . . calls for
a critical re-examination of the country’s [research and design (R&D)]
policies and strategies . . . Kenya’s industrial enterprises are characterised
by obsolete technologies and inefficient machinery, often over 20 years old
. . . Moreover, domestic engineers have had little success in adapting im-
ported technologies to the domestic environment. There is little evidence
of technology deepening or adapting foreign technologies to produce im-
proved or new products. Kenya today lacks well-developed capacities to
provide advice and information to technology users, has inadequate ca-
pacity to screen foreign technologies and is unable to formulate adequate
technology-related policies or plans. There will be need for significantly
increased skills at the enterprise level and in government institutions to
address these shortcomings (Republic of Kenya 1997; quoted in Lall and
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Pietrobelli 2002, p. 54- 55).
The Kenyan economy’s distance from the technological frontier serves as a serious
hindrance to its prospects of achieving greater economic prosperity. An economy char-
acterized by obsolete and inefficient technologies and lacking incentives for economic
actors to upgrade technologies will find it increasingly difficult to stay competitive
relative to other national economies. Accumulating more capital may partly mitigate
this concern, but its effect will be minimal if the accumulated capital is as obsolete
and inefficient as the existing stock. Absent a concerted effort to upgrade production
technologies, either through economic innovation, or, as is more likely in a develop-
ing economy like Kenya’s, the adoption of frontier technologies and processes, this
economy has little chance of experiencing further gains in prosperity.
This brings us to another important issue: whether a study of technological
progress and development should address both outright innovation and the imita-
tion or adoption of frontier technologies. A common notion is that the process of
adopting such frontier technologies is relatively easy by comparison and as such, one
should not combine innovation and imitation in the same theoretical and empirical
analyses. Some have taken this position based on Veblen’s (1915) scholarship on
“catching-up” and the Gerschenkronian proposition that “Industrialization always
seemed the more promising the greater the backlog of technological innovation which
the backward country could take over from the more advanced country” (1952; p.8).
Gerschenkron’s point in this statement is not that technology adoption is itself an
easy task, but rather that the prospects of development are considerable if follower
countries can adopt those existing technologies. A more accurate reading of the Ger-
schenkronian view of “backwardness” is that taking advantage of lagging behind is
arduous and while frontier technologies present opportunities for lagging countries,
absorbing them into one’s own economy requires a concerted effort on behalf of both
economic and political actors. Indeed, often technology adoption demands the devel-
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opment of “institutional instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in
the established industrial country” (Gerschenkron, quoted in Fagerberg and Godinho,
2003). Moreover, scholars have documented that adopting frontier technologies in
such a way to increase productivity in the lagging country is associated with many of
the same costs and risks as outright innovation. According to Grossman and Helpman
(1997), “the process of assimilating existing technologies in the less developed coun-
tries is not unlike that of creating entirely new technologies in the developed world.
In each case, learning requires an allocation of resources and investments”(12). Pack
and Westphal similarly write:
Important elements of the technology appropriate to particular circum-
stances can only be acquired through effort to apply existing knowledge
to those circumstances. Effort is required in using technological infor-
mation and accumulating technological knowledge to evaluate and choose
technology; to acquire and operate processes and produce products, to
manage changes in products, processes, procedures, and organizational
arrangements and to create new technology. This effort takes the form of
investments in technological capability . . . (p.105; emphasis added).
The investments in technology adoption and diffusion are not unlike those neces-
sary for outright innovation. Both are costly in financial terms and expose the firm to
risks. Just as no guarantees exist that investments in innovation will produce a viable
technology, no assurances exists that a follower firm will successfully and efficiently
adopt and adapt existing technologies in a way that increases their own productiv-
ity and competitiveness. In short, technological progress matters in less developed
countries too.
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1.1.2 Empirics on Technological Development
Econometric models support and reinforce the importance of technological progress
for development, allowing Schmookler to write in 1966 that “the creation and diffu-
sion of technological knowledge is at the heart of modern economic growth is now
widely accepted” (1966; p.vii). Much of our empirical results come from “growth
accounting” models that estimate the importance of capital, labor, and a residual
for levels of output and the pace of output growth. The received wisdom from these
models is that the residual–the proxy of technological progress, (variously called the
“Solow residual” or total factor productivity (TFP))–plays a significant role in ex-
plaining economic output and its rate of growth.5 Easterly and Levine (2001) argue
for example that the residual accounts for some 60 percent of output. Solow’s own
estimate is approximately 88 percent (1957). Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997)
conclude that TFP accounts for 90 percent of the cross-national variation in output
during 1960-1985.6 Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between output growth and
growth in TFP using Klenow and Rodriquez-Clare’s data. The figure plots the av-
erage rate of output growth between the years 1960 and 1985 and the average rate
of total factor productivity growth for a number of developing and OECD countries.
The relationship is strong and positive suggesting that higher rates of TFP growth
are correlated highly with faster rates of economic expansion.7
By implication, the data should suggest that accumulation plays a smaller role
5Griliches (2000) comments that the Solow residual is a bit of a misnomer as Solow was not the
first scholar to propose this indicator as a measure of technological capacity and progress.
6See Hall and Jones (1998) and Prescott (1998) for similar conclusions. See Mankiw, Romer and
Weill (1993) however for a dissenting opinion on this topic. Note that, while the critics find that
TFP accounts for a smaller share of output and output growth in comparison to the cited works,
TFP’s share is nonetheless sill sizable.
7The relationship was also plotted (not shown) for samples of OECD and developing countries
separately, and the relationship did not change. Similar results were obtained using data from Hall
and Jones (1998).
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Figure 1.1: Growth in total factor productivity and output per worker growth
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in explaining output growth. We see evidence of this weaker relationship in Figure
1.2, which plots total output growth by growth in the per worker capital stock. The
effect of capital on output growth is positive as expected, but the relationship is
considerably weaker implying that something else seems to drive the cross-national
variation in output growth. This “something else” seems to be TFP.
Not surprisingly, the data also reveal very large variations in both the levels of
current technological development and the pace at which those levels change over
time. Unfortunately a single unassailable measure of technological development does
not exist but we can gain a sense of the variations by relying on a series of indi-
cators. Consider first, human capital formation, measured according to the percent
of the population with some secondary education. There is little doubt that edu-
cation is essential for technological progress. It increases the success rate of R&D
(Arrow 1962; Lucas 1993) and, according to Papageorgiou (2002), the prospects of
engaging in successful technology adoption depend on the level of human capital in
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Figure 1.2: Growth in capital per worker and output per worker growth
R−squared = 0.001
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a country. Furthermore, Papageorgiou (2003) finds that human capital at the level
of post-primary education is a better predictor of the level and pace of technological
development than human capital at the level of primary education.
We can get a sense of the likely variation in technological capacity and prospects
for technological development, then, from education statistics. Figures 1.3 and 1.4
show data on the percent of a given country’s total population above 25 years of
age that have some secondary education for a host of countries, with data averaged
between the years 1960-1999.8 The graphs are ordered by region for presentational
purposes only. The cross-national variations in the figures are stark. In Latin America
and the Caribbean (Figure 1.3), the variations ranges from about 5% of the adult
population with some secondary education in Guatemala and Honduras to over 25%
for Chile and even higher in Barbados. Similar variation exists in sub-Saharan Africa
8The data come from Barro-Lee 2000.
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(Figure 1.4).9
Figure 1.3: Secondary school attainment: Latin America and the Caribbean
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Another useful indicator is Archibugi and Coco’s (2003) Technology Capabilities
Index. The index is composed of three dimensions that the authors contend indicate
a country’s level technological development and its capacity to experience further
technological progress. The three dimensions are (1) country i ’s capacity and proven
ability to create new technologies; (2) the quality of country i ’s technological in-
frastructure; and (3) its stock of human capital. The authors collect data on eight
variables, each of which fit into one of the three dimensions. The variables are as fol-
lows (text in parentheses indicates the dimension in which the variable is included):
patents technology (technology creation), scientific articles (technology creation), in-
ternet penetration (infrastructure), telephone penetration (infrastructure), electricity
consumption (infrastructure), tertiary science and engineering enrollment (human
9Graphs for the other regions in the world show the same trends. They are not presented here
to preserve space. Graphs for the excluded regions are available from the author upon request.
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Figure 1.4: Secondary school attainment: Sub-Sahara Africa
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capita), mean years of schooling (human capital), literacy rate (human capital).10
For each of the eight variables, country i ’s score is calculated as (Xi/Xmax), where
X is the variable in question and max represents the best score in the population
of cases. For example, Finland has the highest percent of total university students
enrolled in science and engineering related subjects at 32.6%. As such, Finland’s
score on that particular variable is 1.000, while Lebanon, with about 11% of all
university students in science and engineering courses receives a score of 0.338. Thus,
each country is coded according to how near it is to the technological “frontier”.
The authors then calculate scores for each dimension by averaging the scores of the
10Variable definitions: Patents: invention patents registered at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office normalized by the country’s population. Patents taken out in the United States by the
inventor’s country of residence were considered; Scientific articles: Number of articles published
in any of 8,000 journals included in the Scientific Citation Index, normalized by the country’s
population; Internet penetration: Number of internet users normalized by population; Telephone
penetration: Number of telephone users normalized by population; Electricity consumption: Electric
power consumption(kilowatt per hour per capita); Tertiary Education: Percent of total university
students enrolled in science and engineering related subjects Mean years of schooling: the average
number of years of school completed in the population over 14; Literacy rate: the percentage of
people over 14 who can, with understanding read and write short,m simple statements about their
everyday life.
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variables included in each dimension. Finally, the authors create the technological





where Ii represents the three dimension scores and λi the constants 1/3. Cross-
national variations in the next are stark as we see in Figures 1.5 and 1.6.11
Figure 1.5: Technological Capabilities Index: Latin America and the Caribbean
 
 



























11Graphs for the other regions in the world show the same trends. They are not presented here
to preserve space. Graphs of the excluded regions are available from the author upon request.
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Figure 1.6: Technological Capabilities Index: Sub-Saharan Africa
 
 
















































When will incumbents deploy technology-oriented economic policies is not clear. In
fact, the time horizons leaders have seem wholly incompatible with the time horizons
they would need to place some nontrivial value on technology policies. Politicians
are notoriously shortsighted. In democracies, institutionalized election periods oblige
office-seeking politicians to set policy with an eye toward the most immediate election
period. In non-democracies, the absence of any institutionalized political selection
mechanism also shortens horizons since in such conditions political evaluation is a
continuous ongoing process and political survival is an ever-present concern (Olson
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1993; 2000).12 Short horizons are incompatible with incentives to value technology-
oriented policies precisely because the economic policies in question have returns that
are delayed substantially from the point of policy initiation, but still require large
upfront financial costs. A leader considering a package of public policies designed at
increasing the stock of human capital can expect a substantial lag between the date
of policy initiation and the timing of the positive economic returns produced by those
policies to exist. Producing a cohort of workers with sufficiently high human capital
quite literally takes years. Additionally, a lag exists between developing that cohort
and the point at which the returns of their innovative and technology adoption efforts
arrive. Similarly, a leader that opts to subsidize or grant tax breaks for private R&D
will not observe immediate economic returns. A substantial time is required for R&D
projects to result in gains in productivity. Regardless of how politicians stimulate
technological development, the positive and observable growth effects of their poli-
cies are deferred well into the future. Such delays are far too long to be politically
profitable. Additionally, the accumulation mechanism have more immediate growth
effects and delayed costs. Given this, it seems that leaders will eschew technology
policies.
Why then, do politicians sometimes initiate policies designed to catalyze tech-
nological development? Consider a portfolio of policies initiated in South Africa in
the late 1990s.13 In 1993, the South African government commissioned a study of
its technological infrastructure and prospects for future and sustained technological
development. Among the conclusions were that South Africa required a substantial
restructuring of its Science and Technology Ministry to allow for a more focused and
12When nondemocratic leaders do have long time horizons, often it is due to a complete absence of
political contestation, which undermines any incentives legislators may have to care about positive
economic performance at all (Lake and Baum 2001).
13The following discussion draws heavily from Mani (2002).
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coherent approach to technology development and that the country needed to re-
energize public R&D spending, which had begun to stall over the years. Finally, the
report found that the country’s stock of human capital was dire, due in large part to
decades of apartheid rule.
In response, the South African government approved a set of policies intended to
remedy these concerns. There were a variety of dimensions to the government’s new
technology direction but some particularly notable aspects of the new policy portfolio
were the following:
The Innovation Trust A government-issued set of grants in which funds are dis-
tributed for use in large-scale projects that have a significant R&D component
and that generate new knowledge of products. Examples of funded projects
included grants to the biotechnology and telecommunications industries and
grants to value-added in general manufacturing.
The Technology and Human Resource for Industry Programme A govern-
ment grant program targeted at increasing “the number and quality of peo-
ple with appropriate skills in the development and management of technology
for industry” (38). The program does so by generating interactions between
researchers in higher education, with firm managers. The program also gives
incentives for high-skilled laborers to move to industries with the greatest po-
tential for substantial technology development.
The Support Programme for Industrial Innovation A program oriented toward
helping firms develop new technologies. Accepted applicants are awarded funds
from the government to use in conducting feasibility studies for the develop-
ment of new technologies. The program can also be used to fund feasibility
studies for technology adoption. Through this program, firms could also receive
government grants matching up to 50% of firm investments allocated toward
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developing new technologies.
Why did South Africa deploy these policies. Why too, did leaders in the United
States initiate the “Protecting America’s Competitive Edge Through Education and
Research” (PACE) Act, which legislates increases in spending on science and math-
ematics teachers at all grade levels and provides numerous incentives to encourage
students to study these fields in high school and college? The act also calls for “federal
research agencies to allow eight percent of [their] R&D budgets to be devoted to high-
risk, high payoff research.” The bill would also double “the current R&D tax credit
(20% to 40%) and expands the credit to allow 100% of the cost of all research con-
ducted by consortium, small businesses, federal laboratories and universities (current
law limits the 100% cost inclusion to energy research). The entire R&D tax credit
would also be made permanent” (Domenici, Bingaman, Alexander, and Mikulski 2006
p.1).
If leaders are shortsighted and if the policies in question are associated with re-
turns that are delayed substantially, under what conditions are governments likely to
place a nontrivial premium on policies designed to stimulate innovation and technol-
ogy adoption? There is little research in comparative political economy that directly
addresses these issues, but some existing arguments regarding the politics of economic
growth might prove useful first approximations. One explanation turns our attention
toward the state bureaucracy and the degree to which bureaucrats can be concep-
tualized as autonomous and embedded agents of the state (Evans 1992, 1995). The
“embedded autonomy” argument recognizes that economic policymaking requires leg-
islators engage in risky endeavors and initiate policies that may not have immediate
results. Elected officials may not have the political flexibility or capacity to priori-
tize these kinds of policies given societal pressures and veto players, but autonomous
bureaucrats have more freedom from popular accountability and those segments of
society able to overcome collective action dilemmas to demand policies in their favor.
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If bureaucrats have such autonomy, they may be able to make the tough choices and
take the risks necessary to spur development forward. The argument continues how-
ever, proposing that officials need to embed themselves in the web of industry and
business associations to gain the information about the various needs, capacities, and
opportunities that exist in various business sectors to get a sense of how they can
calibrate policies best.
There are some important deficiencies with the embedded autonomy rationale,
however. Addressing the state’s capacity to make politically-difficult choices is a
useful aspect of the model, but the fact that the embedded-autonomy thesis does
not address political preferences and incentives is a critical weakness. While it is
possible that autonomous and embedded bureaucrats will use their flexibility and
special knowledge to establish an environment that is good for economic performance,
an equally plausible possibility is that embedded autonomy is a recipe for bureaucratic
corruption and collusion between state officials and owners of capital. Where political
accountability is weak and state officials have strong linkages with business groups
that give them special knowledge of economic opportunities, what prohibits these
officials from engaging in large scale rent-seeking and corruption rather than setting
policies that encourage long-term economic growth? Indeed, if these officials seek
to increase their own disposable income, it seems reasonable that lax accountability
and specialized knowledge provide a greater incentive for rent-seeking than it does
for setting “good” economic policy. This possibility is precisely what Rivera-Batiz’s
model identified as a hindrance to development. In short, a serious principal-agent
problem exists in the embedded autonomy thesis that is not addressed. There can be
little doubt that a quality bureaucracy matters, but without some framework with
which we can understand why autonomy is good for growth rather than good for
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corruption, the autonomy thesis is left underdeveloped in an important way.14
Other scholars have turned their attention to the role of regime type to understand
the political economy of technological progress and development. Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub and Limongi (2000) for example, uncover the observation that “the factors
that differentiate wealthy dictatorships from wealthy democracies are the patterns,
not averages [of growth]” (167). In particular, they find that among a sample of
“wealthy countries” dictatorships tend to achieve growth primarily through mobilizing
labor and accumulating capital. Only a very small portion of growth in these regimes
stems from gains in productivity and technological development. By contrast, their
democratic counterparts tend to benefit more from technological progress and the
productivity gains it brings and they rely less on mobilizing labor and physical capital.
Evidence of this is that the dictatorships in the sample have labor force growth that
is faster than in democracies (on average of 2.03% compared with 1.32%) but the
productivity of that labor in dictatorships is much lower. Democracies, it seems,
offer opportunities and access to better, more efficacious education and production
technologies to workers.
Pinto and Timmons (2005) push this line of argument further, contending that
regime type influences the degree to which an economy will experience technological
progress by way of the pressures regarding taxation and redistribution that elected
officials experience. The electoral connection provides incentives for incumbents to
redistribute wealth in way consistent with Meltzer and Richard (1981). Because
the median voter’s income is less than the average income in society, that citizen
demands redistribution and elected officials respond accordingly. The redistribution
obligation slows investment due to higher taxes on capital, but at the same time
14Nor is it clear under what conditions we should expect to observe sufficiently embedded or
autonomous bureaucracies. The experiences from which these kinds of organizations emerged in
countries like Japan are unlikely to be repeated and it is not clear that these experiences are gener-
alizable.
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redistribution in the form of education spending helps to forge human capital, which
in turn increases the amount of innovation in the economy and the ease with which
frontier technologies are adopted and applied efficaciously in follower economies. The
redistribution obligation is absent in many dictatorships with the consequence that
taxes on capital are less burdensome. While this encourages savings and investment,
the absence of any redistribution obligation corresponds with lower levels of education
spending, lower levels of human capital in the country, and hence less innovation and
technology adoption.
One concern with the line of argument is the proposition that redistribution takes
the form of spending on education. Even given the reasonable proposition that demo-
cratic rule supplies incentives for politicians to redistribute wealth, it is not evident
why education spending would be the redistributive policy of choice. After all, spend-
ing on education does not actually redistribute wealth in the present period or even
the immediate future. Other redistributive options exist for governments and why a
government would opt to redistribute wealth through education spending as opposed
to social insurance (for one example) is not clear from their model.
1.3 Summary of Theory
The starting point for the theory is the recognition that attributes of the national
economy are the aggregated results of the behavior of firms and individuals. This
is perhaps an obvious point, but it is worth noting because the theoretical frame-
work relies on arguments about the relationship between government policies and the
behavior of these firms. Firms are profit-maximizing actors and to increase compet-
itiveness and profit margins versus other firms in an industry, firm managers make
choices over how to allocate scarce resources. One option is to invest in research
projects that raise competitiveness through technological developments. Another op-
tion is to allocate resources toward increasing the stock of labor or the per worker
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capital stock.
But what shapes the firm manager’s precise allocation decision? Relative prices
certainly matter, but the prices themselves are endogenous to a host of policies and
programs implemented by the incumbent government. Incumbents have a number
of policy instruments at their disposal to manipulate the economy and they have
every incentive to employ those instruments to that end. They can, for example,
shape the content of property rights and the extent to which those rights are enforced
(North 1981) and/or affect the economy’s supply of human capital through education
spending. Rulers can also increase the intensity of efforts at innovation and imitation
through subsidy schemes, tax credits and public-private partnerships (Mani 2002,
Hall and Van Reenen 2000; Guellec, Dominique and van Pottelsberghe 2003 ).
These policies shape firm managers’ expected value of allocating funds to research
programs or toward the accumulation activities. We would expect for instance, that a
typical firm would invest less in research activities if profits of successful innovations
are heavily taxed, intellectual property rights are de facto or de jure weak so that
competitors can free ride off the innovative efforts of other firms, and if human capital
is undersupplied, thereby lowering the probable success rate of research endeavors.
In such an environment, the firm is likely to hold technological development in dis-
favor and will instead prioritize the accumulation mechanism. By contrast, policy
improvements will increase the expected returns of firm-level research and we would
expect firms to act accordingly. It follows that the extent to which “perspiration or
inspiration,” fuels growth depends on the kinds of policies government deploy. The
goal of this dissertation is to understand better the conditions in which incumbents
supply the kinds of policies that stimulate research and the adoption of frontier tech-
nologies and the conditions under which they fail to do so and pursue growth through
accumulation instead.
Importantly, politicians must consider that their available economic growth op-
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tions are not perfect substitutes for each other but rather entail a tradeoff. For its
part, even as it can produce results more immediately compared to the alternative, an
accumulation strategy is unable to sustain growth over time (consistent with Solow’s
model recounted earlier). That accumulation suffers from decreasing economic returns
is important because the effort to reinvigorate mobilization in the face of decreasing
returns exhibits political diminishing returns. One can spur forward growth in the
presence of diminishing returns by “ratcheting up” mobilization-oriented economic
policies: lower the tax rate further, increase the rate of compulsory savings, further
suppress wages, or some combination thereof. Each of these actions carry very real
political risks however. Politicians can lower taxes only so far before reaching a bud-
get constraint that forces them to make difficult choices about what items in the
budget receive long-term funding reductions or whether the government should in-
stead borrow and run a deficit. Nor can governments set compulsory savings at any
rate they see fit. In the presence of a too-high compulsory savings rate workers may
exit the formal economy altogether or engage in labor unrest. The same is true with
respect to heavily suppressed wages.
The politician in such a circumstance faces a complicated dilemma. On one hand,
failing to try to reinvigorate growth risks eviction from office as the rate of economic
growth will fall below that which is necessary to win reelection. But further mobiliza-
tion policies may be politically unpopular too. That said, there are two advantages
to a mobilization-oriented growth strategy. The strategy produces observable rates
of positive growth relatively immediately. And secondly, these economic and politi-
cal diminishing returns may be deferred into the future. Decreasing returns do not
emerge immediately, but set in over time.
Policies that spur innovation and the adoption of frontier technologies do not face
the same kind of diminishing returns. In fact, as I will argue more fully in Chapter 2,
these policies may have increasing returns. The tradeoff is that these policies require
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substantial upfront costs that must be sustained over time even as the returns to
those policy initiatives will not produce observable gains in economic performance
immediately. How do politicians navigate this immediacy-sustainability tradeoff ? I
focus on the role of institutions, specifically political parties, in affecting the length
of time horizons. Few institutions have the wide-ranging effects on the politics of a
country as its parties and we might expect that if any institution shapes the length
of time horizons, it might well be political parties.
Scholars have recognized, at least as early as Huntington (1969), that parties differ
substantially in the degree to which they are institutionalized (Mainwaring and Scully
1995; Mainwaring 1999). Weakly-institutionalized parties often are fragile, poorly-
organized organizations without coherent ideologies and strong roots in society. Not
surprisingly, these parties fail to persist over time and tend to dissolve with the
declining popularity of the party founder. By contrast, well-institutionalized parties
are overlapping generations organizations—organizations that are long-lived despite
the relatively short lives of the members of the organization. This is due to these
parties’ legitimacy among the citizenry and political elites, strong societal roots, and
organizational structures that allow them to recruit new members, mobilize support,
and persist beyond the political life of the founder.
That parties differ in the degree of “overlapping-ness” is useful distinction be-
cause scholars have produced valuable insights regarding the relationship between
organization composition and time horizons. Scholars of organizations have found
that intra-organization, inter-generational bargaining can produce outcomes in which
no member of an organization has an incentive to take actions that harm the organi-
zation over the long-term, but benefit a specific cohort in the short term. That is, a
set of institutions can be in place that reduce incentives for individuals to engage in
behaviors that increase their personal utility of one individual at the expense of the
organization as a whole over some longer period. In firms, managers can pay retiring
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employees to not seek rents and sully the firm’s reputation, which harms those that
remain in the firm for years to come. In parties, junior members can bribe their
senior colleague with monetary payments or services rendered to persuade retiring
members to not engage in corruption or defect from campaign promises (Alesina and
Spear 1988). I use these insights to show the nature of parties shapes how leaders
will navigate the immediacy-sustainability tradeoff.
Within an overlapping-generations (OLG) party, one in which members of the
same party are politically active over different periods of time, a cohort of “party
leaders” exists that has been in the party for some time but do not expect to be in the
party for much longer due to exogenously-determined retirement. A second cohort,
the “party deputies”, are more-recently recruited members who, upon the retirement
of the current set of leaders, take over the party’s leadership positions. Party leaders
have few incentives to deploy technology policies due to set the long-deferred returns
and high upfront costs, since they will not be able to claim credit for these returns
when they arrive. Conflict arises because the exclusive accumulation-driven growth
strategy leaders prefer produces a highly disproportionate burden-sharing scheme.
Deputies expect that an exclusive short-term strategy ultimately will stall due to
decreasing returns and they may also expect to face increasingly stiff opposition to
efforts at reinvigorating mobilization. Importantly, because these conditions take
time to emerge, it is period t’s deputies that will be forced to shoulder the weight of
these concerns while period t’s leaders avoid paying those costs altogether. They will
retire long before the costs of accumulation arrive. Thus, a highly disproportionate
burden-sharing scheme exists wherein the current generation of leaders is willing to
mortgage the future for their own political gain by failing to supply policies designed
to catalyze technological development. Crucially, the future that current party leaders
mortgage is precisely the future of the party’s upcoming leadership. It will be the
upcoming generation of party leaders that will be in charge when the diminishing
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returns set in and they will be forced to rule in the face of decreasing economic and
political returns to the accumulation strategy.
What the deputies want is some minimal priority on technology policies to avoid
this unfavorable distribution of costs. They have an incentive to propose a bargain
with party leaders to obtain a higher premium on technology policies. The bargain
requires that deputies offer a utility transfer of some sort to party leaders. While
any number of bargains are plausible, I propose one in which the outcome that we
observe is the solidification of seniority within parties. In exchange for their support
for policies that do not tie their hands down the road, the upcoming generation of
party leaders credibly commits to a seniority system by giving their unconditional
support for leaders’ preferred policies and projects, thus strengthening seniority and
leaders’ agenda setting powers.
A similar bargain is unlikely to occur in non-OLG, weakly-institutionalized parties.
The main reason for this is that, in such parties, power is already concentrated in the
hands of the party leader(s) and there is nothing of value deputies can offer leaders.
In fact, in weakly-institutionalized parties, the political prospects of the rank-and-file
membership turn almost exclusively on the political popularity of the party leader. In
such circumstances, deputies need the support of the party leader much more than the
reverse. Deputies simply do not have the political clout within the party to establish
a bargain. Accordingly, the party leader has little reason to bargain with them and
move from her most preferred policy position.
1.4 Alternative Explanations and Potential Critiques
Before concluding it is worth discussing one plausible alternative to the argument
and one critique of it. The alternative theory would turn our attention away from
parties and toward interest group politics. It would argue that the premium govern-
ments place on technological progress is a function of lobbying on the part of firms
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and industry associations. Different firms and industries place differing premia on
technology policies and when those sectors or groups that prefer technology policy
prevail in the lobbying battle, we will observe governments deploying the associated
kinds of policies.
This argument is certainly plausible and we should be surprised if lobbying on
the part of firms did not affect the policymaking calculi of governments. That said,
this argument does not explain the variations here fully. The problem is that it is
unclear at this juncture what kinds of firms and industries will be more inclined to
value technology policy and the conditions in which those firms will seek to influence
legislators accordingly. Firms face the same temporal dilemma that leaders do. The
assumption that firms are profit-maximizers does not necessarily mean they want
technology policies from governments. In fact, firms can increase their profit margins
and market shares in other ways that are far less expensive to them financially and
do not incur any of the risks associated with innovation and technology adoption.
Firms can, for example lobby governments to protect them from foreign competition,
they can press political leaders to pass legislation that would make it easier for firms
to lower their employment costs such as legislation reducing the minimum wage and
legislation reducing the health care coverage firms are obliged to supply. All of these
policies can help firms become more competitive and all of these policies may act as
substitutes for technology policy. The unanswered question is under what conditions
will firms and industries value technology policy and when will they value the alter-
natives? We do not have very good answers to these questions at this point, which
makes a seemingly simple and compelling lobbying story of technology policy less
persuasive.15
One critique of my theory might be that it implicitly assumes a retrospective
15This is not to say the argument is entirely unpersuasive. It is at this point, however, an incom-
plete argument, but worth pursuing further.
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economic voting model. If we assume instead that voters are forward-looking individ-
uals—“bankers” in the parlance of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992)—it might
be the case that voters prefer that legislators initiate policies that do not suffer from
diminishing returns, but deploy instead policies with increasing returns over time and
long-term positive economic benefits.
There are two responses for this critique. First, if we take the argument here at
face value, it should stand to reason that politicians will deploy technology policies
far more frequently and to a much greater extent than the actually do. Office-seeking
politicians routinely fail to deploy these kinds of policies, which they should not
do if the critique is accurate. Secondly, and more importantly, the assumption of
prospective voters does not explain why governments would deploy technology policies
because prospective voters are not infinitely forward-looking; they rationally discount
the future. If, as I have proposed briefly here and develop further in Chapter 2, the
returns associated with technological progress are deferred well into the future, even
forward looking voters will discount those returns and favor instead returns with more
immediate results. Mobilization-oriented policies would still seem to be preferred by
voters and hence by politicians interested in retaining power.
1.5 Conclusion and Implications
This chapter has put forward two central propositions. The first is that understand-
ing the role of politics in development requires that we identify more clearly which
sources of growth are triggered, which muted, and the extent to which the political
variables in question have these effects. Too often our theoretical and empirical mod-
els have vague and even contradictory hypotheses regarding the role of some variable,
say regime type, on the specific sources of economic growth. For example, a simple
theoretical model might suggest that democracies facilitate growth because of the
accountability mechanisms associated with the electoral connection. Since positive
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economic growth is popular with voters, and since political tests hold politicians ac-
countable to the demands of voters, we should see office-seeking leaders in democracies
initiating policies with the intention of increasing economic growth. However plausi-
ble such a model might be, the argument is uncomfortably vague with reference to the
mechanisms by which growth is generated. This admittedly simplistic accountability
model tells us little about whether the specific growth-stimulating policies in question
come in the form of those that operate by providing incentives to accumulate capital
and labor, those that stimulate growth via advances in factor productivity arising
from economic innovation and imitation, or both. As such, our understanding of the
relationship between politics and development is necessarily limited. As Pinto and
Timmons (2005) point out, “If the same institution affects these sources differently
. . . then jumping from institutions to growth can be misleading” (27). The omission
becomes even more problematic because how a country achieves growth in a very real
way dictates the extent to which that growth is sustainable.16
The second proposition is a tension exists between the goals of retaining office and
the tasks associated with promoting technological progress. Leaders are shortsighted,
but the economic and political returns to their efforts to stimulate technology devel-
opment are long deferred. That tension, however seems to vary cross-nationally and
temporally as politicians do indeed take concerted efforts to stimulate technological
progress.
The implications of this dissertation project should be of interest to a variety of
scholars. On one hand, it contributes to our understanding of technological progress.
Economic historian Ross Thomson quips rather caustically that technological devel-
opment is like God: “It is much discussed, worshiped by some, rejected by others,
16The reader should note that I do not use the phrase “sustainable growth” in the way common to
popular environmental movements that seek to ensure that the development process does not lead
to serious environmental degradation. I use the term to refer to the extent which increases in per
capita income can continue indefinitely over the long-term.
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but little understood” (quoted in Mokyr 1990; 6). While the present work makes
no claim of developing a complete explanation of the level of technological develop-
ment in countries or the pace of its process (I do not, for one example, delve deeply
into the determinants of individual creativity or firm-level factors that shape their
innovative prospects), it can shed some light on the underpinnings of technological
progress by providing a lens through which we might better understand the costliness
of R&D programs for firms and the severity of the market failures that mute R&D
intensity. Insofar as economic actors respond to the incentives supplied by national
economic policies, where governments take steps to ameliorate these failures, the level
of technological knowledge will be higher and the pace of its change faster than where
governments do not take such actions. This project pushes forward our knowledge of
the political underpinnings of economic development by explaining when governments
will be more or less inclined to set these kinds of policies. Accordingly, to the degree
that technological progress is the lever of riches and is necessary for sustained pros-
perity, this research agenda speaks to the political processes that influence whether
a given country can avoid development traps and experience sustained prosperity
instead.
The project also sheds light on a variety of issues relevant specifically for scholars
of political parties. Much scholarly literature is dedicated to understanding the nature
and effects of political parties and party systems. Scholars have linked political parties
to a host of outcomes of interest to political scientists, including democratic account-
ability and responsiveness (Downs 1957) and the stability of modernizing societies
and new democracies (Huntington 1969; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring
1999). The conceptualization of political parties as organizations that may overlap
generations of politicians is one that scholars of comparative politics do not often
make, but it is one that can be fruitful in understanding a host of political phenom-
ena. And in general OLG models of parties can provide purchase on the length of
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political time horizons. Alesina and Spear (1988) for example, have used this concep-
tualization to explain when legislators’ platforms designed to appeal to the median
voter are credible even in absence of a formal commitment mechanism, which would
otherwise make any campaign promise incredible. They argue that the overlapping
generations framework “captures the potential tension between the short time hori-
zon of an individual candidate and the longer horizon of the party” (p. 376). Such a
framework can help understand how this tension is resolved in such a way as to allow
for the initiation of policies which have positive returns that are oriented toward the
medium to long term future rather than purely toward the immediate future. This
dissertation builds on the overlapping generations concept to develop an argument
linking political parties and variations in their institutionalization with time horizons,
thereby providing insight into the length of the future’s shadow, the likelihood that
rulers will deploy technology-oriented economic policies, and ultimately the prospects
for technological progress in a national economy.
1.6 Outline of the Chapters
The dissertation presents these ideas as follows. Chapter 2 accomplishes several tasks.
First, I articulate more completely what policies governments may use to catalyze
technological development and what policies coincide with the mobilization strategy.
Second, I develop more completely the details of the immediacy-sustainability tradeoff
mentioned only briefly here. Third, Chapter 2, shows that in the presence of economic
voting, regardless of whether citizens are retrospective or prospective, technology
policy is undersupplied. From there, I develop the main theoretical propositions and
show that the severity of this undersupply depends on the degree to which ruling
parties are well-institutionalized. Chapter 3 presents the research design and the first




Theory: Parties and Technological Developmentt
This chapter provides a theory to explain when and why politicians might endeavor
to promote technological development despite seemingly incompatible time horizons.
Before delving into the theory however, I specify the policies I include in a technology-
oriented growth strategy and those in the accumulation strategy.1 Next, I discuss the
details of the immediacy-sustainability tradeoff that exists between these strategies.
The theory and its implications follows.
2.1 Strategies of Growth and their Tradeoffs
At the level of the national economy, technological progress occurs through two re-
lated, but distinct processes: innovation and technology adoption. Innovation is the
process of creating some new technology, process, or product. Technology adoption
is the endeavor lagging firms make to employ frontier technologies in their own pro-
duction processes. Adoption may well require modifications be made to the existing
technology, thus improving it in some fashion. Therefore, in some ways, adoption is
not unlike outright innovation.Throughout this and subsequent chapters, I will re-
fer to research and development (R&D) spending as spending on efforts on either
innovation or technology adoption.2
1To avoid repetition, I will use “accumulation” and “mobilization” interchangeably.
2The technologies themselves can take a variety of forms, but for our purposes, it is sufficient
to categorize technologies as follows: new intermediate capital goods that produce final goods more
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2.1.1 The Technological Development Strategy
Innovation and technology adoption suffer from important market failures that, in
combination with the risks and financial costs inherent to the processes, slow the pace
of technological progress. With that in mind, the government policies I include in the
strategy to fuel technological progress are those designed to improve the technological
infrastructure, ameliorate market failures, mute firms’ risks, and offset their costs.
Two categories of policies are useful in catalyzing technological development. The
first are those policies designed to develop a stock of human capital at the post-
primary education level. Technological progress occurs when individuals create and
adopt viable technologies or find ways to implement and modify existing technologies.
A large stock of human capital is essential for both of these processes to occur at
a reasonable rate. Arrow (1962) shows that human capital facilitates “learning-by-
doing,” which in turn adds grease to the wheels of technological progress by increasing
the likelihood that workers will uncover new ways of increasing productivity as they
gain experience in the production process. Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas (1993)
makes a similar claim. He argues that long-run growth happens when there is a
critical amount of human capital in the workforce. More exactly, he contends that
a “growth miracle” can occur when governments and enterprises foster continued
development of human capital.
efficiently, altogether new types of consumer, new cost-saving business models and organizational
strategies, such as “just-in-time” inventory systems. There exists a seemingly infinite number of way
to categorize technologies. Schumpeter categorizes new technologies into five types: new products,
new methods of production, new sources of supply, exploiting new markets and new business organi-
zational strategies. Schmookler (1966) categorizes them according to whether they can be exploited
generally across members of an industry or the economy writ large or whether the technology and
the productivity it brings are firm specific. Hall and Soskice (2001) categorize technologies according
to whether the new technology is a radical departure from existing technologies or an incremental
development. Grossman and Helpman (1997) differentiate between those technologies that expand
the product variety and those that serve principally as instruments to improve the quality of existing
products (Grossman and Helpman, 1997). I note these typologies only to give a sense of the breadth
of technology categories under consideration here, but I do not distinguish between them in the
theoretical framework.
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The stock of human capital is similarly important for technology adoption as it
enables lagging firms and countries to understand better the workings of frontier
technologies (Mokyr 1990; Hall 2004). This in turn increases the probability that
frontier technologies will be efficiently adopted and adapted. Papageorgiou (2002)
presents the concept of “contiguous knowledge” and argues that, contrary to the
conventional wisdom that the pace at which lagging countries can reach the frontier
is solely a function of their relative backwardness, lagging countries can catch up only
if they have a level of knowledge contiguous with that of wealthier countries. If it is
not, technology adoption fails to occur and the laggard does not catch up. He writes:
. . . the technology adoption capacity of a country depends crucially on
how familiar is the frontier technology to the adopting country. This
seems to be consistent with evidence indicating that virtually all high-
growth developing countries have been exposed to technologies that are
at least related to the cutting-edge technology (363).
He also finds finds that technological progress depends on post-primary education
rather than primary education (2003)
As an example of the importance of post-primary education, consider the case
of South Africa as discussed by Mani (2002). South Africa is clearly an outlier in
sub-Saharan Africa in terms of overall wealth and development, but even so, Mani
finds that the country’s effort to catalyze technological development begun in the
mid 1990s has failed to live up to expectations due to a severe shortage of technically
skilled personnel to engage in R&D (27). He argues that the undersupply of human
capital is evident in the decline in the density of research scientists and engineers
in R&D over time. The statistic was 33 scientists and engineers in R&D per 10,000
workers in the labor force in 1990 but declined to 16.3 by 1997-1998 (27).3
3Similar conclusions hold for India and Brazil.
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Despite its importance, human capital might be undersupplied if left to private
markets. Governments can remedy the undersupply and often do through education
and retraining programs and programs designed to use human capital for more ef-
ficiently by providing incentives for workers to move from sectors with low average
returns to R&D to a higher return sectors.
The second class of government policy included in a growth strategy that em-
phasizes technological progress comprises those policies that give incentives for firms
to increase the intensity of their R&D efforts. By subsidizing private firms’ R&D
efforts, governments can both raise the probability of the success rate of such en-
deavors and increase their number. Governments can also establish programs that
encourage joint ventures that facilitate technology transfers, governments might also
establish public-private partnerships that facilitate cooperation in the creation of new
technologies (Mani 2002; Nelson 1993).
Fiscal policies can be quite effective. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) for example,
find that a dollar in R&D credit from the government stimulates about a dollar of
additional R&D spending by firms. They conclude that government R&D initiatives
complement rather than crowd out private efforts. In a study of OECD countries,
Guellec and van Potbolsberghe (2001) find similar results and conclude that govern-
ment subsidies and tax breaks increase R&D spending on the part of firms, although
the business response to tax breaks is quicker relative to subsidies and grants.4
4A brief note about the exclusion of intellectual property rights (IPRs) from the analysis is
warranted here. The conventional wisdom is that promoting technological progress demands that
governments set efficient IPRs. It is well-established that new ideas and technologies have aspects
of public goods. Property rights grant innovators at least temporary monopoly rents on their
innovations and therefore close the gap between the social and private returns to technological
developments (North, 1981). Recently, scholars have begun to find that the role of IPRs differs for
developing and developed economies (Chen and Puttitanun, 2005) While IPRs certainly promote
innovation, they may well slow the diffusion of those innovations, which can be a critical concern for
developing countries that tend to imitate more than they innovate. Helpman (1993) expresses this
possibility, writing “Who benefits from tight intellectual property rights in less developed countries?
My analysis suggests that if anyone benefits, it is not the South” (p.1274). Because this debate is
ongoing, I do not examine the allocation and protection of IPRs here.
44
2.1.2 The Accumulation Strategy
The accumulation or mobilization strategy involves mobilizing labor and raising the
per worker capital stock. This strategy would make no attempt to remedy the market
failures that reduce R&D intensity. Rather, the goal here is to catalyze the growth
process by creating what Gerschenkron (1962) refers to as “industrial labor, in the
sense of a stable, reliable, and disciplined group that has cut the umbilical cord
connecting it with the land and has become suitable for utilization in factories” (9).
Going hand-in-hand with mobilizing labor is increasing the stock of capital per worker
to increase their productivity. Several different tools are available to accomplish
these goals. Governments can, for example, use compulsory savings schemes like
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund, forcing citizens to save a specified percentage
of their earnings, thereby mobilizing household savings and stimulating investment.
Alternatively, or in combination, leaders can lower taxes on households incomes and
firms’ profits and capital investments. Leaders can mobilize labor by forcing citizens
to leave the farm for the factory, lowering the tax rate on on firms’ employment
expenditures, suppressing wages, and through primary education spending, the latter
of which is important as basic literacy and numeracy are important qualities of a
national labor force.
2.1.3 The Return Structures of the Strategies
Choosing a growth strategy involves a tradeoff between policies that face decreasing
economic and political returns on one hand and those that avoid decreasing returns
but are saddled with delayed returns and require upfront financial costs on the other.
To illustrate this, what I will call the immediacy-sustainability tradeoff, consider the
following stylized economy. Assume a national economy with a sufficiently large stock
of human capital at the post-primary education level. Let a Schumpeterian “creative
destruction” dynamic operate whereby firms, in the effort to increase productivity
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and hence their market share, allocate resources to innovation. New technologies
increase productivity such that the developing firm becomes the “industry leader”
consistent with the models of Aghion (2004), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman
and Helpman (1997). Firms in the same industry that lag behind the innovator
scramble to develop their own technologies and to adopt those at the frontier in an
effort to regain lost market share or, at the very least, avoid being competed out of
the marketplace altogether. Finally, let some non-zero percent of all newly-developed
technologies be applicable in more than one industry and hence can diffuse throughout
multiple industries in the economy.
Since firm survival depends on the ability to innovate and efficiently adopt frontier
technologies, R&D spending receives a premium. But upon the development of a new
technology, however, several other processes are activated that catalyze further pro-
ductivity gains. First, some portion of new technologies may be generally applicable
and some technologies will diffuse throughout the economy. As they do, productivity
gains spread as well. Beyond that however, diffusion commonly produces “feedback
effects”, where adopting firms make further improvements to existing technologies
thereby further increasing the value of the technology. Another important attribute
is that some new technologies will generate spillovers, whereby the creation of a new
technology decreases the costs and risks of other R&D endeavors thereby increasing
the likelihood of further innovation. The value of feedback and spillover effects should
not be underestimated. Hall (2004) writes that:
it is safe to say that without diffusion, innovation would have little social
or economic impact . . . diffusion is not only the means by which innova-
tions become useful by being spread throughout a population, it is also an
intrinsic part of the innovation process, as learning, imitation, and feed-
back effects which arise during the spread of a new technology enhance
the original innovation (2-3).
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Now, consider the effects of a government program intended to encourage techno-
logical development, say a set of fiscal instruments to subsidize firm-level R&D. The
most direct effect of this policy will be to raise R&D intensity on the part of firms and
increase the success rate of private R&D spending. The economic implications of the
subsidy scheme go beyond this direct effect, though. In this stylized economy, the dif-
fusion, spillovers, and feedback processes act as a sort of multiplier effect, magnifying
the economic utility of any one innovation and amplifying the economic importance
of the underlying subsidy scheme. The initial fiscal instrument has economic benefits
that extend beyond its direct effect.
The same is true for a policy to forge human capital at the post-primary level.
Again, the most immediate effect of government education spending is to increase
R&D intensity and the success rate of R&D projects, as well as the likelihood that
existing technologies will be efficiently transferred, adopted, and modified. But since
there appears to be no limits to the number of new ideas a cohort of skilled workers
can have except the length of their physical lives, the initial education policy can have
long-lasting and wide-ranging effects on the prospects of sustained economic growth.
And again, diffusion, feedbacks, and spillovers also act as multipliers to the value of
the underlying government policy.
The downside is that all these benefits accrue only with a substantial lag from
the point at which the policies were deployed. Scientists, engineers, and firm man-
agers all require time to turn available resources into viable technologies and so we
should expect a lag between the initial fiscal incentive and returns to any specific
R&D program. Rouvinen (2002) estimates the lag structure between the start of
a given private R&D program and gains in firm-level productivity that result from
that program to be about 4 or 5 years. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982) reach sim-
ilar results. Many projects take considerably longer though with the “adoption of
a new technology [often] coming more than a decade after the initial research is be-
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gun” (Cohen and Noll 1991; p. 48). Accordingly, any piece of legislation intended
to stimulate R&D spending almost certainly will not see returns in the near future
and what returns do occur may be delayed over a decade or more. Nor does diffusion
happen quickly; “in the history of diffusion of many innovations, one cannot help
being struck by. . . its apparent overall slowness” (Rosenberg, quoted in Hall 2004) .
Economic barriers, institutional and budget constraints, and path dependencies all
mean that adopting productivity-increasing technologies is often is a slow, arduous
process (Parente and Prescott 2000; Mokyr 1990). And most obviously, it literally
takes years to educate a cohort of scientists and engineers to conduct the underlying
innovative and technology adoption programs.
Not only is there a temporal lag, but the policies governments would deploy to
fuel innovation and imitation require large financial costs upfront. Legislators have
to allocate resources upfront to build and expand schools, establish retraining pro-
grams, hire teachers, and provide incentives for workers with sufficient human capital
to transfer into sectors with higher expected returns to R&D before technological de-
velopment occurs. In the same way, stimulating private R&D virtually by necessity
demands that legislators distribute the subsidies before research projects are under-
way and well before those projects begin to bear fruit. The fact that the financial
costs are large and upfront while the economic returns are delayed is damaging to
politicians operating in a world with rather short planning horizons.
In contrast, the accumulation strategy has relatively more immediate results. One
reason for this is that the relevant policy instruments to encourage accumulation of
capital and labor do not require the same kind of R&D endeavors necessary for
innovation and adoption. The mobilization strategy does not operate through public
or private R&D programs to develop new technologies or modify new ones and so
there is no delay associated with “searching” and “re-searching” for new technologies
as their is with innovation and technology adoption. Nor does mobilization rely on
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diffusion, feedback effects, and spillover processes to increase gains in productivity
throughout the economy. Accordingly, mobilization-oriented policies do not suffer
from the delays inherent to technological development-driven growth.
The benefits of relatively more immediate returns are counterbalanced by the fact
that the accumulation strategy results in an income path that cannot sustain positive
gains in economic performance indefinitely. As I summarized briefly in Chapter 1,
the neoclassical growth model shows that capital accumulation experiences economic
decreasing returns that make it difficult for accumulation to sustain gains in income
over time. Solow writes that, “A developing economy that succeeds in permanently
increasing its saving (investment) rate will have a higher level of output than if it
had not done so, and must therefore grow faster for a while. But it will not achieve
a permanently higher rate of growth of output” (1988, p.308-309).
Economic diminishing returns may not be all that serious if politicians in power
when diminishing returns set in can reinvigorate growth with further mobilization-
oriented policies. The government unfortunate enough to be in power with the returns
to previous accumulation policies begin to diminish might institute policies that would
reduce taxes further, increase the rate of compulsory savings to mobilize investment,
or repress wages further to encourage labor accumulation. Governments, however, are
constrained in their ability to employ these strategies and this fact constitutes mo-
bilization’s most serious drawback. Not only does an exclusive mobilization strategy
experience economic diminishing returns, the strategy also experiences diminishing
political returns as well. Each of the policies designed to mobilize resources carries
its own political cost. Governments can lower taxes only so far before reaching the
budget constraint at which time the government is forced to make difficult choices
about long-term budget cuts or persistent deficit spending, each of which can be costly
politically. In the same way, governments can repress wages only so far before work-
ers stop engaging in productive activities altogether and either start producing only
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for subsistence, exit the formal economy, and/or engage in labor unrest. So-called
compulsory savings programs face similar political constraints.
Two quick examples illustrate such political constraints. The first occurs in France
in the spring of 2006. In March, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin announced
the First Employment Contract (CPE), a labor initiative that “allows employers to
end job contracts for under-26s at any point during a two-year trial period without
having to offer an explanation or give warning” (BBC News Online March 18, 2006).
At a time where one out of five young people in France was unemployed, the program
was designed to mobilize labor. What the program produced in actuality however
was popular discontent. Not long after the CPE was announced, thousands of young
people in some 35 cities took to the streets in protest (March 18, 2006).5 At the center
of this response was anger at the increased insecurity such a policy would place on
the youth. The protests had their intended effect; after several days, the initiative
was withdrawn from consideration. The French case is suggestive of the point that
politicians often face stiff opposition to their policies designed to mobilize labor.
As another example of the political constraints to an exclusive input-driven growth
strategy, consider the case of Singapore. By most accounts, Singapore’s astonishing
growth since the 1960s was driven by exceptionally high rates of savings and invest-
ment. (Young 1992, 1995; Collins and Bosworth 1996; Bosworth and Collins 2003;
Krugman 1994). Figure 2.1 shows the trend in savings as a percent of GDP for
Singapore (the solid line) and compares that to the average for all countries (the
dashed line) between 1960-2000. Singapore’s savings rate is exceptional by interna-
tional standards, but scholars have noted that as “miraculous” as the Singaporean
savings rate and corresponding investment rate was, much of the accumulated sav-
5Not surprising, there is wide variation in reports on the number of individuals engage in the
protests. Unions reported the final tally was upwards of 1.5 million people, while the police report
the number at 500,000.
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ings was generated through demanding compulsory savings schemes like the Central
Providence Fund (CPF), which are hard to replicate and increase. Krugman (1994)
writes:
Singapore’s growth has been based largely on one-time changes in behav-
ior that cannot be repeated. . . an investment rate of 40% is amazingly
high by any standard; a share of 70% would be ridiculous. So one can
immediately conclude that Singapore is unlikely to achieve future growth
rates comparable to those of the past (71).
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Presumably, one reason why a move to increase the investment rate from from 40%
to 70% of GDP is “ridiculous” is because of the associated increases in compulsory
savings likely needed to achieve higher rate of savings and investment.
The immediacy-sustainability tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 2.2 where line ρ0
represents a hypothetical accumulation-oriented growth path, while line ρ1 represents
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a technology-driven path; the origin of the figure represents the beginning of an
incumbent’s tenure in office and therefore the time when the incumbent announces
an economic policy package. The figure illustrates the main points from the above
discussion. Initially, the returns to line ρ1 are small in absolute terms and especially in
relationship to the returns to ρ0. This represents the time during which firms engage
in the innovative and imitative processes but have yet to produce viable technologies.
Meanwhile, the accumulation strategy produces relatively high rates of economic
performance. With time however, the utility of these strategies switches. After the
development of new technologies, the diffusion, modification, and spillover processes
run their course and the economic benefits of technological development begin to
increase dramatically.








2.1.4 Disincentives for Technological Development
Political processes compel politicians to eschew promoting innovation and technology
diffusion. One prominent force for example, is economic voting. Few would argue
that the status of the economy is not a crucial factor in the ability of leaders to
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retain power, but counter to intuition, one consequence of citizens caring about the
economy is that leaders tend to de-prioritize technology policy. In the typical for-
mulation of the retrospective voting model, voters evaluate the economy based on its
performance over the past few years (or an even shorter period of time (Beck (1991))
and reward incumbents with reelection if the economy is well-performing and evict
otherwise. Mapping the immediacy-sustainability tradeoff onto this model produces
the conclusion that incumbents should stay clear of initiatives to improve the coun-
try’s technological infrastructure and level of human capital. The fact that citizens
use a “linear extrapolation of past economic performance to the future [to formulate]
postures of support or opposition toward the government” (Stokes 2001, p.2) means
that office-seeking politicians need to ensure that the economy is performing at a
level sufficient to buy the support of citizens by the next election regardless of the
longer-term effects of the initiated policies. Cohen and Noll (1991) state the political
calculus at work thusly:
From the perspective of the elected official, the implication of retrospec-
tive evaluation is that, all else being equal . . . a project with earlier realiza-
tion of politically relevant benefits will be preferred to longer-term projects.
That is, to the extent that citizens heavily discount future plans of pro-
grams and engage in retrospective evaluation, they create an incentive for
political officials to be too impatient in evaluating proposed programs.
Because R&D projects are usually long term, they will normally face an
uphill struggle in the battle for budgets with operating programs that pro-
vide current benefits. In general, political leaders will exhibit reluctance
to adopt an R&D strategy . . . (62-63, emphasis added).6
6Since the initial statement of the retrospective voting thesis, scholars have mae some useful
advances with respect to the heterogeneity in the retrospective vote function. Holbrook and Garand
(1996) find that the quality of economic voting depends on the voter’s access to information, which
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Figure 2.3 illustrates this point. Lines ρ0 and ρ1 are the same as in Figure 2.2
representing the returns of the mobilization and technology-oriented strategies respec-
tively, but here line g* represents the minimum level of economic performance over
which an incumbent needs to preside to win reelection at any given point in time. If
the origin of the figure represents the beginning of a politician’s tenure in office when
the incumbent must decide how to pursue economic growth and the vertical line t
represents the point at which citizens evaluate their leadership, it is clear that the
politician’s best strategy is to produce policies that facilitate growth by stimulating
accumulation rather than those policies that operate on growth through technological
development.










The accuracy of the retrospective model is debatable. Chappell and Keech (1985)
for example, contend that citizens are more sophisticated than the retrospective model
formulates and that citizens rationally form expectations of the future impact of
shapes their perceptions of economic realities. Others have argued that “clarity of responsibility”
for policy and the associated outcomes influences the quality of retrospective voting (Powell and
Whitten 1993; Powell 2000). Other extensions to explain heterogeneity in the vote function include
the role of attitudes such as trust in government (Duch 2001; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000)
and the modifying influence of party identification (Fiorina 1981).
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proposed and initiated economic policies and they use those expectations to inform
their vote choice. MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson (1992) suggest that voters are
something more like “bankers” than “peasants,” using all information available to
them to form expectations about what the economic future holds under different
governments rather than past economic performance as their guide. Winning and
retaining office requires candidates credibly promise and/or actually deploy policies
that will have the economy performing well in the future.
If the prospective voting thesis accurately captures the relationship between the
economy and political evaluation, it may be the case that politicians will prefer to
promote innovation and technology adoption. Sophisticated, forward-looking voters,
it could be argued, will understand the future costs and benefits of the technol-
ogy/mobilization choice set and prefer some non-negligible premium be placed on
policies that are good for growth over some substantial period of time. Office-seeking
politicians respond accordingly.
Further investigation challenges this conclusion and shows that the prospective
voting thesis does not ensure that politicians will prioritize human capital formation
and the fiscal instruments that share private firms’ R&D costs and risks after all. At
issue is the fact that prospective voters are not infinitely forward-looking, but rather
they weigh the relatively immediate future more heavily than the more distant future.
Doing so makes sense in a world where unforseen and exogenous shocks can occur.
As the expected date of returns to some policy recedes in the more distant future, the
likelihood that unforeseen changes in conditions will alter the magnitude and distri-
bution of the returns to government policies increases as well. The heightened sense
of uncertainty that exists around long-deferred returns compels voters to discount
those returns relative to those projected to arrive sooner. While prospective voters
are sophisticated and use all available information to make predictions about future
performance, when the returns are projected to arrive with a long delay, they lack
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much of the important information they need to form useful expectations. Policy
instruments with returns that accrue more quickly can still be affected by shocks,
but the shorter time horizon means that such shocks are less likely and less likely to
be unforeseen so voters can incorporate them into their analysis. Even prospective
citizens will opt to favor policies with more immediate returns.7
Like economic voting, political competition may mute incentives to promote inno-
vation and technology adoption. At first glance this proposition seems unlikely. It is
a common and well-founded contention that political competition leads to better eco-
nomic policies. Politicians aiming to fend off their competitors are more likely to work
hard to produce good policies and good outcomes, forgo opportunities to seek rents
and will instead pass along those rents to citizens (Lake and Baum 2001) and provide
more public goods and services (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, Smith, and Morrow
(2005). But with respect to the strategies of growth and the tradeoff discussed above,
political competition will not necessarily lead to polices that can sustain long term
growth. Because competition lowers barriers to entry into the political arena, it raises
the stakes of failing to appeal to the demands of citizens. This would suggest that,
as long as economic voting determines political leadership, competition will suppress
further the premium a government would give to policies with long-delayed returns
7The debate between whether voters are retrospective or prospective continues, but the empirical
work seems to point strongly toward the usefulness of the retrospective thesis. In their thorough
review of economic voting literature, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) point out that both the
prospective and retrospective arguments receive some support from statistical models but that the
classic reward-punishment model appears sound. Voters, regardless of the democracy in which they
live, assess national economic conditions and reward or punish the politicians responsible for those
conditions (211-212). See also Norpoth (1996) and Fiorina (1981) for support for the retrospective
model. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) conclude that retrospection does not necessarily mean
that voters are unsophisticated as proponents of the prospective model have argued. They find that
voters are sophisticated enough to look at multiple indicators of economic performance to inform
their evaluation of the economy and perhaps more importantly they try to discern when a party is
more clearly responsible for the observed outcomes and adjust their vote accordingly.
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and that economic inefficiencies will exist due to domestic political competition.8
The rather disconcerting conclusion of this line of thought is that politicians will
almost always undersupply policies designed to fuel innovation and technology adop-
tion. Anecdotal evidence supports this. Recently, the National Academies of Sciences
in the United States released a 500-page document detailing what it calls “the gather-
ing storm” in reference the United States’ shrinking technological leadership relative
to a handful of East Asian countries and India. The document cites the undersup-
ply of scientists and engineers necessary to provide a reasonably high probability of
success in research programs and rapidly obsolescing equipment as symptoms of the
problem and the places blame for the gathering storm on risk averse and shortsighted
politicians who fail to supply technology-oriented policies and programs (National
Academies 2006). In a similar argument, New York Times columnist Thomas Fried-
man (2005) documents what he calls the “quiet crisis,” or the approaching economic
malaise associated with a persistent undersupply of government incentives to stimu-
late innovation and technological upgrading. He takes members of Congress to task
for being unwilling to place a greater premium on the future:
The way to avoid being caught in such a storm [of underwhelming eco-
nomic performance and loss of national competitiveness] is to identify
the confluence of factors and to change course. . . But this is not what
has been going on in America in recent years. We are blithely sailing
along, heading straight for the storm, with [politicians] insisting that no
8A caveat is worth noting here. The relationship between competition and technology’s premium
is almost certainly nonlinear. If no contestation exists at all, economic performance is less likely
to determine the survival of a government and so the issue of how to pursue growth is moot (Lake
and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, Smith, and Morrow 2005). To the extent that this
argument holds, the possibility exists that a country can have too much of a good thing; while
competition is sufficient for leaders to care about pursuing growth, assuming economic voting, too
much competition suppresses incentives for officials to care about technological development and the
long-term, sustainable growth it facilitates.
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dramatic changes or sacrifices are required now . . . History will show that
when America should have been doubling the [National Science Founda-
tion’s] funding, its Congress passed a pork-laden budget that actually cut
assistance for science and engineering (255; emphasis added).
The “dramatic changes and sacrifices” to which Friedman refers include increases
in education spending to raise the stock of human capital and increasing funding to
inspire firms to increase their R&D spending to undertake technological development.
We have seen however that politics compels leaders to eschew such policies.
But a puzzle still remains. We saw in Chapter 1 that governments do vary in the
efforts they make to catalyze technological development. Indeed, in 2006 President
Bush announced a plan to stimulate technological development in his State of the
Union address and Congressional Democrats announced their own set of plans. How
can we understand this?
In the next section, I present a theory rooted in the relationship between a coun-
try’s ruling parties and time horizons. Few institutions have as large and wide-ranging
effects on the politics of a country as its parties do. Parties leave their footprints on
virtually every aspect of politics and as Schattschneider put it, “the condition of
parties is the best possible evidence of the nature of any regime” (1942, 5). The
typical checklist describing the functions of parties includes aggregating and artic-
ulating societal preferences, nominating candidates for office, mobilizing citizens in
support of those candidates, informing voters about what candidates stand for and
the kinds of policies they are likely to implement if elected, and ultimately forming
governments and setting policy. For Aldrich (1995), parties are essential in overcom-
ing significant social choice and collective action problems that would otherwise make
democracy “unworkable”. For Huntington (1968) the nature of political parties de-
termines whether the country will experience political stability or devolve into civil
violence. Below, I add to this, arguing that parties can be institutions through which
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inter-temporal bargains obtain wherein governments set policies considering not just
the most immediate future.
2.2 Parties, Time Horizons, and Technological Progress
In the literature directed at classifying parties and party systems, Sartori’s (1976)
scheme based on the number of relevant parties and their ideological distance remains
one of the most important. Even so, scholars have begun to argue that conventional
typologies of parties and the systems in which they operate fail to incorporate an
essential dimension: the degree to which the parties in question are institutional-
ized. Mainwaring (1999) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) contend that as useful
as Sartori’s scheme is, the number of parties and the ideological distances between
them do not capture some plainly evident variations in parties and party systems. In
many democracies, the most salient aspect of the party system is the fragility, poor
organization, and ideological vacuousness. For example, Coppedge (2001) uncovers
the eye-opening statistics that of 166 elections in 11 Latin American countries in the
twentieth century “approximately 1,200 parties competed. Of these, only 15 partici-
pated in all the elections held in their country, and only three contested as many as
20 elections. More than 80 percent ran in just one election before becoming defunct”
(p. 174-175). Students of parties often contend that these traits are more impor-
tant for understanding the system than Sartori’s and other standard classifications.
Party systems differ not just according to the number of parties and their ideological
positions, then, but also in the degree to which ruling parties can be considered well-
institutionalized. If Schattschneider is correct that characteristics of parties speak to
the nature of politics in a country, then such variations should have import policymak-
ing consequences. Mainwaring (1999) identifies institutionalized parties as those that
regularly compete for office, have “strong roots in society” that endow the party with
a stable base of political support over time, have strong and effective organizations,
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are seen as legitimate by politicians and citizens alike. Based on these criteria, one
crucial distinction between well- and weakly-institutionalized parties is the degree to
which they approximate what economists and industrial organization scholars have
called “overlapping generations” (hereafter OLG) organizations—organizations that
outlive any given generation of its membership.9 Institutionalized parties are OLG as
a function of their legitimacy, more effective organizations, and roots in society, which
allow the organization to effectively recruit new members and place those members in
elected offices. The ability to recruit and mobilize electoral support for party members
allows the party to persist well into the future even as individual members and cohorts
of members have relatively short and finite lives. Weakly-institutionalized parties, by
contrast, are short-lived organizations. The absence of societal roots, effective orga-
nization, and legitimacy means that ambitious politicians have little reason to join
existing parties to win office as existing parties do not represent the only or even the
most effective channels for obtaining office. Similarly, weak roots and organizations
make identifying and providing support new party members difficult.
That weakly- and well-institutionalized parties differ in the degree to which they
are OLG organizations is a valuable insight. Existing theories of OLG economic
organizations like the firm have generated important conclusions regarding the re-
lationship between organizations and time horizons. Crémer (1986) for example,
recognizes the prevalence of agency problems in organizations and he models how
these play out in OLG organizations. He models a firm composed of several different
generations of employees in which actions that maximize the utility of members of
older cohorts in the present period jeopardize the viability of the entire organization
over some longer period of time and hence the utility of members of younger cohorts.
Notably, in his theory, intra-organizational, inter-generational bargains that produce
9The firm is the quintessential OLG organization.
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as an equilibrium an outcome in which members of the older cohorts do not engage
in those activities can obtain..
A fuller description of the situation is useful here. Assume a firm in which workers
remain for 3 periods and at the end of the third period are forced to retire. Assume
also that the firm hires new employees at the same rate that the older employees
retire such that the firm is infinitely-lived even as the workers live finite lives. We
know from Kreps (1990) that firms have corporate cultures, the stability of which is
invaluable for firms’ profitability. Those with stable corporate cultures are able to
convey expectations about their credibility and efficiency and this in turn facilitates
contracting with other firms and luring finance from investors. Nevertheless, main-
taining a corporate culture is easier said than done. Members in their last period
have few incentives to keep the culture and work hard to grow the firm. Rather,
their incentives are to defect from the culture and engage in corrupt or rent-seeking
activities that quickly increase their personal incomes. After all, their retirement is
imminent and once they retire, the firm’s ability to punish them for their behavior
evaporates.
Corrupt and rent-seeking behavior on a systematic basis however shatters the
firm’s reputation, reduces profits and jeopardizes the firm’s future viability. Of im-
portance to Crémer is the fact that all of these costs are borne disproportionately by
the younger employees. Since those that defect retire soon after, it is the younger
employees that will shoulder the costs of a tarnished reputation. They alone will be
forced to operate in a firm that finds it more difficult to contract and gain investment
even as they did not sully the firm’s reputation in the first place.
In this firm, a burden-sharing scheme is in place that advantages older cohorts at
the expense of the younger members. Crémer models a solution to the ensuing inter-
generational conflict in which younger members bribe the older cohorts to not defect
from the corporate culture. Younger cohorts take on the more difficult tasks that have
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the most long term benefit and/or commit to an ex post utility transfer to their older
counterparts of at least the size senior members could gain through corruption and
rent-seeking. In exchange, older cohorts forgo activities that would sully the firm’s
reputation. The bargain, should it occur, resolves the inter-generational conflict and
ensures the long-term viability of the firm.
Alesina and Spear (1988) construct a similar model of parties to address the
dilemma that a “politician at the end of her career may have no incentive to follow
policies which are beneficial to her party or to society as a whole. Instead, she
may act selfishly to promote her own preferred policies” (p. 359). Alesina and
Spear (hereafter, A&S) question why retiring politicians do not defect from advertised
campaign promises and pursue rents rather than keep their promises. As in the firm,
intra-party conflict grounded in heterogeneous preferences toward the future exists.
A&S assume that voters choose leadership based on campaign promises and that only
promises that are deemed credible receive popular support. That said politicians near
their (exogenously-determined) term limit have little reason to be credible, since their
retirement is imminent. They would instead prefer to renege on advertised platforms
in the pursuit of greater rents.
Party reputations are meaningful and sticky, however, and such behavior on the
part of retiring politicians imposes high costs for other party members that expect
to be in the party for years to come. “Younger” (in political age) politicians that
hope to run under the party’s label in future periods need to preserve the party’s
reputation and to persuade their older counterparts to refrain from activities that
would discredit the organization in the eyes of voters. A&S conclude conclude that an
intra-party bargain struck between the two cohorts wherein members of the younger
cohort provide payments (e.g., monetary transfers or services to be rendered) to their
older counterparts can buy retiring members’ commitments to refrain from activities
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that would ruin the party’s reputation.10
That agency problems within organizations exist and can lead to a situation in
which some share of the organization bears a disproportionate share of the costs re-
sulting from the opportunistic behavior of other members is not especially new (Müller
2000, Weingast and Marshall 1988). What OLG models bring to the table is how
these processes may play out in an organization where the salient intra-organizational
divisions are generational. Models like these show how the cohort expecting to bear
a disproportionate share of the costs to actions taken by another “older” cohort of
members has an incentive and often the tools with which to persuade their counter-
parts to refrain from the actions in question. The upshot of both Crémer and A&S
is that policies within OLG organizations and the behaviors of members of OLG
organization may take into account periods of time beyond the immediate future.
These insights inform my theory about the premia different governments can be
expected to place on the two strategies of pursuing economic growth. I build an infor-
mal model of economic policymaking in the presence of the immediacy-sustainability
tradeoff and I show how variations in whether a ruling party is weakly-or well-
institutionalized maps onto time horizons and hence the premium on technological
progress and development. As in the Alesina and Spear approach, I consider a sit-
uation in which the utility-maximizing behavior of an older cohort, called “party
leaders”, imposes costs shouldered disproportionately by members of a younger co-
hort of “party deputies”.
2.2.1 The Model
To start, the party of interest in the model is the ruling party. For reasons that
become clear as we proceed, opposition parties will not play a role. For simplicity,
10For other models of political OLG organizations, see Soskice, Bates, and Epstein (1992), and
Muthoo and Shepsle (2004).
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I will assume a single-party majority government. Define “party leaders” as the
set of members of the ruling party that reside in the executive branch and initiate
legislation. They are “old” in the sense that they are near the end of the exogenously-
determined political life. Period t’s leaders are able to stand for reelection at the end
of the period. Should they win that reelection bid, leaders rule until the end of period
period t+ 1, when they are forced to retire. Let “party deputies” be the members of
the ruling party housed in the legislature that either accept or reject policy initiatives
proposed by leaders. Deputies are “young” in the sense that when leaders leave office,
they take over the party’s leadership positions.11
For any ruling party, political survival turns on citizens’ sophisticated retrospective
economic evaluations. When voters go to the polls they tally all the observed costs
and benefits of initiated economic policies. Should the net effect of a portfolio of
policies be positive, citizens reward the incumbent party with reelection, otherwise
they evict.12 Given this, political survival for members of a ruling party requires a
well-performing economy that is fueled by policies that do not undermine any positive
growth effects by imposing other more substantial costs on citizens. The survival
function for members of the ruling party then can be represented as
Si,t = Φ(β(Bi,t − Ci,t)), (2.1)
where S represents the probability of winning reelection using growth policy i, Φ is the
cumulative normal distribution, β some positive coefficient, and B and C represent
11The assumption of exogenously-determined political lives is consistent with the A&S approach,
but see Muthoo and Shepsle (2004) for models with endogenously-determined political lives. This
assumption of leaders as executives and deputies as individuals housed in the legislature is consistent
with the model in Soskice, Bates, and Epstein (1992).
12That citizens are sophisticated and look at multiple effects of an economic policy does not mean
they are “bankers” as in the MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) model. Sophisticated citizens
are not trained economists and hence unable to formulate useful expectations regarding the effects
of a set of policies. They can however, assess the returns of initiated policies.
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the benefits and costs of policy i on a representative citizen during period t.
Finally, the model assumes that politicians of all cohorts are interested in gaining
and retaining office for instrumental reasons. Holding office is not an end in and
of itself but it does allow individuals to achieve otherwise unobtainable ends and
therefore provides utility indirectly.Leaders wants policy and votes.13
2.2.2 Inter-Generational Conflict
Within a ruling party composed of leaders and deputies and where the status of
the economy shapes political leadership, we should expect conflict rooted in varying
perceptions of the importance of setting economic policies that have increasing returns
over time to exist. For their part, time t’s leaders will prefer a policy portfolio
that places virtually no importance on technology policy.Their aversion stems from
a couple of sources. Deploying technology policies risks failing to sufficiently satisfy
voters’ demands for a well-performing economy. Deviation from a policy portfolio
that is exclusively mobilization-oriented takes an unnecessary risk that citizens will
go to the polls observing a government that failed to produce sufficient economic
growth. Relatedly, leaders know that they cannot use any of the returns that accrue
after their last reelection bid. Whether they win or lose reelection at the end of
period t they are unable to take credit for any deferred benefits their policies may
bring and reap the rewards for having initiated those policies. Accordingly, such
returns are moot to them. Nor are leaders especially concerned about the decreasing
economic and political returns to an exclusive mobilization strategy since they do not
expect to have to manage those costs of decreasing returns. As long as the returns are
sufficient to win election at the end of period t, they do not care if those returns begin
13Those in power can increase their utility by deploying policies that reflect more closely their
ideology and partisan stances, initiating policies more in line with their ethnic and/or geographic
bases of support, policies that will leave a positive legacy, and/or politicians can use their access to
the policymaking apparatus to pursue rents and engage in corruption.
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to diminish later on. Any returns to a policy portfolio that accrue after period t’s
elections are irrelevant to the utility function of party leaders. Because of this, leaders
prefer to initiate policies with immediately observable positive returns regardless of
the long-term costs of these policies. Given the immediacy-sustainability tradeoff,
accumulation-oriented policies will be their preferred option of stimulating economic
growth.
But the future the leaders are willing to mortgage by such a policy portfolio is
the future of period t’s deputies. The deputies are therefore concerned that, should
leaders get their way, deputies stand to shoulder a disproportionate share of the
economic and political costs incurred from a strict mobilization strategy while the
leaders themselves do not pay any costs. Should it be the case that the returns to the
leaders’ mobilization strategy begin to diminish after the party leaders leave political
life and that the political opposition to further mobilization is expected to be intense,
it will not be period t’s leaders that are forced to rule in such circumstances, but
instead period t’s deputies. But in such an environment, time leaders’ in time t + 1
hands are tied. Technology policies will not be any more palatable then than in
time t, but reinvigorating accumulation incurs political costs. Deputies hope to avoid
this situation. If at all possible, deputies want a more equal burden-sharing scheme
with party leaders. They prefer a portfolio that allows them to retain some minimal
level of flexibility when they become leaders such that they possess tools of economic
management in future periods that allow them to manipulate the economy to their
advantage then as well. Period t’s deputies hope to establish an environment that
allows the party to continue retaining government in future periods. A nontrivial
premium on policies with increasing returns can facilitate this.
To be clear on an important issue, deputies are office-seeking politicians first
and foremost. But subject to the goal of retaining office in the immediate period,
deputies also prefer an economic regime that facilitates their goal of continuing to win
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elections down the road. A strict mobilization strategy subjects period t’s deputies to
the risk that they can win the most immediate reelection but then face an impossible
situation in which neither mobilization nor technology policies can work to help them
win further reelection bids. Mobilization may fail because of increasing opposition
to mobilization policies and the costs policies like wage repression and compulsory
savings place on citizens; technology fails for the reasons discussed at length already.
Thus, deputies seek a way to extend their careers until they are forced to retire by
term limits. A portfolio that can help in this regard is one that places some nontrivial
premium on policies with increasing economic returns like those designed to improve
technological infrastructure and human capital and those that stimulate innovation
and imitation. Such a policy portfolio represents for deputies at period t a more
equitable burden-sharing scheme and a way for deputies to increase the length of
their political careers. To summarize, for deputies, the worst case scenario is that
their party is ousted from the government in the immediate election cycle. But subject
to the goal of retaining office, deputies also prefer that some share of policies have
increasing rather than decreasing returns so as not to tie their hands upon taking
control. We can represent the utility function of a representative deputy as
Udep = Θ[Si,t, (δRi,t+n|Si,t ≥ S̄)], (2.2)
here Θ is a positive coefficient, Si,t, the political survival function in 2.1, and Ri,t+n
represents the returns to policy i in the period when deputies take the reigns of power.
R can be either positive or negative and is discounted by δ and only enters the utility
function if the deputy’s party actually wins reelection (i.e., if Si,t ≥ S̄, where S̄ is some
threshold share of voters the incumbent party needs to retain control of government).
Given their utility function, deputies are likely to be wary of a strict mobilization
strategy as they will be well aware of its decreasing political and economic returns
and the fact that, should those negative returns become manifest, they will be forced
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to deal with them alone. In an effort to avoid bearing the full weight of the constraints
to strict mobilization, period t’s deputies will aspire to find a growth policy regime
that strikes a balance between helping them (and the party generally speaking) win
office in the short term but that does not completely undermine their ability to
manage the economy in a future period.
2.2.3 Conflict Resolution
Having outlined the details of a likely inter-general conflict over economic growth pol-
icy, we can turn to how the conflict is resolved in weakly- and well-institutionalized
parties. There are two related reasons to believe that in weakly-institutionalized
parties, the premium on technological progress will be quite low. The first is that
the very nature of weakly-institutionalized parties makes it unlikely deputies pref-
erences will differ significantly from leaders’. As mentioned earlier, because weakly-
institutionalized parties lack legitimacy, roots in society, and effective organizations
they do not represent legitimate or even particularly effective avenues to power for
politically ambitious individuals. They are fragile entities and their fragility is com-
mon knowledge among members. Political instability of this sort reduces incentives
for deputies to consider the relatively distant future as they simply do not have suffi-
ciently high expectations that the party of which they are a member in period t will
exist in period t + 1 let along some more distant future. Where a party’s political
prospects turn entirely on the leader’s popularity, deputies have few reasons to plan
for the future because there is too much uncertainty regarding what the popularity of
the leader will be in the future and hence too much uncertainty regarding the likeli-
hood that they will have the opportunity to take the reigns of the party’s leadership
positions.
But even if a cohort of deputies with preferences different from the leaders exists,
it is still the case that the preferences of party leaders will prevail. The reason why is
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that deputies have no bargaining leverage relative to the party leaders. To see this,
consider the fact that one of the most notable characteristic of systems dominated by
weakly-institutionalized parties is excessive personalism whereby politics is dominated
by charismatic and popular individuals (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring
1999; Randall and Sv̊asand 2002). Clout within weakly-institutionalized parties lies
almost entirely in the person of the party founder or current leader. The rank-and-file
membership carries little weight and their support for the leader is neither necessary
nor sufficient to affect the outputs of the policymaking process. The support of party
deputies is of little relevance for party leaders and leaders are able to obtain the ends
they seek irrespective of the preferences of the rank-and-file membership.
As an example of the personalistic politics that characterize weakly-institutionalized
parties, take Peruvian politics between the years 1990-2000. This decade covered Fuji-
morismo—that period when Alberto Fujimori dominated the Peruvian political land-
scape. By all accounts this period hastened the decline of parties in Peru and set the
course for a party system composed almost entirely of fragile, weakly-institutionalized
parties and extreme personalism (Levitsky 1999; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Coppedge
2001; Roberts 1996). Throughout the decade, Fujimori created four parties—Cambio
’90 (Change ’90) Nueva Mayoria (New Majority) in 1992, Vamos Vecinos (Let’s
Go Neighbors) in 1998, and Perú 2000, each designed to mobilize support for either
his or his cronies’ candidacies for public office. But these loose organizations just
barely deserve the label “parties”. They had no ideology, no societal roots, no lasting
organization, and their success rested almost entirely on the popularity of Fujimori
himself. Indeed at the time, the Peruvian populace considered parties inimical to the
functioning of democratic politics and recognizing this, Fujimori relied entirely on his
popularity rather than any features of the parties he founded.14
14Indeed, Fujimori actually worked to demobilize Cambio ’90 immediately after his election so
as to consolidate power in himself and keep his public image as a populist anti-system, anti-elitist
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Such personalism meant that members within these parties had little political
leverage with which to bargain with and constrain Fujimori. The parties’ “only [ide-
ologies were] to back whatever Fujimori wanted to do without question” (Coppedge
2001, p. 193). But even in this role, the parties were not especially vital. The fact
that Cambio ’90 was only the third largest party in the legislature with only 32 of
180 seats had little relevance to Fujimori as he was still able to achieve his policy
preferences.15 The clearest evidence of this is his ability to institute a set of harsh ne-
oliberal structural adjustment programs during his presidency even as he campaigned
vigorously against such programs and their proponent Mario Vargas Llosa in the 1990
election (Levitsky and Cameron 2003).
More often than not, deputies in weakly-institutionalized ruling parties are stuck
in a situation in which they are nothing more than rubber stamps on the agenda of
party leaders. The possibility that deputies might disagree with that agenda carries
little weight in such personalized system. Often leaders simply do not need the
support of the deputies to accomplish the goals in question. In the presence of such
disproportionate power distribution, there is little reason to expect an OLG bargain
to obtain. Rather, because deputies find themselves in weak bargaining positions, the
preferences of the party leader will prevail.
Consider the effect of this sort of personalism in the context of the immediacy-
sustainability tradeoff and the generational conflict described above. Assuming for
the moment that period t’s deputies have sufficiently intense preferences for poli-
cies designed to stimulate technological progress, the personalism characteristic of
weakly-institutionalized parties does not endow them with any leverage to affect the
decisionmaking calculus of party leaders. Deputies have no clout within the party and
nothing of value to offer party leaders. In such systems, power already is concentrated
politician.
15By comparison APRA controlled 53 legislative seats and FREDEMO controlled 62 seats.
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in leaders and they have few party-oriented constraints on their behavior. In such
an environment, there is no reason to expect any OLG bargain that will increase the
premium on technology policies will prevail.
We have seen to this point that a cohort of deputies with incentives to plan for
the future and with sufficient bargaining leverage must exist for an OLG bargain to
obtain. Institutionalized parties are more likely to have both. First, the fact that
well-institutionalized parties have legitimacy, roots, and organization makes them
able to persist over time and survive changes in the political economic environment.
This in turn makes it more likely that deputies will have an opportunity to become
leaders in their current party, which is a necessary ingredient for deputies to value
the future.
Secondly, in systems with well-institutionalized parties, personalism is relatively
less important and this means that party leaders need the support of their deputies to
a greater degree to pass legislation. In short, deputies have some degree of bargaining
leverage. Recall the assumption that politicians value retaining office for instrumental
reasons. Politicians may use the policymaking apparatus to seek rents or initiate other
policies they deem valuable and utility enhancing. Where parties have strong roots in
society, effective organizations, and legitimacy personalistic appeals from politicians
are less effective the party leaders needs to work with other institutions and actors to
achieve their goals. This has implications for how party leaders can be expected to
interact with party deputies and vice versa. In weakly-institutionalized parties, party
leaders can achieve the ends they seek irrespective of party deputies’ preferences.
Where the ruling party is well-institutionalized by contrast, party leaders are forced
to rely relatively more on the consent of their party deputies to achieve the ends they
seek.
Because their support is relatively more important, deputies are endowed with
some degree of bargaining power, which they can use to increase their own utility by,
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in effect, holding hostage the utility of party leaders. Deputies will be more inclined
to withhold their support from policies that are utility increasing for the leaders if
the strategy leaders take to win reelection at the end of period t is one that deputies
find wholly unsatisfying because of the costs and constraints that strategy places on
deputies’ collective shoulders. The ability to manipulate the economy in politically
profitable ways for some period of time is crucial for deputies and so they attempt to
constrain leaders’ incentives to increase their own utility at the expense of deputies’.
There is then, a sort of tit-for-tat relationship between leaders and deputies wherein
should leaders undermine deputies’ utility by eschewing technology policies, deputies
exercise their ability to constrain the leaders’ abilities to increase their utilities by
withholding their support for leaders’ favored policies.
Herein lies the details of a bargain that resolves the conflict in such a way as to
produce a policy portfolio that gives a nontrivial premium on more than just the
immediate future. For a more equitable economic burden-sharing scheme, deputies
offer (credibly, I assume) to increase leaders’ seniority and agenda-setting powers of
party leaders. Deputies offer their virtually unconditional support for the leaders’
preferred set of policies if and only if leaders in turn set an economic policy regime
that produces a more equitable burden-sharing scheme and that allows deputies to
manipulate the economy in future periods when they become the party’s leaders. As
a result of deputies’ concession, leaders can set the legislative agenda regarding the
policies they favor and are virtually assured of obtaining their preferred outcomes.
Two conditions must exist for the agreement to hold however. First, it must be
the case that leader’s care about their pet projects to a degree sufficient for them to
strike a bargain with deputies. If the leaders do not value other policies, then there
is nothing that deputies can offer them to persuade leaders to move from their ideal
point. It does not seem like too far of a reach however to assume that leaders care a
good deal about what we might call their pet projects. As mentioned before, holding
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power is not of much value in and of itself, but rather it is meaningful only insofar
as it allows access to otherwise desired ends. Even for party leaders that expect to
leave the political scene in the relatively near future, those ends are valuable and it
should be the case that they will want to achieve those ends. Secondly, the deputies’
commitment to back those legislatives initiatives must be ex post for the bargain to be
enduring. If deputies back the leaders policies before technological development, they
leave themselves no instrument to force the hands of leaders, should leaders renege
on the bargain.
Along with seniority, it should also be the case that party leaders will control
the distribution of all the pork elements to whatever technology policy they initiate.
Technology policies have sizable tangible and distributable elements that can be of
great value to legislators who retain the ability to target and distribute those ele-
ments. Legislators can, for example, target R&D subsidies to firms or industries in
specific political districts or to firms with close relationships to politicians. Research
parks have brick and mortar locations that must be constructed in some location and
contracts must be allocated to do so. In the same way, legislators can target educa-
tion spending to build universities or expand the capabilities of existing universities
to particular geographic location; tax credits and public-private partnerships have
similar distributable elements. The distribution of that pork will be left to leaders,
who can use their authority to increase their utility even further. Economic policies
with steep upfront financial costs and deferred economic benefits will not be pop-
ular with citizens, but leaders can offset that dissatisfaction by targeting the pork
to their districts, thus providing relatively more immediate benefits to the citizens.
For leaders, agreeing to increase spending on R&D subsidies in the hope of fostering
the development of new technologies in the future is more likely when whatever pork
elements that arise from the project go to its own constituents. Technology policies
are far more palatable when firms in one’s own district receive the subsidies and
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the education facilities in one’s district receive large increases in funding. If assured
some large share of the pork elements of technology policy, leaders are more easily
persuaded to support their passage. Deputies recognize this and have incentives to
incorporate this aspect into the OLG bargain.
Existing research lends credence to the proposition that pork barrel politics can
enable the passage of general interest legislation (Alston and Mueller 2006; Evans
1994). Thurow goes so far as to argue that “if Congress insisted that research and
development funds . . . be spent equally in each Congressional district, industrial poli-
cies [that promote technological progress] could not possibly work” (quoted in Cohen
and Noll 1991, p5). My argument is consistent with Thurow’s claim but also shows
how we can expect pork to be distributed. The distribution of pork emerges from
an OLG bargain and represents one reward leaders attain in an inter-generational,
intra-organization burden-sharing scheme with party deputies.
2.2.4 Modifying Conditions
We might expect, however, that the effects of having a well-institutionalized party in
power will be conditional. Deputies may not always choose to exercise their bargain-
ing leverage. The effort to do so likely suffers from collective action dilemmas and
presumably, withholding support is costly because leaders retain access to various
tools useful in enforcing party discipline such as committee assignments, campaign
funding, and candidate position on ballots. Under what conditions will party deputies
overcome collective action dilemmas and work to force the hands of party leaders?
I propose two conditions, both of which rely on the assumption that if a critical
mass of deputies is mobilized on this issue, they can get their way since it would be
self-defeating for leaders to sanction all of them simultaneously.
First, deputies must expect to be able to claim credit for the returns technology
policies produce. This means that the party must be viable enough to expect to con-
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trol some sizeable share of future governments. An important feature of policies that
fuel economic growth is that they are in essence collective goods in the sense that
any politician in power when the returns accrue can use the returns to its political
advantage. This is true irrespective of whether that politician that claims credit for
the returns initiated the policy that produced those returns. The collective nature
of the returns to economic policy carries the disconcerting prospect for incumbents
that the government that initiates some policy will receive none of the political re-
wards those policies create. Rather, some opposition politician or party may control
government when the returns to technology policy accrue and reap the rewards the
policy in question produces even though that politician did not set the initial policy.
In other words, an appropriations problem exists. In the economic sphere, a
similar condition exists in that the new ideas that underpin new technologies are only
partially excludable goods (Romer 1990a; 1990b; North 1981) and competing firms
rationally seek to free ride off the research efforts of other and gain the productivity
benefits of the new technology without paying the costs to discover and develop the
technology itself (Scherer 1967; Loury 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980; Aghion and
Howitt 1992).16 The crucial difference between the economic and political spheres
however is that property rights do not exist for political incumbents as they do—albeit
to varying degrees—for economic actors. Political incumbents have no legal ownership
rights to the returns their policies produce. Hence, the kinds of protections that North
(1981) argues are essential for innovation and technological progress in the economic
sphere are wholly absent for politicians. Instead, reaping the political rewards to
growth policies requires that politicians be in power when the returns accrue and
claim credit for those returns.
Consequently, in assessing the value of policies with deferred returns, incumbents
16For modifying and contrasting views to this argument, see Knot and Possen (2002).
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must assess the share of the returns to the policies they expect to receive, which in
turn, is grounded in the share of future governments they expect to hold. When
members of an incumbent party do not expect the party will control a sizable share
of future governments—for example a single-party minority government in which
the governing party has never been broadly competitive in national elections—those
members have few incentives to set policies with deferred and increasing returns and
run the risk that another party will use those returns for their own political advantage.
Note that the appropriations problem is less severe for accumulation-oriented eco-
nomic policies. To be sure, the returns to these policies are also collective goods and
the growth enhancing effects of these policies are exploitable by any ruler in power
when they emerge. The essential difference is this strategy’s relatively more immedi-
ate returns give a greater likelihood that an initiating government will also be in power
when those returns arrive. Therefore, the prospects that the initiating government
will capture the political rewards their economic policies produce is greater.
Secondly, the effect of a well-institutionalized party depends on the expected eco-
nomic and political utility of further mobilization. If the theory to this point turns
on deputies perceptions of having to bear a disproportionate share of the burden
to short-term growth strategies, then it should be clear that as the intensity of the
perceptions increase so too will deputies’ likelihood of using their bargaining leverage
to obtain a more equitable burden-sharing scheme. The details of the two strategies’
economic and political return structures provides information on when the deputy
cohort’s preferences for technology policy will be intense and when their preferences
will be more consistent with those of party leaders.
Recall that mobilization exhibits political diminishing returns. We should ex-
pect stiff popular opposition to further efforts to invigorate mobilization if the tax
rate is already low (implying further mobilization will require further reductions in
government spending on politically-sensitive items or a larger government deficit),
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compulsory savings rates are already high, and/or wage repression extensive. In such
conditions, the disproportionateness of the leader’s proposed burden-sharing scheme
(i.e., a scheme that defers all of the political costs to economic policy to a future
period) is especially sharp. Deputies will seek to alter that scheme accordingly. Fail-
ure to do so means that deputies will be forced to take over the party’s leadership
positions in the face of hard political constraints that constitute an inability to ma-
nipulate the economy in a way that helps them continue winning elections. Under
such conditions, deputies have the clearest sense that their hands will be tied in a
future period. Accordingly, the value they place on policies that more equitably share
burdens among cohorts of the same party and the likelihood that they will exercise
their bargaining leverage increases.
In contrast when deputies expect opposition to further mobilization policies will be
low, the intensity with which they care about technology policies is negligible. In this
instance, party deputies’ hands are not tied by the mobilization strategy. They can
instead expect to have sufficient flexibility in the next period to continue pursuing
growth through mobilization and they need not be concerned with shouldering a
disproportionate share of the costs of the mobilization strategy. Here there is no
salient inter-generational conflict and deputies will have little reason to prioritize
technological development.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship between the expected political opposition
to reinvigorating mobilization and the premium on improving technological infras-
tructure. The solid line presents that relationship for deputies and the dashed line
does the same for party leaders. At low levels of expected political opposition, the
preferences of the two cohorts are indistinguishable. Here mobilization brings not just
immediate returns, but it has the additional benefit of not carrying any serious costs
for either leaders or deputies. When opposition is expected to be more vigorous, the
two cohorts diverge and separate according to expected costs they expect to bear as
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a result of popular opposition to further mobilization.
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In essence, this proposition concerns the timing of deployment of policies designed
to improve technological infrastructure and human capital. One useful feature of the
argument is that from it we can understand the tendency for governments to put
off improving their national technology systems until the “quiet crises” about which
Friedman (2006) and the National Academies (2006) write begin to find their voices.
In fact, the argument here implies that there might be a kernel of truth to the old
adage that “necessity is the mother of invention”, but here it is a political necessity
rather than an economic one that drives the outcome.17 The premia governments
place on human capital formation and improving the national technology system is
partly a function of the returns to mobilization strategy and the expected political
17At the level of the individual invention, it is rather clear that necessity need not and typically
does not precede the innovative efforts of entrepreneurs. Mokyr actually suggests the opposite might
more likely be the case; new inventions developed in the pursuit of profits engender altogether new
necessities (1990, Ch. 7).
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response to efforts at reinvigorating mobilization should the need arise (i.e., dimin-
ishing returns to some previously initiated portfolio of mobilization policies set in).
In most instances, mobilization is likely to be any government’s preferred strategy.
When the economic and political returns to that strategy begin to diminish however,
party deputies recognize the disproportionate burden-sharing scheme in place and
they endeavor to promote innovation and technology diffusion. To the degree that
innovation and technological adoption respond to government policy, technological
development may be more energetic when politicians have exhausted all their other
growth-stimulating alternatives but still need growth to retain power. Absent looming
economic malaise and expectations of opposition to efforts at further mobilizing labor
and savings to reinvigorate growth, no government will value the deferred returns and
upfront costs associated with catalyzing technological progress.
2.3 Summary and Conclusions
When and why do governments set technology policies when the returns to such
policies are deferred, the financial costs are large and upfront, and other policies with
a more politically palatable temporal return structure exist? The central argument of
this chapter is that the inter-temporal distribution of the costs of economic policy to
members of the same political party is a relevant dimension in understanding policy
choice. Drawing from models of overlapping generations organizations, I have argued
that governments systematically controlled by well-institutionalized ruling parties are
organizations for which the future’s shadow is comparatively longer as some share of
such parties’ membership has an incentive to avoid shouldering a disproportionate
share of the costs incurred by an exclusive short-term accumulation-oriented growth
strategy. That said, the effects of institutionalization are modified both by the party’s
short-term political position medium term viability and the expected utility of the
short-term growth strategy itself.
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The theory lends itself to several testable hypotheses and in the next chapter I
develop a research design with which to test the theory. In Chapter 3 as well as
Chapter 4, I confront the theory with the data.
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Chapter 3
OLG Parties and Human Capital Formation
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 argues that countries with well-institutionalized parties will have relatively
higher premia on policies designed to improve the quality of technological infrastruc-
ture and the level of human capital. This chapter along with Chapter 4 constitute the
empirical chapters of the dissertation. In this chapter I outline the research design
and conduct the first round of empirical tests. Chapter 4 continues to confront the
theory with the data.
3.2 Research Design
For all of the statistical models, all party-oriented independent variables mentioned
in the theory will be coded with reference to the ruling party, which in turn is oper-
ationalized as the largest party in the legislature in parliamentary systems and the
party of the executive for presidential ones. I code the variable with reference to
the ruling party to coincide with the theory’s retrospective voting assumption, which
implies that only parties crucial in setting economic policy are relevant in the theory.
Opposition parties do not play a role in my argument. I define the ruling party in
parliamentary systems as the largest government party following the literature on
cabinet formation, which argues that the distribution of cabinet ministries is deter-
mined in large part by the size of government parties such that the most important
and valuable ministries typically go to the largest parties. The economic ministries
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are almost always the most prized and so will typically be controlled by the largest
government party. In strong presidential democracies, the ruling party is clearer since
the president has policymaking power and appoints the heads of the ministries.
All empirical tests will use a sample of democratic countries. I exclude dicta-
torships even though research shows that poor economic conditions correlate with
changes in political leadership there just as they do in democracies because the mech-
anisms that operate in this relationship in autocracies differ from the relationship
between the economy and political selection in democracies.1 I use the PolityIV
database to measure the level of democracy, categorizing an observation as demo-
cratic if its polity score is greater than 0 on a scale of -10 to 10.
3.2.1 Dependent Variable
This chapter uses human capital statistics on the left hand side of the empirical
models even though education spending is not typically considered a ”technology
policy”. Both theory and evidence conclude that human capital is a critical element
for both innovation and technology adoption. Human capital improves the success
rate of R&D projects, facilitates the efficient adoption of frontier technologies. Ad-
ditionally, scholars have found recently that technological progress responds to the
level and pace of change of human capital at the post-primary education level as
opposed to primary schooling. In an empirical paper assessing the contributions of
primary and post-primary education on the mechanisms of economic growth for a
large cross-national sample of countries, Papageorgiou (2002) concludes that “The
most important finding of the paper is that primary education contributes mainly
to production of final output, whereas post-primary education contributes mainly to
1For literature on the relationship between economic conditions and leadership change in non-
democracies see Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi
(2000).
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adoption and innovation of technology” (14, emphasis added).
Beyond the fact that we have good reason to believe that human capital is an
important source for technological progress, the stock of human capital is useful to
test the theory because we can have confidence that human capital levels and rates of
change are functions of government policy. This feature is crucial because my theory
assumes that government policy shapes firm-level incentives to engage in innovation
and imitation. A proper test of the theory should analyze policy domains where we
have confidence that productive government investments will affect the outcome that
we care about. Education policy is such a domain. Figure 3.1 shows some preliminary
evidence to support this proposition. The figure plots the percent of the population
with some secondary education on the Y-axis against public education spending as a
percent of GDP on the X for democratic country-years between 1970 and 1999.2 The
figure reveals the positive relationship our priors would lead us to expect, suggestive
evidence that human capital outcomes respond to government spending.
Education statistics are useful also because the temporal distribution of the returns
to government efforts at developing post-primary human capital reflects closely the
temporal distribution discussed in the theory in Chapter 2. There is simply no way
around the fact that the largest share of economic returns to human capital-oriented
public policies are deferred well into the future, even as the financial costs necessary
to achieve those returns must be borne upfront. Governments must build and expand
schools, pay teachers’ salaries, and subsidize the costs of education many years before
the economic benefits of those policies emerge. This temporal distribution provides
a tight relationship between the theory and the variables used to assess the theory.
Finally, education statistics are effective as dependent variables because human
capital formation is likely to be the government’s preferred strategy to fuel innovation
2The temporal period reflects the extent of the education spending data. The attainment data
are gathered in five-year intervals between 1960 and 1999 (Barro and Lee 2000).
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and technology adoption, should they be inclined to do so. Relative to many other
policies governments could use, education initiatives have the benefit of being less
risky from the perspective of incumbent politicians. Many of the available policy
options governments have to catalyze technological progress require that politicians
pick winners and losers. R&D subsides and tax credits, for example, will require that
governments assess the viability of prospective technologies and distribute funding
according to those evaluations. Politicians are notoriously incompetent at such tasks
and by using such policies, incumbents expose themselves to the possibility that their
investments will fail to produce a viable technology. The complexities of innovation
and technology adoption are many and there are any number of unpredictable ways
the processes could go wrong. In a political-economic environment that prioritizes
observed economic results, governments will want to minimize the risk their policy
schemes will fail. Accordingly, politicians will seek out those strategies that can
accomplish the goal in question with as little risk of failure as possible.
It may be, then, that education spending is the “technology policy” that mini-
mizes the risks to which politicians expose themselves. While there are no assurances
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that education policy will produce technological progress, assuming that reasonably
well-functioning markets exist, the risks of policy failure are certainly much smaller
compared to the alternatives. Governments do not need to play an active role in
the economy to fuel technological progress as they may be forced to do using sub-
sidy and tax credit schemes. Rather, they can create a cohort of individuals with
sufficiently high human capital and let them engage in innovation and technology
adoption according to market incentives.3
Even as we know that the stock of human capital responds to productive gov-
ernment education spending, we do not necessarily know the conditions in which
governments are inclined to spend resources productively.4 Recognizing this, I rely
on education outcomes as dependent variables in the models rather than education
spending. This choice makes sense given the nature of the theory. I assumed for an-
alytic clarity, that economic policies are allocated with the intention of encouraging
growth and development in the national economy. Essentially, this is an assumption
that governments always allocate resources productively. While useful for analytic
clarity in the theory, it is not an accurate description of actual politics. Firms com-
3Additionally, governments will prefer education spending as a strategy because it is a more effi-
cient use of scarce government resources. That is, where governments seek to catalyze technological
progress through subsidy schemes and programs that grant resources to qualifying firms, the costs
of such programs are a function of the number of qualifying firms, the costs of the programs in
question, and the generosity of the government subsidy. For any serious government-led effort to
fuel the processes of technological progress, any subsidy or tax credit scheme will constitute a large
drain on the state’s financial resource. However, that governments may be compelled to increase
spending in the pursuit of economic growth is not to say that they do not have other commitments
that require government spending as well. Politicians will want to use their scarce resources effi-
ciently. By endeavoring to forge human capital, governments can take advantage of the economies
of scale associated with education spending, thereby maximizing the usefulness of their financial
resources. Once a school is constructed or an education retraining program initiated, the costs of
increasing the number of students that attend that school or program are rather low. The cost
of adding thirty-first student to a classroom of thirty is very small. Because of this, governments
will have more resources at their disposal, making human capital creation a more efficient way to
catalyze technological development and progress.
4One example of research investigating the productivity of education spending is Hicken and
Simmons (2008).
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monly receive favorable policies for reasons that have little to do with promoting
growth and politicians frequently distribute education spending with little regard to
the degree to which that spending produces human capital (Hicken and Simmons
2007). That said, testing the theory requires that we know the degree to which
governments productively invest their resources in technological development. Policy
variables such as education spending as a percent of GDP do not capture productivity,
but education outcomes do.5
Figures 3.2 - 3.4 show that the choice to use outcomes instead of spending is sub-
stantively important. Figure 3.2 plots the relationship between education spending
and one common measure of party institutionalization, the age of the ruling party
(logged), for a times-series cross-section sample of democratic country-years between
1975 and 1999.6 Essentially, the trend line is flat, indicating no effect of party in-
stitutionalization on the stock of human capital. By this graph, my theory would
seem incorrect. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 tell a different story however. In these, I plot the
percent of the total population that has attained some secondary education (in Figure
3.3) and some tertiary education (in Figure 3.4). Both figures show a clear positive
trend, preliminary evidence that institutionalized parties tend to perform better with
regard to the actual stock of human capital than poorly-institutionalized parties do.
Should these trends hold up to more rigorous statistical procedures, there would be
strong support for my theory even though there is no evidence that institutionalized
parties spend more on education. Taken together, these figures indicate that countries
may differ in the productivity of their education investments.
5Another reason I prefer to use education outcomes as dependent variables in this chapter rather
than education spending is because it need not be the case that governments have to increase
spending to increase the stock of human capital in a country. Governments could reveal a high
premium on technological development by minimizing the waste and inefficiencies in the current
education spending regime and reallocate resources to programs believed or proven to have the
greatest returns on the stock of human capital.
6The data reflect the coverage of the party age variable.
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With that in mind, I use two education attainment variables: (1) the percentage
of the total population that has attained some secondary education and (2) the per-
cent of the population that has attained some tertiary education. I obtained these
data from the International Data on Education Attainment Database (Barro and
Lee 2000), which collects education attainment statistics for over 100 countries for
five-year intervals for the period 1960-1999.
3.2.2 Independent Variables
The central variable in the theory presented in Chapter is the degree to which ruling
parties are well-institutionalized. We turn now to measuring that variable. Un-
fortunately, the extant literature on party institutionalization is not a very useful
guide.7 The difference between two prominent works on party institutionalization,
Huntington (1968) and Panebianco (1988) is illustrative. Huntington defines insti-
7For that matter, even the concept of an institution itself varies among scholars. North (1990)
for example, defines institutions as the formal rules and processes that impose constraints on actors,
while March and Olsen (1984) take a broader view and include informal behaviors and aspects of
culture.
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tutionalization as the “process by which organizations and procedures acquire value
and stability” (p. 12) evidenced by whether the organization in question exhibits four
characteristics:
1. Complexity—the presence and differentiation of subunits within an organiza-
tion,
2. Autonomy—the ability of the organization to “exist independently of other
social groupings and methods of behavior” (p. 20),
3. Coherence—unity of purpose among members of the organization, and
4. Adaptability—the ability to adjust structures and modes of behavior to a chang-
ing environment.
Panebianco disagrees. While Huntington argues that “[t]he more adaptable an or-
ganization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable
and more rigid it is, the lower its level of institutionalization” (p. 13), Panebianco
contends that institutionalized parties may well fail to change. For Panebianco, when
a party becomes institutionalized, it becomes more than just an instrument to accom-
plish some other goal. Rather, an institutionalized party is one that has “solidified”
in terms of its general ideology, bases of support, and organizational structure. For
such a party, change is hard to come by, even though the external environment may
undergo change. For Panebianco, institutionalization may decrease adaptability of a
party rather than stem from the ability of an institution to change over time.
Another source of confusion in the extant literature is whether party institution-
alization fundamentally concerns attitudes of society and party members toward the
organization or whether institutionalization concerns the behavioral attributes of the
organization, the routinization of procedures and whether the current rules and proce-
dures constitute a stable equilibrium. Here Huntington and Panebianco agree: both
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dimensions are relevant. Both authors speak about the importance of routinized
rules and structures and both also contend that a party is institutionalized when
it becomes valued in itself rather than solely for its instrumental purposes. Others
disagree however. An attitudinal dimension is conspicuously absent from North’s
general definition of institutions and for him institutionalization has more to do with
routinization than attitudes.8
Not surprisingly, the multiplicity of concepts and meanings leads to muddled
coding decisions and problems for causal inference (Levitsky 1998). One useful aspect
of my theory is that it identifies specific aspects of institutionalization that matter for
the economic policies under study in the dissertation. For my purposes, the relevant
dimensions of party institutionalization are those that determine the degree to which
an observed party resembles an ideal-type OLG organization.
Mainwaring’s (1999) conceptualization of an institutionalized party as one that has
strong roots in society, a capable organization, and is seen as legitimate by members
of the organization and other actors is a useful framework to capture the relationship
between institutionalization and “overlapping-ness”. The various combinations of
these three features indicate the prospects for a given party to be longer-lived than
the individual members of the organization. Roots in society, for example, create a
connection between citizens and the party that gives the organization a stable and
dependable base of support on which it can rely over time and in multiple elections.
Effective organizations are crucial for mobilizing this support base in elections. And
where parties are seen as legitimate and even necessary for functioning of democratic
8Levtisky (1998) brings some cohesion to this debate arguing that both values of routinization of
rules and behavior matter for institutionalization but they constitute separate dimensions. Actual
parties may well be institutionalized on one dimension but not the other. As evidence, he gives
Partido Justicialista (PJ), Argentina’s Peronist party. According to Levitsky, PJ is institutionalized
on the attitudinal dimension evidenced by its long-standing support from the lower classes and labor
even after the death of Perón. But PJ is uninstitutionalized on the routinization dimension as seen
by the fact that party members often ignore or change the party’s rules and structures to suit their
personal preferences at the time.
90
politics, ambitious individuals look to join existing parties to accomplish their political
aspirations, thereby giving the party a new cohort of individuals that can sustain the
organization even after the current cohort of party leaders leaves political life. By
contrast, illegitimate parties with weak organizations, and only tenuous connections
with social groups are likely to be fragile and unable to survive the exit of the part
founder as the party has nothing except the popularity of the leader to sustain itself
over time.
Despite their usefulness conceptually, practical and substantive concerns make
measuring each of these three features difficult. A common way of measuring the
legitimacy of an organization is through surveys of citizens in which respondents are
asked to identify how much they trust various organizations. While use of such mea-
sures is common in American and comparative research, a trust instrument is prob-
lematic here. The most serious issue stems from the fact that the survey instrument
does not allow us to identify the source of trust. Citizens may trust an organization
on at least two grounds: the procedures by which the organization produces outcomes
and the nature of the outcomes themselves (Almond and Verba 1963; Weatherford
1992).9 In my theory, insofar as citizens assign legitimacy based on outcomes, there
is bound to be pernicious endogneity. I have argued that party institutionalization
has observable consequences for economic policy and in the statistical models to test
the theory, the dependent variables are indicators of an economy’s ability and proven
capacity to achieve sustained economic growth. Available evidence from comparative
studies shows that real and perceived economic conditions affect the degree to which
respondents trust various organizations (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). The finding
that economic performance affects trust responses means reverse causality will be at
9So, for example, a judicial system can be seen as trustworthy (and hence legitimate) if it uses
predictable and fair processes in adjudicating conflicts and/or, for example, because it manages to
stamp out corruption in the government and bureaucracy.
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work if the trust instrument is used on the right-hand side of statistical models as a
measure of the degree of party institutionalization.
The same endogeneity problem arises with respect to measuring the strength of
societal roots through survey instruments asking respondents to identify how “close”
they feel to a certain party. My theory has assumed that evaluations of the incum-
bent party turn, at least in part, on evaluations of the economy. To the degree that
attitudes of “closeness” to a party respond to the performance of the economy, citi-
zens are going to feel close to a party presiding over a well-performing economy and
distant from a party presiding over economic stagnation, malaise, and economic crisis.
Again, because my theory links party institutionalization to economic policy choice
and indirectly to economic performance, a causal relationship leading from economic
performance to the dimensions of institutionalization creates endogeneity problems.
Instrumental variable regression provides some respite from the endogeneity con-
cern, but such models are notoriously fickle and depend critically on strict exogeneity
assumptions that often are unfulfilled (Bound et. al. 1995; Bartels 1991). And as
difficult as it is to estimate an endogenous relationship between one right-hand side
variable and the left-hand side variable, it is even more difficult to estimate accurately
and usefully a model that accounts jointly for two endogenous relationships. An ad-
ditional problem with using trust or closeness instruments is their limited spatial and
temporal coverage in new and developing democracies. Surveys of the sort that asks
trust questions cross-nationally are relatively new in the developing world and this
lack of data will bias my sample toward stable and consolidated democracies and
away from an important set of cases. Measuring the strength of an organization is
not any easier. From Mainwaring’s discussion for example, one only knows a strong
organization by the ability of the organization to live past the life of the leader.
An alternative strategy to measure party institutionalization is to find a variable
from whose variations we can infer the values the three underlying variables take. This
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variable can be used to proxy for legitimacy, societal roots, and organization strength.
One variable that fits the bill is a party’s time since formation. As discussed above,
a clear observable implication of the degree to which a party is well-institutionalized
is whether the party is long-lived. Illegitimate, poorly organized, and ideologically
unattached parties are unlikely to persist over time. Indeed, on what grounds could
such a party persist? The popularity of the leader is certainly one possibility, but the
prospects of becoming a long-lived organization for a party whose political prospects
turn entirely on the popularity of the party founder are bleak. By contrast, legitimate,
well-organized parties with strong roots find it easier to survive over time. Party lead-
ers can come and go and wax and wane in popularity while the party, through its
organization, connectedness with groups in society, and perception of legitimacy can
persist. A party’s age is not a perfect proxy, of course. We do not know the exact rela-
tionships between legitimacy, societal roots, and organizational strength on one hand
and party age on the other. Still, time since formation is a useful proxy as it certainly
captures the sharpest differences between illegitimate, disconnected, and disorganized
parties and their highly legitimate, connected, and organized counterparts.
Despite its many points of disagreement, the extant literature supports the notion
of using an organization’s age as an indicator of institutionalization. Huntington
(1968) writes “the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the
higher the level of institutionalization. The older an organization is, the more likely
it is to continue to exist through any specified future time period” (13). Mainwaring
concurs: “the ability of parties to survive a long time provides one indication that
they have probably captured the long-term loyalties of some social categories” (p.31).
Wibbels and Roberts (1999) use party age as a measure of party institutionalization
in their study of electoral volatility in Latin America.10
10See also Dix (1992) Kuenzi and Lambright (2001).
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Additionally, a party’s time since formation is a good indicator of the degree to
which a party is an OLG organization. Stokes (1999) reviews Alesina and Spear’s
model of parties and democratic accountability and writes, “If overlapping gener-
ations models have the mechanisms right, comparative research ought to reveal an
association between the age of parties and the age of democracy on one hand and gov-
ernment responsiveness, on the other” (259-260, emphasis added). The same should
apply to an OLG model of parties and economic policy. A party’s time since forma-
tion is a useful indicator here precisely because it is a measure of the organization’s
proven capacity to survive longer than any cohort of members. With few exceptions
especially new and young parties cannot be considered OLG parties as they simply do
not fulfill a basic requirement: they have not actually “overlapped” anything. Older
parties have proven their ability to outlive the members they serve.
I measure the age of parties with the World Bank’s Database of Political Institu-
tions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh, 2001). The database covers the period
1975-2004 for well over 150 countries of all levels of political and economic develop-
ment. A party’s age is coded according to the number of years since the party was
founded under its current name. The investigators are aware of purely “cosmetic”
name changes in which the party’s name changes, but the party leaders, platform, and
constituency remain the same, and they do not code an obviously cosmetic change as
the date of a new party’s formation. Those changes are incorporated into the time
since formation of the party before the name changes.11
The left graph in Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the age of the ruling party
across all democratic country-years. The data clearly are right-skewed; this is ex-
pected. Countries that took part in the third wave of democratization constitute a
11A merger between parties is not counted as a new party with a new formation date unless the
new party has an altogether new name instead of incorporating the name of one of the previous
parties before the merger.
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sizable share of the observations and it should not be surprising that the ruling parties
in these countries often are relatively young; many of the parties formed only after
the political openness brought by democratization. Even so, a nontrivial share of the
sample have ruling parties over 50 years old. The graph on the right is the party age
logged, which I will use in the subsequent statistical analyses to address the skew in
the data and minimize the probability that extreme cases will wreak havoc on the
estimated betas.
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3.2.3 Modifying Independent Variables
The theory also discussed two variables that shape whether the mechanisms that con-
nect party institutionalization to the economic policies in question here are activated.
The first of these is the party’s medium-term viability, or the degree to which members
of the ruling party (specifically deputy members) can reasonably expect to control
a sizable share of future governments in the relatively near future. The argument is
that deputies only value the increasing returns to technology policies if they believe
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their party is sufficiently politically viable over time to retain some sizeable share of
future governments, which in turns allows them to claim credit for some share of the
returns created by technology policies deployed in a previous period.
How do we go about measuring expectations? The ideal strategy would be to
interview politicians, but this is impractical in a cross-national analysis. Macro-
political variables can suffice if we can use that data to simulate the calculations
a politician in country i at time t actually might make when forming expectations
about the party’s political future. Formulating expectations about the share of future
governments a party might control is exceedingly complicated and we should expect
that a politician forming such expectations will look for shortcuts. That politician
might assess the party’s position in the legislature and government in previous years
and use that as an informational shortcut regarding the party’s future. So for example,
a member of a party with a history of only barely exceeding the minimum number
of votes necessary to receive seats in the legislature and that only rarely is part of
a governing coalition will not expect that the party will control a sizable share of
future governments. By contrast, members of an historically dominant party may
reasonably expect to control a nontrivial share of seats in the future.
In other words, the information contained in a party’s past acts as the politician’s
guide to how heroic the assumptions of changes in the political-economic environment
must be for the politician to have suitably high expectations that the party will
control a sizable share of future governments. A member of a traditionally small
party that is also inessential for governing coalitions would need to make rather heroic
assumptions about changes in the political and economic status quo to conclude that
the party should expect to obtain a sizable share of future governments. Members
of viable and dominant parties need not resort to such strained assumptions to reach
the same conclusion. Rather in the political economy as it exists, members of this
party can conclude that their party is a viable political actor. Therefore, we can
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use macro-political data to approximate individual politicians’ calculations regarding
their parties’ future prospects. Specifically, as alluded to above, perhaps the most
useful information for a politician forming expectations about the party’s prospects
in the not-too-distant future is the ruling party’s past share of seats in the legislature.
Worth noting is the fact that past shares of seats is not, and probably cannot be a
perfect measure of actual seat shares a party receives in future periods. Unforseen and
exogenous shocks that decrease the relevance of past events may occur and politicians
may alter their campaign and policymaking strategies based on their previous seat
shares, thereby reducing the salience of past conditions for the future. Thirdly, a
myriad of factors shape the share of seats a party obtains and actual share of seats
simplifies the processes at work producing unavoidable estimation error. Each of
these are serious concerns, but even so past seat share can still be useful.
For one, we do not need to predict the share of seats a party will actually control.
For the purposes of testing my theory, the measure needs only to capture the likely
estimate a party member has, accurate or not. Politicians will act according to their
expectations, irrespective of whether those expectations prove close approximations
to reality in a future period. With that in mind, my measure needs only to capture
the crucial ingredients in that estimate, one of which almost certainly will be the
party’s past share of seats. Notice also that this logic implies that exogenous shocks
that decrease the relevance of the past share of seats or the fact that politicians may
alter their behavior based on the distribution of seat shares are not too troubling. If
a given exogenous shock or policy change by members of an opposing party truly are
unforseen, their effects will not enter the calculations of party members in the present
period and so they are irrelevant from the standpoint of forming expectations before
the shocks and endogenous changes occur.
The variable that I create to measure expectations of the share of future gov-
ernments a party can expect to control then is a moving average of the party’s past
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share of seats. I use a moving average both because over time, significant variation
in a party’s seat share can occur and because a representative politician is likely to
weigh the recent past more heavily than the distant; a moving window simulates
this by dropping information from the too-distant past from the politician’s calculus
altogether.
The inevitable concern with using a moving average is the possibility that the
length of the window of time used to create the average will drive the results. There is
no getting around the fact that the choice of window length is arbitrary, but to ensure
the results are robust, I will create measures based on a couple of window lengths.
Primarily, I will use a length of 5 years. Longer windows are preferable theoretically
but as a practical matter, the costs of lengthening the window outweight the benefits.
A nontrivial share of observations in my database are new democracies or relatively
short democratic episodes in between periods of autocratic rule and do not last much
longer than 4 or 5 years and even then, the ruling party may change frequently during
that period. Using a window of longer than five year excludes these observations from
the sample and biases the sample toward stable countries and away from developing
and transitioning ones. That said, five year years should be long enough in most
countries to cover at least 1 election period and so should be long enough to find
changes in the seat share of the parties.
The second variable that conditions when we should expect to observe the effects
of party institutionalization on economic policy is the expected returns of the mo-
bilization strategy. The crux of the theory is that party deputies hope to avoid a
scenario in which party leaders use short-term economic growth policies exclusively
and leave party deputies to shoulder the economic and political costs of that strategy
in the future. It should be evident that if the mobilization strategy is not expected
to run into diminishing returns in the near future, then party deputies will have no
problem with an exclusive short-term strategy. In fact, just the opposite should be
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the case. When it is not expected that the mobilization strategy will not exhibit di-
minishing returns, deputies’ preference are completely in line with party leaders and
everyone prefers to use the mobilization growth strategy exclusively. In this instance,
deputies do not feel that their hands are being tied and their ability to manipulate
the economy in a future period undermined by the behavior and economic policy
preferences of party leaders. In other words, the intensity of members of the deputy
cohort’s preferences depends on the expected costs and benefits of the mobilization
strategy itself. Should deputies expect that the mobilization will exhibit diminish-
ing returns and that they will be forced to handle the economic and political fallout
that comes with those decreasing returns, deputies will tend to prefer to place some
nontrivial weight on technological progress (subject to the constraint of winning the
most immediate election).
I measure the expected returns to mobilization as the level of investment as a
share of a country’s Gross Domestic Product. The hypothesis motivating this variable
choice is that the growth effects of mobilizing capital and labor where those factors of
production are under-mobilized will be much more significant in comparison to those
countries where that have already invested in mobilizing those factors. In countries
with especially low stocks of capital, a government initiative to mobilize capital and
labor can have dramatic positive economic benefits. In countries where the stock of
capital is already quite high, mobilizing more labor to a degree that has a significant
economic impact becomes increasingly difficult and it should be in this instances
where the effect of party institutionalization should be more pronounced.
3.2.4 Estimation
To test the theory, I estimate the following equations separately using Ordinary Least
Squares.
EDi = β0 + β1PARTYi + βXi + εi (3.1)
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EDi = γ0 + γ1PARTYi + γ2MVi + γ3PARTYi ∗MVi + γXi + νi (3.2)
β0 and γ0 are constant terms, EDi is either secondary or tertiary education attainment
for country i, PARTY is the party institutionalization measure, MV either of the
modifying variables, X a set of economic and political control variables, and ε and
ν the error terms. Equation 3.1 tests the general proposition that institutionalized
ruling parties matter. Equation 3.2 test the validity of the modifying conditions.
Both are useful to assess the theory.
One necessary control variable is the log of per capita GDP, which accounts for
“Wagner’s Law”, the proposition that increasing levels of wealth correspond with
more government spending on services like education programs. GDP per capita also
measures the extent to which citizens have access to a private source of education
supply. Wealthier citizens have easier access to private schools, which they can use
if they deem the government’s education programs inadequate. Poor citizens must
rely on public education programs. GDP may also be correlated with the age of
parties. As an empirical matter, it is certainly the case that most countries that have
long-lived parties are, with few exceptions, exceptionally rich countries and those
countries with young parties are disproportionately new democracies and short-lived
democratic episodes; observations disproportionately relating to the developing world.
Additionally, insofar as economic performance affects citizen’s trust and closeness
evaluations, it will be the case that parties in wealthier countries will find their support
among the citizenry longer-lasting than the support of citizens for particular parties
where the economy is poorly-performing.
I also include the log of a country’s population in the models. Recall that the
dependent variables under scrutiny in this chapter are scaled as a percent of country
i’s total population. Countries with large populations then, will have to allocate more
resources or allocate resources more productively than their less populated counter-
parts to achieve similar results. Data on GDP and population are obtained from the
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Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002).
Even though the sample of countries used in the statistical models excludes dic-
tatorships, variation in the level of democracy still exists. This is relevant given the
substantial evidence that more democratic countries spend more on education (and
public goods in general) and spend more productively, evidenced by their better per-
formance on education statistics (Lake and Baum 2001; Stasavage 2005; Brown and
Hunter 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Rudra and Haggard 2005). To
account for this and to isolate the effect of party institutionalization irrespective of
the degree of democracy, I include level of democracy as a control using the Polity
database (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2004).
The log of the age of the regime is a useful control variable as well. Using a
party’s time since formation as an independent variable runs the risk of conflating
the effects of institutionalized parties with the effects of an institutionalized regime.
Not surprisingly, old parties typically exist only in established regimes. Since there
is little doubt that politics in established and new democracies differ considerably on
many dimensions, including the age of the party, omitting the age of the regime may
produce a spurious correlation on the party age variable. Its estimated effect may
“pick up” the effects of the institutionalized and consolidated regimes.
The next set of variables are institutions that distinguish between types of democ-
racies and that may also affect education spending patterns. First, I control for
whether a country has a presidential or parliamentary arrangement given the evi-
dence that this distinction generates differences in the amount of government spend-
ing and its efficiency. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) for example argue that
presidential systems should have smaller governments as they will allocate fewer re-
sources to inefficient programs and they spend less on public goods. Their finding
regarding public goods is especially relevant here. Education spending is not a pure
public good per se, but it is a public-regarding good as Cox and McCubbins (2001)
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define that term. More significantly, the main outcome associated with human cap-
ital—namely sustained economic growth—does approximate a public good. I use
the Database of Political Institution’s trichotomous measure which divides democra-
cies into three types: parliamentary (which receives a score of 2), assembly-elected
presidential (scored as 1), and directly-elected presidential systems (a score of 0).12
To account for any differences in spending levels and efficiency that may exist
between majoritarian and proportional representation systems, I include an indicator
variable from DPI that assigns a value of 1 to plurality systems and a 0 to PR systems.
I also include a set of regional dummy variables into the model. I do so to account
for the broader political and economic trends that determine education statistics in
individual countries. Take for example the set of Eastern European countries of the
former Soviet Union that have successfully transitioned to democracies after the col-
lapse of the U.S.S.R. During the Cold War, communist governments promoted educa-
tion actively. They did so to teach and spread the ideology and also to create a stock
of human capital that would rival, if not surpass, that in the West. Consequently,
the countries of the Eastern Bloc had some of the highest education attainment rates
in the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these countries retained high
stocks of human capital. For those countries that transitioned to democracy and
therefore enter my sample here, the fact that they have high education attainment
rates has nothing to do with the quality of their political parties since they became
democratic, but rather the nature of the communist regime that controlled the coun-
try for decades. Failing to account for the fact that these new democracies emerged
from regimes that placed a good deal of emphasis on education will mis-estimate the
12In the instance that a country has both a prime minister and president, the investigators consider
whether the president has veto powers where the legislature needs a supermajority to override that
veto, whether the president can appoint and dismiss the prime minster, and whether the president
can dissolve parliament. A system is categorized if the first of these is true or the second and third
points are true.
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effect of party institutionalization.
A similar issue exists for countries in East and Southeast Asia. As has been
recounted numerous times, autocratic regimes in these countries made great strides
in increasing literacy rates since the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, there is evidence
that countries in the region learned from each other and mimicked successful economic
polices including those oriented toward improving education. Since the 1990s, many of
these countries have transitioned to democracy and many have altogether new parties
controlling government. But since the education rates are sticky, it would seem that
absent some set of controls to model the fact that a previous regime went a long way
in forging the stock of human capital that we observe today, we will estimate poorly
the effect of the party institutionalization on education attainment. Unfortunately,
despite the volumes of literature on the topic, we still do not have a very good sense
as to what determined why regimes in these countries went to such greater lengths
to forge human capital and what factors shape the variations in the effort and ability
the governments had to do so. A regional control variable can grant us some leverage
here however. To account for these broader factors as well as potential similar issues
in the other regions, I include a set of regional dummy variables in all of the models;
Sub-Saharan Africa will be the excluded category.
I estimate equations 3.1 and 3.2 using a cross-section sample of democratic episodes
between the years 1975-1999, where an episode is defined as any country-year with a
Polity score greater than 0 on the standard twenty point scale ranging from -10 to 10.
At first glance, using a cross-section sample may appear questionable in light of the
increasing popularity of TSCS samples and techniques in the comparative political
economy field and the theory which deals with specifically with the nature of a spe-
cific ruling party at a specific country-time. Without a doubt TSCS models can be
useful. They allow researchers to model both cross-national and temporal variations
and avoid discarding useful information. Even so, there exist a couple of reasons why
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a TSCS sample and corresponding techniques are inappropriate here.
The first is the problem of serial correlation in both independent and dependent
variables. Education attainment statistics change only slowly over time and typi-
cally changes in attainment move in one direction: toward higher proportions of the
population having attained some education. Age of the ruling party too, exhibits au-
tocorrelation; not surprising since ruling parties are in power typically for more than
one year at a time. The first-order correlation for secondary education attainment
in my is 0.94 and even higher for tertiary education at 0.97. This, despite the fact
that the education data were collected only once every 5 years. It is likely that the
correlations would be even larger if the data were gathered on a yearly basis. The
first-order correlation for the age of the ruling party is 0.97 for the observed values of
the indicator and 0.93 for the log of the party age variable.
As is well-known serial correlation on the left-hand side presents several impor-
tant statistical problems. One can however model the serial correlation with a lagged
dependent variable (LDV) as Beck and Katz (1995) recommend. Doing so however,
does not constitute a perfect solution. Achen (2000) warns of the statistical problems
that arise with both independent and dependent variables exhibit high serial corre-
lation. He shows that including an LDV on the right-hand side can wreak havoc on
the model’s exogenous autocorrelated Xs. Specifically, he finds that when both Xs
and Ys exhibit serial correlation, the coefficient on the LDV is biased upward and
dominates the regression, while at the same time wiping out the effect of the other
trended exogenous variables. Even worse, the presence of an LDV may cause the sign
on the exogenous coefficients to flip altogether. An AR(1) model avoids this concern,
but is less appealing substantively here since we have reason to believe that it is not
the errors that are correlated over time but rather the level of secondary and tertiary
education attainment themselves.
An added complication is that the models require the inclusion of country-specific
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fixed effects to model unit heterogeneity. In a model that included country dummies
(not shown here), an F-test on the set of country dummies rejects the null hypothesis.
The inclusion of country-specific effects is problematic though because many of the
independent variables whose effects I want to estimate are time-invariant or move
only infrequently over time. The country-specific effects will be highly correlated
with the slowly-moving variables and perfectly correlated with the time invariant
one; the sluggish variables will have very large standard errors and the time invariant
ones will drop from the model altogether.13
Still, we might be able to gain some traction on equations 3.1 and 3.2 using a
TSCS sample by using a distributed lag model, a distributed lag model with an
autoregressive component, or an error-correction model, but I contend that even
in light of these alternatives, an important issue exists that warrants the use of a
cross-sectional sample. Simply put, given the data, most of the variation that needs
explanation is in fact cross-sectional in nature rather than temporal. The issue here
is that the variable I use to measure party institutionalization—the log of party
age—moves more frequently than the concept of institutionalization itself does. Party
age moves every year, but a party’s level of institutionalization is exceedingly sticky.
To state the obvious, the ruling party cannot increase in age by more than 1 year at
a time. This however, is far too small an increase to generate meaningful changes in
institutionalization and so it is far too small to produce the changes in the dependent
variable that I expect to observe. In short, a unit change of the independent variable
used in the model does not produce a change in the conceptual independent variable.
A problem would not exist if a large number of countries had both well- and
13The main alternative to the fixed effects estimator, the random effects model, is inappropriate
as well. The sampling strategy in this project is to collect as many democratic episodes as possible
and so it is difficult to argue that the unit-effects are randomly drawn from some larger universe of
cases. Nor are we likely to fulfill the rather strict assumptions of exogeneity between the Xs and the
errors that the random effects model requires.
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weakly-institutionalized parties and control of government frequently alternated be-
tween them. Unfortunately, precisely the opposite occurs more often. In most coun-
tries that have institutionalized parties, all of the major political parties are relatively
well-institutionalized and vice versa. In my sample, for example, the average within-
country standard deviation in the age of ruling parties is just over 11 years, the
median is 9 years, and the 75th percentile only 15 years. It is quite a stretch to
argue that 11 years is sufficiently different to distinguish between a well- and weakly-
institutionalized ruling party. Add to this the fact that most countries that have large
standard deviations in the age of the ruling parties are wealthy democracies and they
have larger standard deviations in no small part because of longer time series in the
data rather than because there are clear differences between the level of institution-
alization in the ruling parties. Of the set of countries that have standard deviations
in the age of ruling parties at the mean value (11.8) or lower, 75% of observations are
developing countries (i.e., non-OECD democracies) and the average age of the demo-
cratic episodes for those developing countries is less than 14 years.14 For countries
in the 75th percentile in terms of the standard deviation of the age of ruling parties
(14.94), just under 60% of the observations are OECD countries and the average age
of the regime for these OECD countries is over 48 years.15 Much of the variation
in the standard deviation of party ages then comes as a function of the age of the
regime, not because of any substantial differences in the level of institutionalization
between parties in a country.
Think about it this way. Consider a hypothetical young democracy that has ex-
isted for ten years. Let the hypothetical country have two parties, each of which
14For all countries with a standard deviation at or below the mean value, the average regime age
is still just under 20 years.
15For all countries above the 75th percentile, the average regime age is still just about 35 years.
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ruled for 5 consecutive years. Party A ruled for the first five years and Party B
rule for years 6-10. Assume each was formed immediately at the founding of the
democratic regime. At the end of the 10-year period, it is safe to say that neither
party would be old enough to be considered well-institutionalized. In a TSCS set of
countries, all of the observations would indicate a weakly-institutionalized party ruled
government even though in period 1, the ruling party was one year old and in period
10, the ruling party was ten years old. Despite the fact that the ages of the party
changed over time, the observations represent repeated observations of the same polit-
ical event—a weakly-institutionalized party controlling government. In this scenario,
the conceptual independent variable is a constant even as the independent variable
as operationalized varies. The relevant comparison groups are not the hypothetical
country at time 1 versus the same country at time 10, but rather countries controlled
by weakly-institutionalized and those controlled by well-institutionalized ones.
The upshot here is that for most countries, the variation in the ages of ruling
parties is negligible relative to the variation needed to indicate significant cross-party
variations in institutionalization. Consequently, given my theory, within a coun-
try over time, we will not observe noticeable differences in the premium technological
progress receives. That this is true means that using a TSCS sample of countries is in-
appropriate since the core conceptual variable—party institutionalization—effectively
is a constant for most countries or at least quite sluggish.
Expectations
In Equation 3.1, the theory’s expectations are clear: PARTY should be positive.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the expectations stemming from Equation 3.2. In each graph,
the bold solid line represents the marginal effect of party institutionalization, the
curved dashed lines indicate the confidence intervals around that effect ( curved to
represent the distribution of the modifying variable and the increased confidence we
have of the marginal effect where we have more data).
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Graph 1(a) reflects Equation 3.2 where the modifying variables is either the three-
year or 5-year ruling party’s past seat share. The figure shows that the marginal effect
of party institutionalization is positive throughout the range of the modifying seat
share variable, but is only statistically significant for a small range of that variable.
This represents the theoretical proposition that it is only in the instances when the
ruling party expects to control some sizeable share of future governments, measured
by a moving average of past share of seats, that party deputies will have an incentive
to press for a greater premium on technology policy. When they do not have such
expectations (when the moving average of seat shares is small), deputies infer that
they will be unable to reap the political rewards of their technology policies since
they will not be in power to claim credit what returns ultimately arrive. Therefore,
deputies do not use their bargaining leverage.
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Figure 3.6: Theoretical expectations
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Notice also that in Graph 1(a) that the effect of party institutionalization becomes
insignificant at very high level of seats shares. This reflects the effects of weak com-
petition on a ruling party’s policymaking strategies. When a party has controlled an
exceptionally large share of seats for some nontrivial length of time in the past, say
upwards of 70% for example, it likely does so because of weak political competition,
constraints on the ability of opposition parties to mobilize support, or outright ma-
nipulation at the ballot box. In any event, when a party controls an exceedingly large
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share of seats, we can expect that the possibility of being evicted from office for poor
economic performance is lower and so the incentive to provide a growing economy is
lower too. As Lake and Baum (2001), Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, Smith, and Mor-
row (2004) have noted, a certain level of political competition is necessary to inspire
leaders to care about economic growth at all. Insofar as an exceptionally large share
of seats over a long period of time is evidence of a lack of that level of competition it
should be the case that the effect of a large share of seats trumps the effects of party
institutionalization.
Graph 1(a) shows the marginal effect of party institutionalization as having a
flat slope for illustrative purposes, but in practice, the slope may be positive as in
Graph 1(b). Graph 2, reflects Equation 3.2 where the modifying variable is invest-
ment as a share of GDP. Here, the slope certainly should be positive, indicating the
effects of party institutionalization should increase with the stock of capital as further
mobilization will have smaller and smaller effects on the overall growth rate.
I now turn to the statistical results.
3.3 Results
Table 3.1 presents the results from Equation 3.1. Model 1 in the table presents results
using secondary education attainment as the dependent variable and Model 2 uses
tertiary education attainment. The results of both models support the proposition in
the theory regarding the effect of political parties are policies designed to fuel inno-
vation and technology adoption. In each, the coefficient is positive and statistically
significant. The sizes of the coefficients are of substantive importance too. Given
that party age in its logged form, the results tell us that a 1-percent increase in the
age of the ruling party increases secondary education attainment by about 2.7% of
the population and tertiary education attainment by about 1.5%. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that institutionalized, long-lived parties give a greater emphasis
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on policies designed to fuel innovation and technology diffusion.
Notably, the effect of the age of the ruling party exists when controlling for the
age of the regime. These results inform us that something particular about the
nature of ruling parties determines education attainment. It is not just that older,
consolidated democracies outperform new and unconsolidated democracies. Rather,
we see in these two models that regimes where the ruling parties are on average more
institutionalized tend to have politicians that set different kinds of policies than in
countries dominated by weakly-institutionalized ones.
How stable are these results? For Model 1, Cook’s Distance scores suggest that six
countries might be outliers: Hungary, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal,
and Thailand. DFITS statistics identify, along with some of the above, Austria,
Germany, Congo, Guyana, and South Korea.16 In a small sample like this one,
potential outliers can wreak havoc on the results and we want to assess whether the
estimates depend on these observations. To do so, I reestimate the equations dropping
each of the above cases from the model in turn. The results are reported in Table 3.2.
For the model using tertiary education as the dependent variable, the results where
secondary education is the dependent variable are presented in Table 3.3 and Table
3.3 shows the results of models using tertiary education as the dependent variable.17
16With respect to Cook’s D, I follow Chatterjee and Hadi (1988) and identify potentially influential
outliers if Di ≥ 4/(n − k − 1). Regarding DFITS, I follow Bollen and Jackman’s (1985) cutoff of
DFITSi ≥ 2 ∗ (k/n)1/2.
17Note: the countries that are deemed outliers are different for the two dependent variables. The
countries excluded are listed above each model in the two tables.
111
Table 3.1: Regression Results: Baseline model
Model Number (1)a (2)
DV: Secondary Tertiary




Regime Age 4.00** 1.69*
(1.60) (0.89)


























a* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In virtually every instance, the results do not change substantively; even the
coefficients’ sizes are relatively stable to the exclusion of these cases. Of the set of
excluded cases only two cases total seem to change the results in any substantive way:
Portugal (in Table 3.2) and Canada (in Table 3.3).
Even as the results are robust to their exclusion, dropping cases is not particu-
larly appealing. Granato, Ingelhart, and Leblang (1996) critique this strategy thusly.
“Not only do these cases provide valuable information, but also one imagines a situ-
ation where after deleting observations and reeestimating the model other influential
cases are identified and are removed. This process continues until few interesting
observations remain” (623). Nor is adding a set of dummy variables for countries
in question since there is no theoretical reason to add more variables to the models.
In light of this, I employ a second strategy to assess the model’s stability in light of
potential outliers. Welsch (1980) proposes a one-step bounded-influence estimator,
whereby one uses weighted least squares to estimate the equation of interest with
weights calculated as follows:
Weight = 1 if |DFITS| ≤ .34 (3.3)
Weight = (.34/|DFITS|) if |DFITS| > .34 (3.4)
where .34 is suggested as it provides approximate 95% asymptotic efficiency. This
strategy will estimate the model weighs the potentially outlying observations less, by
the degree to which it affects the coefficients in the model.
The results of the bounded-influence estimations for both education attainment
statistics are presented in Models 24 and 25 in Table 3.4. Here again, the substantive
results do not change. In fact, the coefficients of the party age variable both increase
in size in both models. From these estimates a 1-percent increases in ruling party
age increases secondary attainment in the population by just under 3% and tertiary



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































than in the original model.18
According to the standard litany of statistical tests and post-estimation plots,
heteroscedasticity exists and is especially prevalent in the tertiary education model
(Model 2 in Table 3.1. Models 26 and 27 in Table 3.4 present results of the estimated
equations using Huber/White “robust” standard errors. Once again, the substantive
results do not change.
3.3.1 Testing the Modifying Conditions
We have tested whether an unconditional effect of party age exists and whether the
direction of the effect is as the theory predicts and thus far the results support the
proposition developed in Chapter 2 that party institutionalization matters.
But the theory also proposed that the effects of party institutionalization may
be conditional. I argued that it need not be the case that the mechanisms that
translate variations in party institutionalization to variations in outcomes are always
activated. Rather, it may be the case that those mechanisms are activated under
certain conditions, when the party expects to control some sizeable share of future
government and when the expected returns to mobilization are low, and that the
mechanisms should remain latent when these conditions do not hold. The hypothesis
is represented in Equation 3.2 and I turn to testing that model here. Table 3.5 shows
results where secondary education is the dependent variable and the five-year moving
average of seat share is the modifying variable. Model 28 estimates the equation with
OLS, Model 29 uses the bounded-influence procedure discussed above and Model 30,
includes robust standard errors given the finding of heteroscedasticity from tests and
18The author also conducted jackknife estimation whereby Equation 3.1 was estimated n times,
each time dropping one observation from the database to assess the stability of the results. Similarly,
the author conducted a bootstrapping exercise whereby Equation 3.1 was estimated 1000 times, each
time dropping a set of countries with replacement. The results of both procedures do not change
the substantive results reported thus far. Results are available from the author upon request.
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Table 3.4: Regressions Results: Bounded-influence and and “robust” estimation
Model Number (24)a (25) (26) (27)
DV: Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary
Model Details Bounded Bounded Robust SEs Robust SEs
Party Age 2.97** 1.98*** 2.71** 1.58*
(1.18) (0.70) (1.34) (0.88)
GDP 8.37*** 2.46** 8.57*** 2.70**
(2.30) (1.23) (2.18) (1.07)
Regime Age 4.15*** 1.90** 4.00** 1.69**
(1.53) (0.77) (1.71) (0.67)
Polity Score -0.85 0.24 -0.92 0.22
(0.66) (0.33) (0.72) (0.27)
Population -1.45* -0.17 -1.26* -0.26
(0.77) (0.40) (0.70) (0.39)
Pres/Parl -3.33** -4.33*** -3.30* -4.36***
(1.56) (0.80) (1.67) (0.85)
Plurality 0.75 4.26*** 0.59 3.30**
(2.01) (1.14) (2.23) (1.47)
OECD 8.72 8.36*** 8.61* 7.83***
(5.79) (2.60) (4.52) (2.17)
Post-Soviet 22.11*** 7.75* 21.10*** 6.90**
(7.57) (4.14) (6.76) (3.22)
L.America -4.04 1.07 -5.06 1.11
(3.48) (1.62) (3.24) (1.27)
Mid.East 6.12 14.42*** 5.41 13.50***
(7.78) (3.50) (4.41) (4.18)
S.Asia 10.99** 4.48* 10.06** 5.01*
(5.11) (2.52) (4.47) (2.66)
E.Asiab 6.60 5.92*** 6.46 5.78***
(4.35) (2.04) (4.19) (1.84)
Constant -46.52*** -26.05*** -47.62*** -24.37***
(15.24) (7.97) (13.23) (6.75)
R-squared 0.74 0.68 0.67 0.59
Observations 73 73 73 73
Akaike 507.98 416.43 522.19 435.65
Schwartz 540.05 448.50 554.25 467.72
a* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
bSub-Sahara Africa is the excluded regional category
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plots. Models 31-33 repeat the procedure but use tertiary education as the dependent
variable. Table 3.6 conducts the same set of tests using the three-year moving average
instead.
Following Franseze and Kam (2007) and Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005), I
graph the marginal effect of the variable of interest over the range of the respective
modifying variable to assess the accuracy of the theory. Figure 3.7 presents these
results for four different models. In each, the solid line represents the marginal effect of
the log of the age of ruling party as the five-year moving average of ruling parties’ past
seat share increases. The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals around that
marginal effect, and the histograms show the distribution of the modifying variable
and should be evaluated according to the vertical axis on the right side of each graph.
The top two graphs in the figure use secondary attainment as the dependent variable;
the bottom two refer to tertiary education. Graphs on the left use robust standard
errors and graphs on the right use the bounded-influence procedure.
The set of graphs show strong support for the theory. In the top two figures, the
marginal effect of party age is positive as expected but statistically significant only in
the middling ranges of the seat share variable. When the seat share variable is low,
that is when a ruling party has not controlled a large share of legislative seats in the
past, there is no effect of having a well-institutionalized party control government.
Increasing the seat share moving average brings the marginal effect into significance
but the effect fades away again when the seat share is exceedingly large.19 Moving
down to the second row of graphs, we observe similar patterns. In the bottom left
graph, the marginal effect of party age never reaches statistical significance as the
confidence intervals span 0 throughout the range. But at the middle ranges of the
19Note that the lack of significance at high values of the marginal effect can occur due to weak
competition, as I argued earlier, or because there are simply too few cases for us to have confidence
around the point estimate. Both are possible and we cannot distinguish between them here.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results: Party age modified by 5-year seat share average
Model Number (28)a (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)
DV: Secondary Secondary Secondary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary
Model Details: OLS Bounded Robust SEs OLS Bounded Robust SEs
Party Age 3.08 2.93 3.08 -1.20 -1.75 -1.20
(5.84) (5.21) (4.60) (3.50) (3.43) (3.16)
5-Year Seat Share 11.84 9.64 11.84 -16.49 -19.16 -16.49
(41.97) (37.68) (27.71) (25.20) (24.65) (23.31)
Party Age * Seat Share -0.92 -0.00 -0.92 5.85 7.03 5.85
(12.04) (10.81) (8.92) (7.23) (7.05) (7.49)
GDP 9.07*** 9.03*** 9.07*** 2.70 2.73 2.70*
(2.84) (2.56) (2.24) (1.71) (1.73) (1.38)
Regime Age 5.34*** 5.61*** 5.34** 2.33** 2.44** 2.33**
(1.90) (1.84) (2.12) (1.14) (1.15) (1.04)
Pres/Parl -2.63 -2.73 -2.63 -5.06*** -5.08*** -5.06***
(1.99) (1.86) (1.87) (1.20) (1.19) (1.17)
Plurality 1.59 2.11 1.59 3.31** 3.69** 3.31*
(2.68) (2.53) (3.05) (1.61) (1.61) (1.82)
Polity Score -0.13 -0.08 -0.13 0.56 0.54 0.56
(0.85) (0.83) (0.79) (0.51) (0.51) (0.36)
Population -1.60 -1.62* -1.60* -0.59 -0.54 -0.59
(0.97) (0.95) (0.85) (0.58) (0.58) (0.56)
OECD 5.76 5.40 5.76 7.86** 8.25** 7.86***
(5.99) (5.53) (4.46) (3.60) (3.60) (2.31)
Post-Soviet 30.58*** 30.91*** 30.58*** 4.53 4.74 4.53
(10.46) (9.82) (5.76) (6.28) (5.70) (3.25)
L.America -2.73 -3.02 -2.73 1.14 1.18 1.14
(4.47) (4.11) (3.54) (2.69) (2.59) (1.70)
Mid.East 5.66 5.83 5.66 13.66*** 13.91*** 13.66***
(8.02) (7.41) (4.72) (4.82) (4.68) (3.82)
S.Asia 12.37* 12.62** 12.37** 7.02* 6.29 7.02*
(6.36) (6.22) (5.03) (3.82) (3.78) (4.02)
E.Asiab 10.33* 9.41 10.33* 9.30** 9.37** 9.30***
(6.04) (5.61) (5.80) (3.62) (3.73) (2.48)
Constant -65.36** -65.71** -65.36*** -17.42 -17.23 -17.42
(30.42) (27.36) (21.55) (18.26) (18.15) (14.98)
R-squared 0.68 0.73 0.68 0.53 0.56 0.53
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
Akaike 418.95 412.34 416.95 359.77 357.61 357.77
Schwartz 451.92 445.31 447.86 392.74 390.58 388.68
a* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
bSub-Sahara Africa is the excluded regional category
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Table 3.6: Regression Results: Party age modified by 3-year seat share average
Model Number (34)a (35) (36) (37) (38) (39)
DV: Secondary Secondary Secondary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary
Model Details: OLS Bounded Robust SEs OLS Bounded Robust SEs
Party Age 2.26 1.70 2.26 -1.68 -2.30 -1.68
(5.62) (4.97) (4.26) (3.32) (3.30) (3.26)
3-Year Seat Share 4.51 -1.97 4.51 -20.10 -23.92 -20.10
(38.53) (34.42) (24.05) (22.80) (22.51) (23.17)
Party Age * Share 1.24 3.19 1.24 6.77 8.18 6.77
(11.18) (9.96) (8.17) (6.62) (6.52) (7.53)
GDP 8.77*** 8.71*** 8.77*** 2.70 2.67 2.70**
(2.74) (2.47) (2.11) (1.62) (1.63) (1.30)
Regime Age 5.39*** 5.51*** 5.39** 2.23* 2.31** 2.23**
(1.89) (1.79) (2.08) (1.12) (1.13) (1.00)
Pres/Parl -3.33* -3.59** -3.33* -4.95*** -4.96*** -4.95***
(1.95) (1.77) (1.83) (1.15) (1.13) (1.15)
Plurality 0.74 1.12 0.74 3.41** 3.73** 3.41*
(2.61) (2.47) (2.97) (1.54) (1.54) (1.72)
Polity -0.18 -0.16 -0.18 0.57 0.55 0.57
(0.84) (0.81) (0.79) (0.50) (0.50) (0.35)
Population -1.53 -1.61* -1.53* -0.64 -0.58 -0.64
(0.97) (0.93) (0.83) (0.57) (0.57) (0.55)
OECD 6.04 6.05 6.04 7.71** 8.10** 7.71***
(5.96) (5.72) (4.22) (3.53) (3.57) (2.33)
Post-Soviet 22.22** 22.41*** 22.22*** 7.10 7.21 7.10*
(8.53) (7.74) (7.92) (5.05) (5.03) (3.74)
L.America -3.98 -4.49 -3.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
(4.20) (3.90) (3.32) (2.49) (2.43) (1.73)
Mid.East 5.30 5.59 5.30 13.32*** 13.49*** 13.32***
(7.87) (7.40) (4.36) (4.66) (4.55) (3.75)
S.Asia 12.08* 12.58** 12.08** 6.81* 6.00 6.81*
(6.17) (5.84) (4.57) (3.65) (3.60) (3.86)
E.Asiab 10.12* 9.28 10.12* 9.28** 9.50** 9.28***
(5.99) (5.63) (5.49) (3.54) (3.59) (2.53)
Constant -58.91** -56.00** -58.91*** -14.93 -13.82 -14.93
(26.82) (23.98) (17.95) (15.87) (15.85) (13.42)
R-squared 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.54 0.57 0.54
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60
Akaike 432.64 425.25 432.64 369.71 367.93 369.71
Schwartz 466.15 458.76 466.15 403.22 401.44 403.22
a* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
bSub-Sahara Africa is the excluded regional category
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modifying variable, the marginal effect is very close to significance and so does provide
some support for the theory. The results using the bounded-influence procedures
produce stronger results.
The results from models using the three-year moving average are shown in Figure
3.8. Here again, the bottom left graph, where tertiary education is the dependent
variable and the model uses robust standard errors, the marginal effect never quite
reaches significance, but it is especially close around 0.5 on the X-axis.
Table 3.7 and Figure 3.9 repeat the analysis using investments share of GDP as
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the modifying variable. Once again, the graphs in the figure reflect the theoretical
expectations as represented in Figure 3.6. The marginal effect is significantly positive
at high levels of the modifying variable. This support the proposition that where
the expected returns to mobilization are likely to be large, the effects of party insti-
tutionalization are not activated, but as the expectations regarding the benefits of
mobilization decrease, the effects of institutionalization begin to emerge.
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Table 3.7: Regression Results: Party age modified by investment share of GDP
Model Number (40)a (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
DV: Secondary Secondary Secondary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary
Model Details: OLS Bounded Robust SEs OLS Bounded Robust SEs
Party Age -0.55 -0.11 -0.55 0.69 1.27 0.69
(3.11) (2.92) (2.40) (1.77) (1.71) (1.50)
Investment -0.26 -0.22 -0.26 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.51) (0.50) (0.49) (0.29) (0.28) (0.26)
Party Age * Investment 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
GDP 7.82*** 7.98*** 7.82*** 2.31 2.28 2.31**
(2.51) (2.32) (2.10) (1.43) (1.43) (0.99)
Regime Age 4.13** 4.32*** 4.13** 1.62* 1.75* 1.62**
(1.63) (1.60) (1.72) (0.93) (0.92) (0.73)
Pres/Parl -3.47* -3.47* -3.47** -4.67*** -4.68*** -4.67***
(1.76) (1.73) (1.71) (1.00) (0.96) (0.88)
Plurality 0.27 0.44 0.27 3.25** 3.94*** 3.25**
(2.22) (2.14) (2.17) (1.26) (1.28) (1.47)
Polity -0.31 -0.33 -0.31 0.47 0.46 0.47*
(0.75) (0.75) (0.79) (0.43) (0.39) (0.24)
Population -1.22 -1.34 -1.22 -0.29 -0.24 -0.29
(0.82) (0.81) (0.74) (0.46) (0.45) (0.40)
OECD 4.41 4.93 4.41 5.94* 6.44* 5.94**
(6.06) (5.99) (4.82) (3.45) (3.31) (2.48)
Post-Soviet 19.86** 20.08** 19.86*** 5.99 6.62 5.99
(8.16) (7.74) (6.97) (4.64) (4.61) (3.62)
L.America -5.29 -4.99 -5.29 0.65 0.57 0.65
(3.69) (3.64) (3.16) (2.10) (1.97) (1.26)
Mid.East 2.64 2.93 2.64 12.10*** 13.03*** 12.10***
(7.62) (8.36) (4.53) (4.34) (4.07) (4.04)
S.Asia 10.32* 10.67* 10.32** 5.08 4.76 5.08*
(5.41) (5.36) (4.37) (3.08) (2.87) (2.68)
E.Asiab 7.50 7.42 7.50* 5.63* 5.71** 5.63**
(4.94) (4.76) (4.30) (2.81) (2.71) (2.12)
Constant -39.94** -41.32** -39.94** -21.32** -23.70** -21.32***
(17.59) (16.55) (15.49) (10.01) (9.97) (7.27)
R-squared 0.69 0.72 0.69 0.58 0.63 0.58
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70
Akaike 500.25 494.81 500.25 421.37 414.96 421.37
Schwartz 536.22 530.79 536.22 457.35 450.94 457.35
a* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
bSub-Sahara Africa is the excluded regional category
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter subjected the theory to the first round of empirical tests using the stock
of human capital as the dependent variable. The results are encouraging. Controlling
for various confounding factors, to include GDP, the level of democracy, the age of the
democratic regime, and regional controls, the results show that the age of the ruling
party predicts the stock of human capital in the way theory would predict. These
results are robust and they indicate that OLG place a greater premium on policies
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designed to stimulate technological progress. We also see evidence in support of two
modifying propositions. First, party institutionalization seems to matter only when
deputies in the party in question expect that when they hold the party’s reigns of
power, the party will also be political viable in the sense of controlling some nontriv-
ial share of the government. When such expectations are absent, deputies have no
incentive to plan for the future as they do not expect to be able to reap the political
rewards of technology policy. The second modifying condition is that deputies’ pref-
erences for technology policy is increasing as the expectation that accumulation will
exhibit diminishing returns is decreasing. This proposition, too, receives empirical
support.
In the next chapter, I continue testing the theory, using total factor productivity
as a measure for the premium that governments place on technological progress.
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Chapter 4
OLG Parties and Total Factor Productivity
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 I found that variation in the degree to which ruling parties in a country
are typically well-institutionalized, OLG organizations is positively correlated with
secondary and tertiary education attainment rates—consistent with my theory that
intraparty politics may help explain the premium governments place on technological
development as a source of economic growth. In institutionalized parties, inter-general
bargaining can produce a sort of burden-sharing agreement in which one output is
a greater priority on time beyond the immediate future. In the context of economic
growth policy, this increased premium on the future may include policies designed
to catalyze technological progress, such as developing human capital. By contrast,
the internal politics of weakly-institutionalized parties are almost entirely biased to-
ward the immediate future. The results in Chapter 3 also found support for the
two modifying conditions. First, party institutionalization only affects education at-
tainment rates when deputy members of the ruling party expect to control a sizable
share of government when they take control of the party’s leadership positions. This
supports the argument that because politicians that set policy do not have owner-
ship rights over the outcomes those policies produce, incumbents will set long term
growth policies only when they expect to be in power to claim credit for the pol-
icy’s returns. Secondly, as the theory predicted, there is evidence that the effect of
well-institutionalized parties on human capital formation increases as the expected
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returns to further mobilization decrease.
Even as these results are supportive, this chapter subjects the argument to further
empirical scrutiny. Because of the unobservable nature of the conceptual dependent
variable—the premiums governments assign to technological progress—we need to
use various proxies that capture different dimensions of the underlying variable to
assess the theory’s accuracy. In this regard, data on government R&D subsidies and
loans, and/or public R&D spending may be useful as proxies of government premiums.
Unfortunately, since we cannot infer intentions from spending amounts, we cannot
know the political rationale of government spending. We cannot know, for example,
whether a government that spends money on R&D programs does so because its
premium on technological progress is high or because the resource allocation is meant
to buy the support of owners of capital and/or particular sectors of the economy.
Consequently, I follow the strategy proposed in Chapter 3 and avoid using policy
variables as a proxy for government premiums and instead use outcomes that we
can logically and empirically connect back to government policy initiatives. In this
chapter, I rely on total factor productivity as a dependent variable, which should
respond to a host of government policy actions. Below, I discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of the variable and its measurement. From there, I present the results
of econometric models that put total factor productivity on the left-hand side of the
equation.
4.2 Total Factor Productivity as a Proxy for Government
Premiums on Technological Progress
The premium governments place on technological progress should be evident in the
efficiency with which the factors of production, capital and labor, are used in an
economy. All else constant, where political factors induce governments to place a
greater premium on technological progress, governments will engage in a host of
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activities designed to provide incentives for private economic actors to engage in
innovation and adoption of frontier technologies. When economic actors undertake
such initiatives, we should observe that a given stock of capital or labor will be able
to produce more output or output of a higher quality than before. To see this, start
with the production function Yi = F (Ki, Li), where Y is output in country i, K is the
stock of capital, and L is the stock of labor. Introduce variation in the productivity of
these inputs by allowing the production function to shift up or down. More exactly,
assume economies operate according to the Hicksian production function:
Yi = AF (Ki, Li), (4.1)
were A is the technology parameter and changes thereof shift the production function.
For simplicity, express Equation 4.1 in terms of per worker output as
yi = AF (ki), (4.2)
where y = Y/L and k = K/L.
Figure 4.1 shows production functions of the form in Equation 4.2 for two hy-
pothetical countries. For Country 1, increasing the stock of capital from K1 to K2
constitutes a movement along its production function from point a to b and produces
the increase in output per worker from Y1 to Y2. Notice that for Country 2, the
same increase in capital per worker, from K1 to K2, produces an increase in output
from Y2 to Y3, represented by the movement along its production function from c to
d. Controlling for the per worker capital stock, labor in Country 2 is always more
productive, and hence wealthier, than labor in Country 1, which would indicate that
labor in Country 2 has access to more efficient production processes and capital goods
that make them more productive.
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We should expect to observe that where economic actors are engaging in inno-
vation and technology adoption, the inputs to production will be more efficient, all
else constant. According to my theory, where OLG parties typically control govern-
ment, we should expect to observe more productive capital and labor stocks than in
countries where fragile parties dominate the landscape. In Figure 4.1, the difference
between the two kinds of countries is indicated by the difference between points a
and c or between b and d.1
1The production function in Equation 4.1 assumes that technological development affects K and
L proportionately instead of being biased toward either labor or capital respectively. This is the most
common way of expressing the relationship between capital, labor, and output, but the production
function can be expressed in other ways as well. For example, some have argued that a shift in
the production function might in fact cause further savings and investment and hence an increase
in the capital stock per worker. This is the “induced accumulation effect” (Hulten 1975) and can
be expressed as Yi = F (Ki, aLi). The idea here is that “A shift in the production function at a
given capital-labor ratio leads to an increase in output per workers and some of this extra output
is saved, leading to more output, more saving and so on” (Hulten and Isaksson 2007, 9). Whether
one uses the Hicksian or Harrodian production function depends on the question under scrutiny.
Hulten and Isaksson (2007) suggest that “In order to find out how efficiently existing labor and
capital are used, the Hicksian approach is the right way to proceed. However, if the question is
about the relative importance of capital deepening versus efficiency change as the cause of growth,
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4.2.1 Measuring Factor Productivity
How might we measure the productivity with which the factors of production are used
and distinguish the efficiency effect of factor inputs on economic output and output
growth from the stock effect? This is, of course, an enduring problem for scholars
and one that has not yet been resolved. Thus, scholars are relegated to estimating
the productivity of inputs using one of two strategies. The first uses econometric
techniques to estimate (subscripts removed) ∆Y/Y = β0 +β1 ·∆K/K+β2 ·∆L/L+ε.
Here β0 is the growth rate of factor productivity (Barro 1999).
2
Using regression to estimate TFP suffers from various deficiencies however. Among
them is the fact that the estimated equation is merely one in a larger system of equa-
tions that model growth in output. Capital, for example, grows as a function of
variables that affect the propensity to save and the efficiency of financial institutions
that direct savings into investment. Estimating the equation above without modeling
these other relationships could result in biased estimates (Hulten and Isaksson 2007).
Additionally, and perhaps more serious, is the endogeneity between factor productiv-
ity and the stocks of capital and labor, which may result in biased estimates if not
properly modeled (Barro 1999). Given the difficulty of finding appropriate instru-
ments, this concern may be especially relevant.3 Given these problems, scholars often
balk at using econometric techniques to create a measure of TFP.
The second approach avoids some of the pitfalls of econometric techniques. Instead
the Harrodian model gives the better answer, since capital formation is endogenous” (11, emphasis
in original). Since I am interested in the degree to which political institutions influence the efficiency
of the factors or production rather than the determinants of growth per se, the data I use is based
on the Hicksian model.
2The coefficients β1 and β2 are the marginal products of K and L respectively, leaving the
intercept term as a measure of the growth or regress in the productivity of the factor inputs.
3See however, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Senhadji (2000) for strategies of using econo-
metrics to estimate TFP while avoiding or modeling the potential endogeneity of the right-hand side
variables.
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of estimating TFP with regression, this method uses accounting identities to generate
a measure of factor productivity. Solow (1957) showed that economic growth can be
expressed as a function of growth in capital, weighted by its share of income in GDP,
and the stock of labor weighted by its share. He also concluded that the growth rate
of TFP is that part of total output growth unaccounted for by the share-weighted
growth in the capital stock and labor force. Rewriting Equation 4.1 in terms of growth
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In these equations, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the share of capital in total income. The equations
show that, with data on the growth of capital, labor and output, and an estimate of α,
∆A
A
can be measured as a residual. ∆A
A
is the so-called “Solow residual” and scholars
have used the residual as an estimate of TFP growth and to calculate the share of
output growth for which TFP growth accounts.4 A similar procedure can calculate
TFP levels rather than growth rates. In fact, increasingly, economists have argued
that levels accounting is a more useful procedure than growth accounting. Senhadji
(2000), drawing from Hall and Jones (1999) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992),
contends that levels accounting is a more appropriate exercise:
First, growth rates are important only to the extent that they are a de-
termining factor of levels. Second. . . Easterly and others (1993) show that
4Griliches (2001) shows that Solow was not the first to come up with this idea and so the “Solow
residual” is a misnomer.
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growth rates over decades are only weakly correlated, suggesting that
cross-country differences in growth rates may essentially be transitory.
Moreover, several recent models of technology transfer across countries
imply convergence in growth rates as technology transfers prevent coun-
tries from drifting away from each other indefinitely (Senhadji 2000 p.131).
Accounting techniques are the most common way of estimating TFP, largely due
to the intuitiveness of the measures. Such exercises are not without deficiencies
however. Among them is the fact that accounting for growth is distinct from showing
causation. Accounting exercises can show the magnitude of TFP, the pace of its
growth over time, and its contribution to output levels and growth, but accounting
cannot show that TFP growth causes output growth (Barro 1999; Easterly and Levine
2001).5
Secondly, values of the residual are not exclusively a function of technology im-
provements or regressions. To see why, consider that it is not uncommon for TFP
growth to be negative over some substantial period of time for a given country. If TFP
was exclusively a function of technological knowledge this would indicate a process
of “forgetting” technological knowledge. This, however, seems unlikely. Instead, we
need to keep in mind that, while many scholars equate the residual with technologi-
cal knowledge and its pace of change (Grossman and Helpman 1997), it incorporates
other variables as well. If one were to conduct a variable decomposition technique,
5Related to the debate over whether TFP causes growth is a debate among economists regarding
the percent of total output and output growth for which TFP accounts. Some, like Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992) conclude that the vast majority of cross-national differences in per capita output is
due to capital accumulation, while others like Prescott (1998), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2001),
Easterly and Levine (2003), Senhadji (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (1990, 2003) conclude that
TFP matters more. Although I make use of TFP data in the econometric models in this chapters,
I do not intend to participate in this debate. The exact percent of total output and output growth
for which TFP accounts is less important here than the fact that TFP itself is a useful measure
of the efficiency of production inputs. Whatever its contribution to economic growth, TFP can
serve as useful way to test the relationship between the nature of political parties and the premiums
governments place on technological progress as a source of economic growth.
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one would almost certainly find that the residual captures phenomena like cost reduc-
tions (Harberger 1998), infrastructure investments, variation in institution efficiency,
and scale economies, all of which affect productivity even though they have little
to do with advances in technological knowledge. For these reasons some have quite
accurately posed that TFP is a “measure of our ignorance” regarding what drives
growth and output levels.6
Despite its deficiencies, the Solow residual is still a commonly used measure of
the productivity with which the factors of production are used and may be the best
summary measure of the efficiency of the factors of production that we have to date.
More than that, the variable is especially useful for the purposes of testing the theory.
One of the points to keep in mind is that, while the theory recognizes that governments
have access to any number of strategies to stimulate technological progress should they
be so inclined to do so, the theory does not attempt to ascertain the conditions under
which governments will use some set of policies and avoid using others. Presumably,
governments will use all policies at their disposal to the degree that the marginal
benefit of the policy equals the marginal cost, but the costs and benefits of the policies
may differ according to institutional or political-economic contexts. Accordingly, two
countries may both be interested in stimulating technological progress for the reasons
developed in the theory, but how they do so might differ quite substantially. The
benefit of using a summary measure like the Solow residual is that we are not tied to
using a particular policy variable as the dependent variable. Rather, we can assume
that governments will use all the policies available to them and each policy should
contribute in some way to increasing the productivity of factor inputs. Thus, TFP
should be higher in contexts where governments place a premium on technological
6The concern that the residual includes other determinants of TFP besides technological knowl-
edge has led some scholars to use alternative measures of technological development. Griliches
(1990) points to the usefulness of patent data as an alternative measure of the level of technological
knowledge and its pace of change.
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progress and lower where governments fail to do so, irrespective of what particular
policies governments employ to fulfill their goal. To be sure, the residual is a noisy
measure, but in combination with the human capital models used in Chapter 3, the
TFP indicator has significant benefits.
4.2.2 Data Description
The TFP data I use comes from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006) who calculate the
Solow residual for 145 countries. Each TFP observation is calculated using data on
physical capital, human capital, and GDP averaged over a ten-year period. Averaging
the data over the course of a decade ensures that the resulting TFP calculation is
not too heavily influenced by business cycles or exogenous shocks. The database is
comprised of multiple observations per country where the data used to calculate TFP
are averaged by decade between 1950 and 2000.7 However, since the independent
variables that I use in the subsequent models date back only to 1975, I will only use
the last two calculations only: 1981-1990 and 1991-2000.8
A nice feature of this database is the fact that the production function Baier,
Dwyer and Tamura (hereafter BDT) use to calculate TFP includes human capital on
the right-hand side of the equation: Yi = AF (Ki, Hi), where Hi is the level of human
capital, operationalized as the average number of years of schooling and the average
number of years employed for an employed person.9 The inclusion of human capital
into the production function is valuable because it ensures that a correlation between
TFP and party institutionalization is not due simply to the relationship between
7For 24 countries, calculations extend back to 1900 or earlier.
8BDT do not provide the original annual data used to create their calculations and so I cannot
alter the time periods.
9The latter of these variables captures human capital developed by learning-by-doing processes.
See Arrow (1962) for one growth model that incorporates learning-by-doing.
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party institutionalization and human capital that we saw in Chapter 3. Recall that
the statistical models revealed a relationship between party institutionalization and
secondary and tertiary education attainment. In this chapter, we are not interested
in replicating that finding. Rather, we want to assess whether party institutionaliza-
tion increases productivity through mechanisms other than human capital formation.
If however, human capital was not included in the production function, the residual
would soak up variations in human capital and, should an effect of party institutional-
ization on TFP be revealed, we would be unable to ascertain whether the relationship
exists because the residual incorporates human capital or because party institution-
alization activates other mechanisms along with human capital.
As with the empirical models in Chapter 3, the sample of countries with which I
will test the theory are democracies. Specifically, a country is included in the sample
if its average PolityIV score is greater than zero for the ten-year period of time for
which BDT collect data on capital, output and labor. Using this sample of countries
for the last two time periods in the BDT database, Figure 4.2 shows the distribution
of TFP levels.
Figure 4.3 further explores the TFP variable by plotting both the logged levels
of TFP and the logged levels of capital per worker on the X-axis against output
per worker on the Y-axis. We want to asses whether the BDT data generally are
consistent with the expected relationships between capital and output on one hand
and TFP and output on the other. Both trends are positive as we would expect, but
notice also that the slope of the TFP trend is substantially steeper than the capital
per worker trend. This is indicative of the conclusion many scholars reach that the
magnitude of TFP’s effect on output may be a good deal larger than the effect of
increasing capital. That is, the marginal effect of increasing the productivity of the
factors of production on output per worker seems to be larger than the marginal
135











3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Total Factor Productivity (Log)


















4 6 8 10 12
Logged Values
 Total Factor Productivity Total Factor Productivity Trend
 Capital per Worker  Capital per Worker Trend
136
effect of increasing capital per worker at the status quo level of productivity.10 Even
as variation in capital per worker is important to understand cross-national variation
in output production, cross-national variation in TFP appears at least as important,
if not more so.
4.2.3 Model Specification and Estimation
The hypothesis under scrutiny is that countries typically ruled by overlapping gen-
erations political parties will have higher levels of factor productivity compared to
countries ruled by fragile, weakly-institutionalized parties. We test this idea using
OLS on a sample of democratic countries at all levels of economic development. Two
models, estimated separately, will be the basis for assessing the theory:
TFPi = β0 + β1PAGEi + βXi + εi (4.5)
and
TFPi = γ0 + γ1PAGEi + γ2SHAREi + γ3PAGEi ∗ SHAREi + γXi + νi. (4.6)
Equation 4.5 tests the main theoretical proposition—that the degree to which
parties are OLG organizations affects the level of technolgoical development in a
country. In 4.5, PAGE is the measure of overlapping-ness. It is the age of the largest
party in government. X is a set of controls. If the theory is correct, β1 should be
positive. Equation 4.6 tests the modifying proposition, presented in Chapter 2, that
OLG ruling parties will only pursue technological development if deputies expect their
party to control a sizable share of governments in the future when they take over the
reigns of the power in the party. SHARE is the seat share variable that we used
in Chapter 3 to measure these expectations. It is the ruling party’s moving average
10A comparison of slopes test reveals a statistically significant difference between them (p = 0.000)
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of seat shares of a window of three years. If the modifying condition is correct, we
should find that γ3 is positive, γ1 +γ3∗SHARE > 0, and the confidence intervals will
show the marginal effect of party institutionalization to be significant at traditional
levels over the range of the modifying variable indicating expectations of controlling
a more sizable share of future governments.
I will not however, test the proposition that the effects of party institutionaliza-
tion is conditioned by the expected returns to further accumulation. The reason for
this is a technical issue rather than a concern with the validity of the proposition
itself. Recall that the expected returns to further mobilization was operationalized in
Chapter 3 as an economy’s capital stock. I argued that the expected returns to capi-
tal accumulation should be higher where the capital stock is currently small. Where
there is little capital per worker, the accumulation strategy can produce a dramatic
increase in output per worker. Given that technology policies have deferred benefits
and upfront costs and the accumulation strategy will have large returns much more
immediately, when the capital stock is low, there is no political need for deputies to
force party leaders to set technology policies. The unequal burden-sharing agreement
that encourages deputies to overcome problems of collective action, wherein leaders
continue to set only short-term policies and leave deputies to suffer the consequences
thereof, is wholly absent. The problem with testing this argument in this chapter
is the endogenous relationship between TFP and the capital stock. Since the Solow
residual is calculated from the stock of capital (and human capital-augmented labor),
adding the stock of capital on the right-hand side as a predictor of TFP is inappro-
priate. For similar reasons, GDP per capita and population do not enter the model
as controls.
Equations 4.5 and 4.6 control for the following variables. First I control for the
level of democracy to account for any differences that may exist between moderately
and fully democratic systems. Second, I control for the age of the democratic regime to
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ensure that the coefficient on the party age variable captures only differences between
countries ruled by well-institutionalized and weakly-institutionalized parties and does
not capture the degree to which the regime is institutionalized and consolidated.
Finally, I control for regional indicators with the OECD “region” as the excluded
category. We want to control for regional effects as evidence suggests some regional
trends in the degree to which TFP accounts for output and output growth. For
example, the available evidence shows consistently that East Asian countries growth
experiences since the 1960s, while exceptional, failed to exhibit much TFP growth
(Young 1992, Krugman 1994, Collins and Bosworth 1996, Bosworth and Collins 2003).
Similarly, the human capital formation and technological development pursued by the
communist regimes of the Eastern Bloc and former Soviet Union may distinguish the
TFP levels and growth rates of the successor states in those areas from other regions
around the world.
Since the BDT database has more than one observation per country, one might be
tempted to pool the multiple observations, thereby taking advantage of all the avail-
able information, and employ some combination of a lagged dependent variable (or
whatever more complex lag structure theory would suggest and the data allow), fixed
effects to control for unit heterogeneity should it exist, and panel-corrected standard
errors. These techniques are inappropriate here due to the very small number of time
periods covered in the samples that I use. The coverage of the independent variable
is relatively short and I can use only TFP observations calculated with data averaged
between 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. Two time periods is far too few for the standard
time-series cross-section techniques. Therefore, I estimate OLS on the pooled data,
and cluster the standard errors by country to model the fact that the multiple ob-
servations for the same country are not independent from each other.11 Additionally,
11Clustered standard errors will not remedy omitted variable bias that may result from unit-
heterogeneity should it exist, but it will estimate more accurately the standard errors.
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fixed effects are inappropriate here since a large number of countries have only one
observation in the database given the that they were democratic for only one period.
Eastern European countries are particularly relevant in this regard. I will also present
results that estimate the equations on each time period separately.
To anticipate the findings, there is some evidence in support of the unconditional
effect for party institutionalization. Unfortunately, the results are not robust and de-
pend on the time period used. The results from Equation 4.5 support the theory only
when estimated using the 1991-2000 panel. Importantly, however, it is also this sample
of countries that offers that largest variation in the party institutionalization indepen-
dent variable. Results using only the first panel do not support the theory because
the within panel distribution in party institutionalization is such that there are too
few countries typically ruled by weakly-institutionalized parties for us to draw useful
and accurate inferences regarding the effects of non-OLG ruling parties. By contrast,
where we have sufficient numbers of observations with weakly-institutionalized ruling
parties, we also observe robust support for the theory’s predictions. The evidence of
a conditional effect is similarly weak. The conditional models also faces the the prob-
lem of influential outliers. When the outliers are accounted for, the results support
the theory.
4.2.4 Unconditional effects of party institutionalization
Before turning to the coefficient estimates, the scatterplots in Figure 4.4 show the
relationship between TFP levels and the average age of the largest government party.
The trends are positive as we expect, but notice that the slope is quite a bit shallower
in the first panel when compared to the second. We will return to this difference
below.
The OLS estimates for the pooled sample are presented in Table 4.1. Model 1
includes the complete set of controls, Models 2-4 exclude various controls to assess
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stability. Looking at the set of models, we see some support for the theory. In
Models 2-4, the coefficient on party age is positive and significant in every instance.
Unfortunately, the conclusions we draw from these models are tempered with the
results in Model 1. Here, the coefficient is in the predicted direction and the p-value
is small, but with a value of 0.121, it is just a bit too large for standard levels of
confidence.
What explains the marginal level of support for the theory using the pooled model?
While we cannot dismiss the possibility that Model 1 is an accurate reflection of real-
ity, at least two other explanations exist as well. In combination, they go a long way
in explaining the weak level of support. The first is collinearity of the Xs—in par-
ticular, the possibility that the regional indicators are “soaking up” the explanatory
power of the party age variable. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to
believe that the regional indicators and party institutionalization are correlated such
that variation in the degree to which ruling parties are OLG organizations within the
various regions of the world is substantially less than variation in “overlapping-ness”
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Table 4.1: Regression Results: Party age and TFP (Pooled panel)
Model Number (1)a (2) (3) (4)
Party Age 0.06 0.23*** 0.11** 0.09*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Regime Age 0.06 0.23*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)














Constant 4.78*** 4.21*** 3.92*** 3.60***
(0.26) (0.16) (0.14) (0.18)
R-squared 0.62 0.22 0.36 0.43
Observations 123 123 123 123
Akaike 63.93 144.27 120.76 109.02
Schwartz 92.05 149.89 129.20 120.27
a* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
bThe OECD “region” is the excluded regional category.
across those regions. The consequence of this is that, when included, the regional
indicators may wash out the explanatory power of the party institutionalization mea-
sure. A comparison of Model 1 with Models 2-4 suggest this may be happening. In
2-4, all of the independent variables are significant, including the positive coefficient
on the party institutionalization measure (Log Party Age). It is only when we include
the regional indicators that support for the theory vanishes.
Table 4.2 presents further evidence of a correlation between the regional indicators
and the party institutionalization measure. The table presents results from a set of
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Table 4.2: P-values from comparison of means tests evaluating the age of the largest government
party by region. Numbers in parentheses are the regions average age for largest government parties.
OECD L. America Africa S. Asia E. Asia Mid. East E. Europe
OECD (77.60) – 0.016 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.031 0.000
L. America (47.83) – 0.006 0.127 0.067 0.078 0.006
Africa (31.47) – 0.347 0.285 0.075 0.017
South Asia (27.59) – 0.574 0.050 0.051
E. Asia (21.79) – 0.229 0.111
Middle East (13.25) – 0.451
E. Europe (11.28) –
comparison of means tests where the variable in question is the party age variable and
the mean is compared across the seven regions. If the proposition that within regional
differences are greater than across region differences is correct, we should observe a
large number of statistically significant differences between the regions. The values
in each cell are p-values for one-tailed tests that investigate whether the mean party
age in the row region is larger than the mean in the column region. The regions are
arranged in descending order according to their means, which in turn are displayed
inside the parentheses. For example, the mean of the party age variable in the OECD
is 77.60 years, while in Latin America, the mean is 47.83 years. A one-tailed test
where the null hypothesis is the two means are equal and the alternative hypothesis
being that the OECD mean is larger than the Latin American mean, produces the
p-value of 0.016. We can reject the null hypothesis that the two means are the same
and conclude instead that the OECD mean is larger than the Latin America mean.
Going through the table, we see statistically significant differences across many of
the world’s regions. This is evidence of the fact that within region differences in the
degree to which parties are OLG organizations are smaller than the across region
differences. Thus, including the regions may suppress the explanatory power of the
party institution.
Another factor explaining the insignificant results in Model 1 is that the strength
of the relationship between party institutionalization and TFP differs across the two
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time periods that are pooled together in the models in Table 4.1. We saw glimpses of
this in Figure 4.4. Table 4.3 explores this possibility more rigorously by estimating the
relevant equation on the two time periods separately. Models 5-8 in the table estimate
the unconditional effect of party institutionalization for the 1981-1990 period and
Models 6-9 do the same for 1991-2000. Start with Models 5-8. There are no instances
of the positive effect of institutionalization on TFP that theory would lead us to
predict, with the exception of Model 6, which is too parsimonious to be accurate.
In Model 5, the coefficient is not just insignificant, it also has the “wrong” sign.
Models 9-12 tell a much different story. In these models, the coefficient on the party
age variable is always positive and significant. Here, party institutionalization has a
robust effect on the productivity with which the factors of production are used in an
economy.
There is no theoretical reason why the predictions should receive support in the
second panel only. Rather, the two panels produce different results because they
use different samples. The first panel includes 46 countries, 50% of which are the
consolidated democracies of the industrialized world. Notably, the major political
parties in these countries typically are long-lived, OLG organizations. The mean
value of the party age variable for the OECD set of countries in this panel is 70 years.
Additionally, many of the developing world democracies in this sample also tend to
have long-lived parties. For example, Thailand’s value of the party age variable is
41 years, Peru’s value is 58 years, South Africa 73 years, Honduras 90 years, and
Colombia 170 years. Of the just 46 countries in the sample, the majority have a
value on the institutionalization measure that indicate OLG parties are important
parts of the political landscape. There are too few cases of parties typically domi-
nated by weakly-institutionalized parties for us to draw accurate conclusions of their
effects. While there is no precise age at which point we can conclude that a party is























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































moderately institutionalized when it has survived for thirty consecutive years, in this
sample, some 60% of observations would meet that standard. More revealing is the
fact that only 16 observations fail to meet the critieria. This may be too few to draw
accurate conclusions.
By comparison, the second panel adds about 30 observations, each of which is a
developing or transitioning country and virtually all of which have values that indicate
relatively young ruling parties. Table 4.4 displays the countries included in the second
panel but not the first and lists their values on the party institutionalization and TFP
measures. The bottom of the table presents summary statistics for the government
age variable by panel. Notice that with the additional 31 countries, the median value
of the party institutionalization measure falls from just over 41 years to around 25.
Figure 4.5 goes further and shows the distribution of party age by panel. We can
see in the figure that the increase in the number of cases in the second panel makes
the distribution more bell-shaped, whereas the age variable is distributed such that
most countries have high values in the first. Returning to our institutionalization age
criteria of 30 years, we find that in the second panel, only 35% of the sample would
be identified as well-institutionalized
There is, then, good reason to believe that the relationship between party institu-
tionalization and TFP varies across the two panels (and hence we see no evidence of a
relationship in the pooled sample) because there are too few weakly-institutionalized
cases in the first panel of time to draw useful conclusions. In the panel where we have
substantial variation in institutionalization, we see strong support for the theory’s
predictions. Additionally, these results are robust. In other models not displayed
here, I have have estimated the relevant equation on the second panel controlling for
additional variables, to include whether the system is presidential or parliamentary,
the district magnitude of the country, and whether the country uses majoritarian
or proportional electoral formula. Bootstrap and jackknife estimations, which drop
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Table 4.4: Countries included in Panel 2 only and summary statistics by panel
Country Party Age Log TFP
Bangladesh 43.2 4.328062
Bulgaria 8.16667 4.253947
Central African Republic 20 4.421105
Chile 42 5.072697






















Russian Federation 5.5 4.448468
Slovakia 8 4.985594
South Korea 6.5 5.254907
Taiwan 104.5 5.441057
Ukraine 4 3.965307
Summary Statistics by Panel
Panel Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median
1981-1990 46 53.58 44.98 41
1991-2000 77 42.73 41.71 25.83
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cases to assess the stability of the estimate, reveal that the results do not depend on
the inclusion of one or a few influential cases.12
What are we to conclude then? The results are decidedly mixed. It would be
going too far to conclude from the results using the second panel that the data strongly
support the theory, but we do find evidence in the direction the theory predicts where
history provides the most variation in the key independent variable. This is certainly
an encouraging finding.
4.2.5 Conditional effects of party institutionalization
Next, we turn to a discussion of whether the effect of party institutionalization on
TFP is mediated by parties’ expectations of future political influence. To reiterate,
the hypothesis is that if time t’s ruling party deputies do not expect their party to
control a sizable share of future governments when they become party leaders, they
12Results available from the author.
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forgo proposing the burden-sharing scheme that prioritizes technology policies. They
refrain from doing so expecting to be unable to claim credit for the economic benefits
technology policies produce and hence being unable to reap the political rewards from
such policies.
As we did in Chapter 3, we measure party deputies’ expectations of future gov-
ernment control with data on their party’s previous seat share. The notion here is
that for party deputies, one of the best estimates they have regarding the prospects
of their party in the future is the performance of the party in the relatively recent
past—even if that estimate is not a particularly good one in the sense of having a
small margin of error. Equation 4.6 tests the hypothesis. The control variables are
the same as those included in the unconditional models. All models use Huber/White
standard errors.
As we learned above, there is reason to believe there may be too little varia-
tion in party institutionalization in the 1981-1990 panel to draw useful inferences.
Consequently, I start the discussion here with the results from the 1991-2000 panel.
Subsequently, I discuss results from the first panel and the pooled model.
Table 4.5 displays the coefficient estimates. Model 13 is the full model and Models
14-16 check the stability of the estimates when the controls variables are excluded.
Model 17 excludes influential outliers from the analysis, a model that will be discussed
below. The results from the full sample appear to reject the theory. In three of the
four models that retain the full sample, the coefficient on the interaction term is
negative, indicating that the effect of party institutionalization on TFP is decreasing
in magnitude as deputies begin to expect that their party will control a larger share
of future governments. The theory predicts just the opposite.
These unsupportive results are due to outliers however. Two cases in particular
seem to be the culprits: Ukraine and Jamaica. Both of these cases have DFFITS
scores and Cooks’ Distances scores greater than the recommended thresholds. We
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Table 4.5: Regressions Results: Marginal effect of party age on TFP modified by 3-year seat share
average
Model Number (13)a (14) (15) (16) (17)
Panel 2 2 2 2 2
Outliers Dropped? No No No No Yes
Party Age 0.27 0.30** 0.18 0.09 0.07
(0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
Seat Share 0.79 -0.38 -0.27 -0.51 -0.51
(1.33) (1.14) (1.03) (1.03) (1.27)
Party Age * Seat Share -0.33 -0.06 -0.07 0.07 0.12
(0.38) (0.35) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34)
Regime Age 0.07 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)














Constant 4.38*** 4.22*** 3.89*** 3.69*** 4.87***
(0.66) (0.45) (0.40) (0.39) (0.62)
R-squared 0.55 0.27 0.40 0.43 0.56
Observations 70 68 68 68 68
Akaike 66.12 86.89 74.59 71.89 59.31
Schwartz 93.10 95.77 85.69 85.21 85.94
a* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
bThe OECD “region” is the excluded regional category.
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can get a better sense of the observations’ effects by examining the partial regression
plots and leverage versus residual plot in Figure 4.6. Looking at the partial regression
plots, it seems possible that Ukraine and Jamaica are influencing the slope of the
coefficient of the party age variable in Graph a. and the interaction term in Graph
c. Turning to the graph in the bottom right of the figure, we see that, of the set of
countries in the sample, Ukraine and Jamaica both have substantial residuals, and
appear to be two of the more influential points in the database.
I assessed whether these cases are in fact affecting the results, by estimating the
same model, but dropping these cases from the analysis. The result is presented in
Model 17 in Table 4.5. Here, we see that the results appear more supportive of the
theory. In this case, both the party institutionalization measure and its interaction
with the seat share variable are positive as predicted.
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Due to the interaction term, it is difficult to assess whether the theory has support
since it is difficult to ascertain from the coefficient estimates whether there is a range
of the modifying variable where party age is a significant predictor of TFP levels.
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Figures are useful in understanding the results (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006;
Franzese and Kam 2007). Figure 4.7 displays two graphs. In each, the solid line is the
marginal effect of party institutionalization and the two dashed lines indicate the 90%
confidence interval around that marginal effect. Each figure also displays a histogram
of the seat share variable’s distribution. The histogram is to be evaluated according
the second Y-axis and we include it in the graph to better understand whether the
marginal effect of institutionalization is statistically significant for a substantively
important share of the sample in question. Graph a. comes from the results of Model
13, which includes all of the countries and b. comes from Model 17, which excludes
the outliers.
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Note:  Histograms display seat share distribution in percent and should be evaluated using the second Y−axis
All results use 90% confidence intervals
The most noticeable difference between the two graphs is that when we allow the
outliers to remain in the sample, the marginal effect of party institutionalization is
decreasing with increases in the seat share variable, but when we take into account the
presence of outlying observations, the slope of the marginal effect becomes positive
and the results become more supportive of the theory. Focusing for the moment on
Graph b., notice that at low values of the modifying variable, party institutionaliza-
tion is an insignificant predictor of total factor productivity levels, evidenced by the
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fact that the confidence intervals fall on either side of the 0 horizontal line. This is
consistent with the argument that where party deputies do not expect their party to
control a sizable share of future governments when they become party leaders, they
have little interest in pursuing technological development since they will be unable to
reap the political rewards from those policies. When party members begin to expect
to control a larger share of future governments, the effect of party institutionalization
becomes more positive and statistically significant since both confidence intervals rise
above the 0 line. This too, is consistent with the theory and is evidence that the de-
gree to which party members care about technological development is correlated with
expectations of being able to claim credit for the policies’ benefits in the future. Fi-
nally, Graph b. shows a result consistent with that uncovered in Chapter 3—namely
that at very high levels of the seat share variable, party institutionalization is also
statistically insignificant. This results from the fewer cases at higher values of the
modifying variable as we can see with the underlying histogram. Graph a., however,
does not support the theory. Here we see that the effect of party institutionalization
is greatest at low levels of the modifying variable.
While the results here are marginally supportive, the results from the 1981-1990
panel do not support the theory at all. The marginal effect graph is presented in
Figure 4.8.13 Here, the slope of the line is positive as we expect; the effect of party
institutionalization on TFP is increasing with the seat share variable. However, there
is no range of the modifying variable where institutionalization obtains statistical
significance. Hence, we are forced to conclude that there is no support for the theory
using this sample.14
13The coefficient estimates are suppressed here to preserve space. Results available from the
author.
14This model does not exclude outliers. Ukraine is not included in this sample at all and the
Jamaica observation in this sample is not an outlier.
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The results from the pooled model reflect those from the 1991-2000 sample. Post-
estimation tests and graphs show that Ukraine and Jamaica are outliers and once
again the choice to include or exclude them is not innocuous. The relevant marginal
effect graphs are presented in Figure 4.9. In graph a., which includes the offending
countries, the marginal effect of institutionalization is decreasing. When we exclude
the outliers, in the graph to the right in the figure, the slope is increasing. As
we saw using only the 1991-2000 panel, the marginal effect is insignificant at very
low values of the modifying variable, becomes significant as the seat share variables
becomes larger and then becomes statistically insignificant at very high values of the
modifying variable.
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4.3 Conclusion
The fact that the conceptual dependent variable of the dissertation—the premiums
governments place on technological development—is unobserved means that we can
have confidence in the theory only if we use a set of variables that act as measures
for that concept, each of which captures a different aspect of the conceptual variable.
Consistent results across a variety of measures instills greater confidence in the the-
ory. Chapter 3 began the empirical investigation, focusing its attention on human
capital and the current chapter turned its attention to the efficiency of inputs to
production, or TFP. The main benefit of using TFP is that it is an outcome measure
that frees us from having to make troublesome assumptions regarding what policies
governments will use to catalyze technological progress and the political intentions
behind government policies, such as R&D subsidies and grants.
That said, the results of the TFP models are decidedly mixed and ultimately
weaken our confidence in the theory’s accuracy. In the models estimating an uncon-
ditional effect of institutionalization, there is robust support for the theory when we
use the 1991-2000 time period, but the results of the 1981-1990 panel reject the the-
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ory outright. Accordingly, when we pool the samples the results are in the predicted
direction and the p-value is small, but still too large for standard levels of confidence
(p = 0.121). The difference between the two panels’ results are due to their different
samples and the within panel variation in the institutionalization measure and, while
our results are strongest where we have the most variation and weakest in the panel
that provides the fewest observations with sufficiently young, fragile ruling parties,
the fact that the theory does not have support over various time periods weakens our
confidence in it.
The results from the conditional model further undermine the theory. The sup-
portive results depend entirely on the exclusion of two outlying cases, Ukraine and
Jamaica. While these two cases are indeed influential outliers according to post-
estimation tests and graphs, there is no theoretical reason to exclude these cases from
the sample. When included in the model, the relevant coefficients have the wrong sign
and show a significant effect of institutionalization at a range we would not expect if
the theory were accurate. These results seem quite damaging to the theory.
What can explain the weak results? I offer a couple of suggestions here, each
of which will receive more development in Chapter 5. First, if we assume for the
moment that these measures are good ones, then we must conclude that the theory is
inaccurate, or at the very least, party institutionalization is not a first-order concern
when it comes to understanding variation in TFP and that other factors, perhaps
economic in nature, are more important and trump political considerations.
But before we reach this conclusion, it may be the case that the measures used
here obscure more than they reveal. First, for all of its usefulness, TFP is not a perfect
measure of the premium governments place on technological progress. After all, it is
a residual in an accounting identity and anything that affects GDP levels that is not
the capital stock or the stock of human-capital augmented labor is included within it.
Economies of scale, cost-reductions, and even geography are just a few of the factors
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that might be included in the residual. The fact that TFP is a residual means all
of the other things that affect output and output growth make it a noisy proxy for
the premiums governments place on technological progress. Second, the seat share
modifying variable is also a noisy measure of expectations of future government control
and this too may be a reason for the unsupportive results. Chapter 5 addresses these





5.1 Summary of the Theory
Understanding why countries vary in their levels of wealth and rates of income growth
has long had a prominent role in comparative political economy and every indication
points to this continuing in the future. Since Solow’s seminal papers in the mid-
1950s, a central challenge for students of economic development is to explain the pace
of technological progress. Most of the extant literature gives attention to economic
competition, but scholars are beginning to place more focus on political factors such
as policy credibility, constraints on government predation, and public policy. This dis-
sertation is situated within this politics-oriented literature and focuses on explaining
when and why governments deploy the kinds of policies thought to catalyze inno-
vation and technology adoption. This concentration on policymaking is motivated
by the literature showing that market failures, financial costs, and risks all act as
hindrances to technological progress, but their effects can be reduced by government
policies.
The motivation of the project is this: given the current state of knowledge of poli-
tics and economics, we would expect that governments would always and everywhere
eschew precisely the kinds of policies designed to facilitate technological progress. The
problem is one of incompatible time horizons. In democracies, politicians’ horizons
are determined by the electoral calendar and are far shorter than the horizons needed
to value the delayed returns of technology policy. When this inherent incompatibility
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is combined with the fact that leaders interested in creating growth can also follow a
strategy that produces more immediate economic returns, it would seem that politi-
cians should have little interest in deploying technology policies. The puzzle is that,
even in light of the seeming horizon incompatibility, there can be little doubt that
governments do deploy policies designed to stimulate technological progress. How can
we explain this?
To answer this question, I proposed a model that began by illuminating the costs
and benefits of the short-term “accumulation” growth strategy and the longer-term
“technology” strategy and then proceeded to address how politics shapes how govern-
ments prioritize these two strategies. I argued of a relationship between the nature
of a country’s dominant political parties and the premium governments place on the
technology stratgy. The argument can be summarized as follows. Cohorts within
an overlapping generations (OLG) party conflict over the distribution of costs and
benefits of economic policy. An older generation of “party leaders” expects to leave
the political arena shortly and consequently, places no value on policies with delayed
returns. They prefer instead to emphasize the short-term growth strategy that has
more immediate returns and delayed costs. This preference conflicts with those of the
party’s cohort of “deputies”, the members that expect to be involved in politics for
some time to come. Deputies want a policy regime that promises to retain sufficient
policy flexibility so that they can manipulate the economy to their advantage in fu-
ture periods. This cohort recognizes that the short-term growth strategy constitutes
an implicit burden-sharing scheme that reifies leaders’ utilities at the expense of their
own since the short-term strategy suffers from political and economic diminishing
returns, which constrain leaders’ abilities to manipulate the economy in a politically
advantageous way. Since these constraints to the accumulation strategy arrive with
a delay, time t’s deputies are concerned that they will be the politicians most likely
exposed to those constraints while time t’s leaders will have exited the political scene
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long before these costs arrive.
To assess how the generational conflict could be resolved, I drew from the litera-
ture on OLG organizations like the firm, and proposed a bargain that involves inter-
generational utility transfers. In the solution, deputies offer to strengthen leaders’
agenda-setting and seniority powers by credibly committing to backing the leaders’
non-growth-related policy agenda if, in return, those leaders commit to an economic
regime that places a greater premium on technology policy. Deputies also offer to
forgo bargaining over the the distribution of the pork elements of whatever technol-
ogy policies leaders initiate, instead leaving the distribution entirely to the leaders.
Leaders can then use their seniority powers and control of the distribution of pork to
offset the costs they pay by deploying long-term growth policies that has returns they
cannot use. Thus, should the bargain hold, technology policy can be understood as
an output of an intra-party, inter-generational burden-sharing arrangement.
The central hypothesis from the model is that the nature of a country’s ruling
parties will determine the premium technology policy receives. For the bargain to
exist, a party needs a cohort of members that have an incentive to care about the
future as this relatively more forward looking cohort makes the proposal. Such a
cohort will exist only when parties recruit new members and the party is sufficiently
institutionalized such that the new recruits can have reasonable expectations of hav-
ing long political careers by leveraging the party’s organizational structure and label.
Subject to winning the most immediate election, deputies in this party have an in-
centive to consider what kinds of policies will extend their political career beyond the
immediate election.
Leaders in fragile and short-lived parties, by contrast, might be unable or unin-
terested in recruiting new members, allowing leaders’ preferences for the short-term
strategy to go uncontested. Even if the party does recruit successfully, however,
deputies will not have incentives to be forward-looking since they do not expect to
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be able to rely on the party continuing to exist over time and help them win future
elections. The party’s fragility leaves much uncertainty regarding their future polit-
ical prospects and under these circumstances, there are few reasons to value policies
with delayed benefits, even if those benefits are substantial and allow for sustained
increases in well-being. In short, in non-OLG parties, nobody demands technology
policy. Consequently, countries typically ruled by OLG parties should show evidence
of having a greater premium on technological progress.
Two factors modify the effects of OLG ruling parties. The first is the expecta-
tion deputies in a party have that their party will control a sizable share of future
governments. Today’s deputies must expect that they will rule the government in
the future, not just their party. To value technology policies, deputies must expect
to be able to claim credit for the positive benefits those policies produce, but in the
model, only the party in power when the returns arrive can claim credit for them. If
deputies do not have expectations along these lines, they will not value technology
policy. The second modifying factor is the expected returns to further accumulation.
If deputies expect that the short-term strategy will not tie their hands in the future
period—that is, decreasing returns are a very long way off, as in very capital poor
developing countries—then they have no concerns with the short-term strategy and
will have no reason to press leaders for technology policies.
5.2 Summary of Empirical Results
Chapters 3 and 4 present the statistical tests of the theory. I argued in Chapter
3 that one way to measure the premium politicians place on technology policies is
by examining post-primary education statistics. Human capital is crucial for tech-
nological development and post-primary education policy has the temporal return
structure as that proposed in the theory. Using data on secondary and tertiary ed-
ucation attainment in the population and data on the time since formation of the
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largest government party as the measure of the degree of overlapping-ness, I found
strong and consistent support for the theory. Those findings can be summarized as
follows.
1. Countries governed by long-lived, OLG parties have populations where more
citizens have some secondary and tertiary education. This is as predicted. No-
tably, this effect is not a function of the fact that OLG parties tend to exist in
more stable, long-lived and consolidated democracies as the models control for
the age of the democratic regime. Similarly, the results hold given a battery
of robustness checks for outliers and the inclusion of potentially confounding
variables or the exclusion of variables in the baseline model.
2. The effect of OLG parties is modified by the share of future governments deputy
members expect their party to control. The modifying variable was measured
by a moving average of party i’s past seat share, based on the argument that
the best information a party member has about future prospects is past per-
formance. When deputies do not expect their party to control a large share
of future governments, the marginal effect of the party age variable is not dis-
tinguishable from zero. But as a party’s future prospects improve, OLG par-
ties distinguish themselves from their weakly-institutionalized counterparts. In
short, OLG parties only matter when those parties are also politically viable in
the sense of being an important part of future governments. These results hold
for both secondary and tertiary education attainment models.
3. The effect of parties is modified by the expected to returns to further accumula-
tion. Here, the modifying variable is measured according to investments share
of GDP. I find that, as investment share of GDP increases, indicating a greater
likelihood of a situation in which decreasing returns to further accumulation
will occur, the party age variable is positively and statistically significantly cor-
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related with the human capital variables. At low levels of investment, there is
no effect of the party age variable. These findings are consistent with the claim
that in low investment environments, the returns to accumulation are thought
to be high and so few politicians demand technology policies. These results are
also robust.
5.2.1 OLG Parties and Total Factor Productivity
Chapter 4 continued the empirical investigation, estimating the effects of parties on
total factor productivity (TFP). These results show only limited support for the
theory. In a cross-section of countries between 1991-2000, there is support for the
proposition that countries ruled by OLG parties prioritize technology policy more
than countries ruled by weakly-institutionalized parties. Results from the period
covering 1981-1990 reject the theory, however. Here, the slope is positive as predicted,
but it is not significant stastically. This discrepancy can be explained by the sample
of countries in the two time periods. The 1991-2000 sample is both the largest in
terms of observations and it has the largest variation in the independent variables of
interest. As such, where we have the most countries, we see support for the theory.
This is encouraging, but the lack of robust results tempers our enthusiasm. In neither
sample is there robust support for the hypothesis that the effect of parties is modified
by expectations of future government control.
These weaker results deserve to be taken seriously, but they do not necessarily
undermine the theory. As noted in Chapter 4, TFP is a very noisy measure of
the conceptual dependent variable. TFP is, after all, measured as a residual and it
captures many other factors and combinations of factors not modeled in the theory.
Additionally, the causal chain between policy and TFP is a good deal more complex
than that between government education policy and secondary and tertiary education
attainment. That this complicated causal chain is not modeled explicitly in the
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empirics almost certainly affects the coefficient estimates on the party age variable.
A more sophisticated statistical model may produce more supportive results.
While not all the results are robust, that we find any support for the model is
an improvement over the state of knowledge prior to this dissertation. Given what
we know about politics and economics, we have been hard pressed to understand wy
governments deploy such policies at all. Furthermore, given the theory, the conditions
under which governments deploy technology policies are extremely strict. Consider
the factors that must be properly aligned according to my theory for a ruling party
to set such policies:
1. Parties must be OLG.
2. Deputies must expect that their party will control a sizable share of future
governments.
3. The expected returns to further accumulation must be small.
4. Deputies and leaders must be able to make credible commitments.
5. Deputies must have some ability to sanction leaders should leaders refuse to
accept deputies’ proposal. Additionally, deputies must be able to overcome
problems of collective action to use their sanctioning ability.1
At least five variables must take on particular values for a ruling party to prioritize
technology policies. Should any of these factors not hold, leaders will not initiate
technology policies and what technological progress occurs will be due to reasons
orthogonal to public policy. We would expect that the chances of the five variables
being properly aligned will be uncommon and so it is not too surprising that it is
1To facilitate theory building, I assumed away points 4 and 5 in the theory, but they are certainly
relevant in reality.
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hard to find evidence of an effect of OLG parties. In fact, it should be the case that
technology policy deployment is a rare event. Yet, we do find evidence of a party
effect, the robustness of which seems to depend on the usefulness of the dependent
variables more than the accuracy of the theory itself.
5.3 Theoretical Contributions
Beyond the empirical findings regarding technological progress, this dissertation pro-
vides theoretical contributions to our understanding of political parties by offering
a novel and plausible way to think about intra-party conflicts and their resolution.
Scholars have long recognized that the assumption of parties as unitary actors is one
that is false in many instances and that the heterogeneity that exists within parties
can be useful in understanding various features of political and economic environ-
ment.2 In the existing literature, two kinds of intra-party preference heterogeneity
receive the most attention: heterogeneity produced by variation in the safeness of
legislators’ seats and heterogeneity in legislators’ ideal points on some spatial dimen-
sion. Here, I have presented an altogether different source of intra-party preference
heterogeneity where one’s political generation affects one’s time horizons. In compar-
ative political economy, we typically assume that politicians seek to win and retain
office, but the extreme version of this proposition—that politicians are focused exclu-
sively on winning the most immediate elections, but give no attention to time periods
beyond that—may be too restricting. Whether for “ego rents” or policy positions,
politicians want to retain office for the long haul. For deputies, this certainly means
winning the immediate election, but it also entails establishing an environment one
can use in the effort to continue winning elections over time. As Aldrich (1995) writes,
“[Political] ambition is for a career. To that end, victory in the immediate election is
2That the assumption is not literally true does not mean it cannot be a useful simplifying as-
sumption for modeling exercises.
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crucial, for any defeat greatly reduces the prospects for a long areer. So too, however,
are the prospects for continued election crticial.” (54). The key source of preference
heterogeneity is the potential for a career that extends well into the future and how
that potential differs between political generations. Leaders will look less far into the
future than deputies will and their preferences over policy will differ accordingly.
This discussion of another basis for intra-party conflict is a valuable proposition,
but so too is the offered resolution to it. To my knowledge, the argument that
increased seniority and agenda-setting powers constitutes one part of the solution
is novel. Other solutions to the conflict exist as well, but the possibility that the
seniority institution is maintained by an ongoing inter-generational bargain is a new
approach and a proposition that may be worth studying and testing further.
5.3.1 Further Implications
I conclude the dissertation with a brief discussion of how these theoretical contribu-
tions can be used to understand other issue areas besides technology policy. Consider
the question of how governments remain credible in the presence of incentives to ex-
ploit foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is a vital source of capital and technology
and countries compete vigorously to lure FDI, usually by offering potential investors
tax incentives. Owners of capital, however, demand policy credibility from politi-
cians. Capital owners know that politicians in the host country have incentives to
take advantage of FDI’s substantial irreversibilities and the fact that investors are at a
weaker bargaining position relative to the host country’s government once a plant has
been constructed. Politicians may be tempted to renege on their tax policy promises
and raise taxes to increase state revenues.
Under what conditions will politicians keep their promises? An OLG model of
parties can help answer this question. Reneging on promises sullies the party’s repu-
tation with owners of capital and in the future, potential investors will go elsewhere.
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In an OLG model of parties, where political survival depends at least in part on
the rate of economic growth and where party reputations for credibility endure over
time, reneging on policy promises disproportionately hurts party deputies who, when
they become party leaders (and, subject to electoral context, perhaps government
leaders) will have to find ways to attract FDI to stimulate growth absent credibility
with investors. Deputies in this model have an incentive to persuade party leaders
to commit credibly to their tax policy promises and maintain the party’s credibility.
One solution is an inter-generational utility transfer that amounts to at least the
size that leaders would obtain by reneging. Such a bargain will not occur in fragile,
weakly-institutionalized, non-OLG parties, where members have few reasons to plan
for the future and so are less concerned about their and their party’s reputations over
time. Non-OLG parties will act instead like Olson’s (2000) “roving bandits” that will
renege on their promises to gain immediate rents.3
Whether this or other applications receive support remains to be seen. And should
the hypothesized correlations show up in the data, however, we would still need to
probe deeper into the empirical record to know whether the mechanisms posited in
the theory (i.e., inter-generational transfers) are the cause of that correlation. Case
studies will be useful in this regard and in future research, I hope to show evidence
that I have specified the mechanisms correctly. In any case, we would do well to
consider the generational conflicts that exist within parties, how they are resolved,
and the implications these processes have on policymaking and an array of other
phenomena of interest to political scientists.
3Following Nooruddin (2003), we may be able to use a somewhat similar logic to reach the
conclusion that a relationship between OLG parties and growth rate volatility should exist as well.
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